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Members of the San Francisco Bay Area collective who have labored over this issue are: Jens Christiansen, Les Guliasi, Jim Hawley, Paul Johnston, Sheryl Lutjens, Patricia Morgan, Brian Murphy, Chuck Noble, Patrick O'Donnell, Anno Saxenian, Alan Wolfe and visiting member, Paolo Palazzi.

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DEDICATION

Margaret A. Fay
1944-1979

This issue of *Kapitalistate* is dedicated to Margaret Fay. Before her death last June near Starnberg, Germany, Margaret had been a member of the *Kapitalistate* network for over six years. Her intelligence, lively personality, and contribution to state theory will all be missed; but most of all we feel the loss of a dear and gentle friend.

As one of the original members of the San Francisco Bay Area *Kapitalistate* group, her primary interest in the quality of the journal bespoke a standard for excellence she imposed most severely on herself. A rigorous scholar, Margaret's work on the state, her most recent studies of the early Marx, and her writings in this journal all give evidence to this. Her commitment to a socialist transformation of the capitalist system was anchored in building and extending our knowledge of Marxist theory. To this end she dedicated her life.

Margaret always left impressions. Whether she was tending bar at the local Irish pub here in Berkeley, teaching a dynamic introductory Marxist course at the East Bay Socialist School, or engaging in theoretical debate with friends and colleagues, her energetic presence left its mark. Margaret never merely did a task. She threw herself into things with a vengeance that often left others breathless.

To those of us who know her, Margaret will be remembered for other things as well. We will recall her impish and sparkling humor, her boundless energy, her unqualified hospitality, and her simple generosity. For all her vitality, Margaret was unafraid to show her own neediness, vulnerability, or fears. She possessed the strength and willingness, however, to help friends over the rough spots in their own lives.

The personal and the political were always inextricably woven into the fabric of Margaret Fay's life. Her commitment to building a strong theory of the state and to the *Kapitalistate* collective never waned. We hope that this dedication will help acknowledge our debt to a dear friend and brilliant colleague.

Introduction

From its inception, *Kapitalistate* has been dedicated to developing an analysis of the role of the state. The journal is founded on the premises that we live in a world where the state plays a crucial part in the functioning of all contemporary societies, and that in the struggle for socialism battles around the state sector will be vitally important. More specifically, the journal assumes that, for socialists in the capitalist nations to have an effective strategy, they must have a theory of the capitalist state. These premises have been behind the work publishied in the earlier issues of the journal. And they continue to inspire our work.

In the present issue, one particular problem in state theory has emerged as our central theme: What is the significance of *democracy* in the struggle for socialism? The question of democracy, of course, has not appeared out of the sky. Socialists, from Marx's time to the present, have considered democracy a central goal of the class struggle. Democracy lies at the moral and philosophical, as well as the political, foundations of all socialist visions of the world. Certain contemporary developments, however, have brought the question of democracy to the fore.

For one thing, the commitment of the European communist parties to pursue a "democratic road to socialism" raises many questions about democracy. There has been a great deal of debate over the implications for left parties of accepting traditional bourgeois democratic practices, such as an electoral strategy and parliamentary representation. In addition, profound questions about the extent and nature of democratization *within* socialist organizations have been raised, and demand answers. Still another set of questions about democracy have been posed by the emergence of numerous popular movements in the advanced capitalist countries in recent times. These movements, which have included movements of feminists, environmentalists, and welfare recipients, are certainly democratic; however, their relation to traditional movements of the working class and their role in the overall struggle towards a democratic socialism are not yet clear. (For one view on this topic, see James O'Connor, "The Democratic Movement in the United States," *Kapitalistate,* Issue Number 7.) Finally, questions about democracy have been raised as a result of the culture and political practices of existing socialist regimes. Critics, who consider themselves dedicated socialists, have argued that the weakness or absence of democracy in many nominally socialist nations renders those regimes

fundamentally defective. So the following question arises: While it is certainly true that no real democracy is possible without socialism, is it not equally true that no real socialism is possible without democracy? This, in turn, raises the even more fundamental question: What is meant by "democracy"?

The question of democracy is an exceedingly important one for everyone on the left. It is also an exceedingly difficult one to answer. We in the Bay Area *Kapitalistate* collective, prompted in part by James O'Connor's article in the last issue, have been trying for the past year to get a handle on this vexing subject. Several of the essays in the current issue represent our thoughts about democracy. While these essays obviously do not provide any definitive answers, we hope that they can contribute to what will certainly be an ongoing debate among people on the left. We invite readers working on the question of democracy to contact us and to send us their ideas.

* * * * *

The lead article in this issue is "Democracy in Disarray" by M. Brian Murphy and Alan Wolfe. This essay explores the fate of bourgeois democratic institutions in the present period. The authors argue that, in the face of mounting economic adversity, the state is likely to take an increasingly authoritarian direction. In this situation, the need for popular resistance is growing even stronger. The authors offer a rather pessimistic assessment of the prospects for using traditional electoral measures to achieve democratic ends. And they attempt to outline what a genuine democratic movement might look like. The article is broad in its sweep, disturbing in its analysis, and challenging in its conclusions.

The second article published here is Paul Johnston's "Democracy, Public Work, and Labor Strategy." This essay focuses on a specific, but crucial, aspect of the current democratic struggle: public workers unions' fight to defend themselves from the widespread attacks on the public sector. Johnston takes the provocative position that old-style labor strategies, based on the economic strike, are inappropriate and even self-destructive for public sector unions today. Public sector unions must develop a new, more flexible strategy, which may be termed the "political strike." To illustrate how the political strike works, Johnston describes the successful San Francisco Housing Authority strike of 1979. As that case demonstrates, the political strike entails makng demands for more democratically organized public agencies; it involves building a broad organization of participatory rank and file leadership; it brings together workers from diverse strata of the public workforce (e.g., "professionals," "skilled crafts," and "second class workers"); and finally it involves building new alliances between public workers and groups in the community. Thus the political strike not only emerges as a viable strategy for public workers themselves, but also draws those workers into a broader movement for the democratization of society.

The third essay in this issue is Zillah Eisenstein's "The State, the Patriarchal Family, and Working Mothers." Though this essay does not directly address the question of democracy, it may go to the heart of the whole issue by looking at two of the most undemocratic places in our society, especially for women: the home and the workplace. The purposes of Eisenstein's article are to clarify what is at stake in the current discussions of the "crisis" of the family, and what must be understood if existing power relations are to be changed to promote the interests of women and a more just society. Eisenstein traces the history of patriarchy; she shows how this system of domination has changed in the course of capitalist development; and she analyzes its most recent forms. An important feature of the current situation, according to Eisenstein, is that a series of conflicts have emerged between the priorities of patriarchy (e.g., for mothering) and those of capitalism (e.g., for workers). These conflicts are most forcefully experienced by working mothers, who are undergoing changes as they enter the labor force while continuing to suffer from patriarchal domination at home and at work. The task of reconciling the conflicting needs of maintaining patriarchy and promoting capitalist interests has in large part fallen on the state. This has proven a difficult, if not impossible, responsibility—which helps explain the state's present contradictory politics and policies around the family, women's rights, and other related issues. In sum, Eisenstein's analysis provides a valuable basis for understanding the roots of the current politics of the family and women's labor force participation; in addition, her essay provides an important set of insights into the nature of the modern capitalist state.

We in the Bay Area *Kapitalistate* collective have long felt that feminist analysis has an essential contribution to make to state theory. We have also been aware that much of our own previous work has suffered from failing to absorb the lessons of the women's movement and feminist research. We, therefore, are pleased in this issue to be able to publish Zillah Eisenstein's important article and also to hear from others doing related work. (See the "Note on Women's Work and the Capitalist State" from the Santa Cruz Collective published at the end of this volume.) We welcome comments and contributions from people doing work in this area.

The fourth essay in this issue is "Planning, Austerity, and the Democratic Prospect" by Dudley Burton and M. Brian Murphy. This article explores an important problem which anyone concerned about the prospects for democracy in advanced capitalist societies must confront: How can the process of planning, which is assuming an ever-increasing role in contemporary societies, be reconciled with the claims

of democracy? The authors provide a powerful critique of prevailing planning practices. They show that, while planning was originally advocated as a way of serving the "public interest," it has generally done precisely the opposite: it has participated in the state's serving of the corporate world, and has helped perpetuate racial and class divisions. The authors argue that, to rescue planning from its subservience to corporate capitalism, critically oriented planners must derive from, and inform, emergent movements involved in workers' control, massive resistance, state enterprise, appropriate technology, and other similar areas. Moreover, planning must be linked to a broader movement which revitalizes a culture of democracy and freedom. Like Johnston's analysis of the public workers' movement, Burton and Murphy's interpretation of planning sees the seeds of a democratic future latent in the concrete struggles which abound today. Both these essays, as well as parts of Eisenstein's article, give substance to the general overview on democracy presented in the opening essay in this issue.

The final article in this volume is Ronald H. Chilcote's "Perspectives of Class and Political Struggle in the Portuguese Capitalist State." Chilcote applies several prominent theories of the state to the recent developments in Portugal. He finds that, while each of these theories offers insights into the political and class struggle taking place there, no single theory is altogether satisfactory. Chilcote's analysis also offers some insights into the obstacles faced by the Portuguese left in bringing about a transition to socialism. These obstacles have included a lack of historical experience of class struggle, the effects of nearly half a century of repressive dictatorship, adverse economic and political conditions, splits within the coalition of left forces, and the resilience of the Portuguese state. To this list one could certainly add the impact of an unfavorable international political environment. In sum, Chilcote provides a useful background to the most recent developments in Portugal, which continue to be adverse to the left; and, more broadly, his case study offers sobering lessons for both state theory and political practice.

* * * * *

As in the past, this issue of *Kapitalistate* contains a series of reviews of books which may be of interest to those concerned about state theory. This time our reviewers have looked at Gough's work on the welfare state, Cassano's analysis of the Italian Demochristian Party, Von Braunmühl's research on the bourgeois state viewed in a world market context, and Trimberger's interpretation of revolutions from above. For forthcoming issues, readers are invited to submit reviews of books which they think ought to be brought to public attention.

* * * * *

At the end of the previous issue (Number 7), the *Kapitalistate* collective mentioned that it was considering producing a volume on "The State in the Third World." For a variety of reasons, this project has not proven feasible at the present time. The need for work on the subject, however, remains obvious, as events in the past year in the Middle East, Latin America, Africa, Southeast Asia, and elsewhere attest. Hence, although we do not plan to devote an entire issue to the topic, individual articles on the state in the Third World will be considered and published if appropriate.

* * * * *

Finally, the Bay Area *Kapitalistate* collective felt that we should conclude by noting the passing this year of two persons to whom we are deeply indebted: Herbert Marcuse and Nicos Poulantzas. We would like to say a few words about what these individuals meant to us, knowing that many others will share our feelings and sense of loss.

Herbert Marcuse had a truly profound influence on our lives and the lives of our whole generation. He was, as so often noted, the philosopher of the radical movements of the 1960s in which so many of us first developed our political consciousness and commitments. Where we had feelings born out of struggle, he provided us with a language and a vision. He gave us a critical way of looking at the world. And he developed a philosophy of rebellion which spoke to the needs and aspirations of oppressed peoples everywhere. Moreover, as we grew to greater political and intellectual maturity, we found that Marcuse had gotten there ahead of us and had prepared the way. He had done pathbreaking work on Marxism and revolutionary theory. He had understood the need to integrate a radical political-economic vision with a new psychology. He appreciated the importance of culture in the process of human liberation. In these, and so many other ways, Herbert Marcuse was a person whose contributions we shall never forget. We will miss him deeply.

We shall also sorely miss Nicos Poulantzas, a pioneer in the field of state theory. His work was an inspiration for all of us. In a short period of time, Poulantzas produced a series of major works which contributed enormously to our collective understanding of the political processes of advanced capitalist countries. Poulantzas always set extraordinarily high standards for rigor and sophistication, and was indisputably one of the leading theoreticians of our times. Yet, throughout his writings, his deep commitment to political practice and the struggle for socialism always shone through.

Beyond question, Marcuse and Poulantzas both shared a remarkable gift for intellectual achievement. What made them so special was that they used their extraordinary talents in the service of realizing a

better future for all, especially the oppressed people of the world. We are fortunate to have known, and learned from, such men.

Democracy in Disarray

M. Brian Murphy and Alan Wolfe

I. *Introduction*

An accumulation crisis, energy shortages, declining hegemony, fiscal difficulties and growing right-wing sentiment all raise questions about the future of bourgeois democracy. And in so doing, they raise questions as well about genuine democracy, about the transition to a socialist society and about what forms of democracy accompany it. Ruling class and left-wing parties, challenger and challenged, are rethinking what democracy means to them.

The crisis of bourgeois political institutions has already been extensively discussed. Rather than a single snapping of the twig, there has been instead a slow transformation within existing institutions, an erosion of older forms of public power and the claims that supported it. For example, the electoral system fails to engage the people and seems increasingly irrelevant. Larger numbers of citizens refuse to vote and withhold allegiance from the traditional parties. (Jimmy Carter was elected president in 1978 by 28% of the eligible voters in the United States.) This withdrawal from the electoral system, combined with increased dissatisfaction with the quality of public life, is matched by a steady increase in the power of the executive, the centralization of power of wider areas of public policy, the closer coordination of central governments with the needs and moves of international capital, the development of new forms of bureaucratic control over social and economic planning, and other examples of the domination of administration over politics. The entire apparatus of pluralist electoral democracy is in disarray, as the administrative state becomes more powerful

**We are grateful to the Bay Area Kapitalistate group for their continued criticism and discussion throughout the preparation of this piece; we thank everyone for the quite substantial conversation as well as the insistence that we continue to continually rewrite. Thanks especially to Jens Christiansen, Les Guliasi, Lenny Goldberg, Jim Hawley, Paul Johnston, Sheryl Lutjens, Patricia Morgan, Patrick O'Donnell, Paolo Palazzi and AnnaLee Saxenian; also to Jim O'Connor and Dudley Burton.

while even the more ritualized and meaningless forms of public participation atrophy.

The response to the breakdown of bourgeois political institutions is simultaneously contradictory and consistent. One the one hand, advocates of planning and managerialism make claims for centralized state power, while on the other hand pleas for laissez-faire and a return to the market increase their credibility. Both moves ratify the increased power of monopoly capital, further insulating that power from political challenge. Despite the radical differences between centralization and reprivatization, however, both are similar responses to the crisis, for both imply the removal of public issues from popular, democratic debate, removing them on the one hand into centralized public bureaucracies and on the other into centralized private bureaucracies. Just as Carter can call in the same speech for an energy board with the power to cut through "red tape" *and* for the decontrol of oil prices, state corporatism and laissez-faire imply an attack on democracy as we have come to recognize it: the process of making policy through the give and take of private interests exercising public powers. At one time, conservative scholars emphasized that popular movements had to be controlled so that liberal pluralism could flourish. Now the dominant position is that even liberal pluralism needs to be controlled so that accumulation can take place. Once the potential for democracy was a threat to advanced capitalism. Now even the modified and tamed forms of public participation seem incompatible with accumulation as usual.

Democracy, then, comes under attack both on an institutional and ideological level—never directly, seldom by name, but through a critique of the institutions that have given it meaning in the bourgeois epoch. The crisis, at this time, is one of bourgeois democracy—of a system of liberal freedoms, individual rights, and electoral politics. Such a crisis does not mean an end to all democratic politics or an erosion of all democratic claims, and it may be the occasion for the emergence of other forms of democracy—or, conversely, of more authoritarian forms. In any event, these transformations compel an examination of what is meant by democracy and its relationship to both the existing order and potential new ones. An examination, however tentative, of the following questions seems in order: the relationship of bourgeois democracy and capitalist economic growth; the relationship between popular struggles and electoral struggles; the relationship between democracy and social class; and the differences between political and economic democracy.

II. *Democracy Without Growth*

Capitalism has always had an ambivalent relationship to its most favored political regime of bourgeois democracy. Early capitalist revolutions took place under extremely undemocratic political conditions, yet capitalism required the nominal freedoms of liberalism in order to mobilize free labor. But the bourgeois revolution, at the same time, was more than a requirement of capital but was also the demand for individual liberation from the Church, Absolutism, and the late feudal social order. Nonetheless, the eventual correspondence between bourgeois democracy and capitalism was late in coming. Great Britain did not become a formal democracy until after World War I; America saw no reason to translate nominal freedom into political freedom for women until well into the twentieth century. In the broadest terms, bourgeois democracy came to capitalism only when working people demanded legal access to the state. In that sense, for all its obvious limitations and illusions, formal democratic mechanisms do represent the struggle by the excluded to have some form of political power, to exercise sovereignty. Bourgeois democracy was formed through struggle, ironically rooted in the demand of a kind of sovereignty that the economy was systematically organized against.

But the dynamics of that struggle were confused, contradictory, often self-defeating. In all of the capitalist democracies the working classes came to a formal political majority through a complex battle in both economic and political arenas. In some cases the two struggles were united—especially in Europe—as working class parties were allied with trade unions and socialist organizations. In the United States the struggle over economic concerns was seldom explicitly tied to a particular political party until the Democratic party successfully forged an alliance with the most conventional and least radical wing of organized labor. This alliance followed two decades of intense anti-communism within the trade-union movement and was itself followed by the consolidation of non-communist leadership in the major unions.

In both the United States and Europe, the inclusion of the working class in the democratic process of electoral politics tended to absorb the political energy of that class, as it offered only the formality of represented participation in the management of the Capitalist order. For those factions of the working class which were well-organized and mobilized into the coalition of power there was a massive exchange of passivity for prosperity. So long as the organized working class was content to receive the blessings of growth—consumer goods, social and geographic mobility within the working class—it accepted a narrow meaning of its membership in the political community. Citizenship no longer had its classical connotation of public action and direct participa-

tion—it did not imply a personal engagement in public affairs. Even less did the modern conception of citizenship mean defining the direction and rules of the accumulation of capital. The realm of "politics" became a realm of brokered conflict over differential benefits within capitalism. And democracy was redefined to mean the orchestrated encounters of interest group pluralism; something was democratic to the degree that it represented the agreement of organized interest groups over questions of public policy. The extension of democracy was thus seen as an extension of the groups that were allowed to participate in the negotiations. The price paid for participation was demobilization.

But this exchange itself became the occasion for popular struggle among those parts of the working class excluded from the prosperity. During the late fifties and sixties those who were not mobilized into demobilization began to demand access to pluralism: Blacks, Hispanics, Woman, Rural workers, the urban poor—all brought their struggles first to, and then into the dominant parties. To the degree those demands could be met (and transformed) through the processes of pluralist negotiation, they were admitted into the "democratic" arena. Where they could not be, or where their demands were too close to a critique of the system itself, overt repression replaced a negotiated admission. Increased welfare dollars and the War on Poverty joined the attack on the Black Panthers and the Left. This repression of overtly (or suspected) radical demands and forces went hand-in-hand with the vision that democracy had come to mean brokered participation in Capitalist expansion. The ideological conviction that the system could provide legitimated both repression and struggles for access. Capital could do legal battle over relative shares with those wanting admission to the brokering, and join with its nominal antagonists to crush those who threatened the process itself. The conservative alliance between parts of Capital and the AFL/CIO during the Vietnam period was perhaps the saddest recent example of this.

The entire edifice of 20th-century bourgeois democracy embodies, then, a complex history of repression and compromise. Compromise was made possible for some insofar as it was not made possible for all, and the struggles among factions of the working class were often as significant as the encounter between labor and capital. The result was a formally democratic order of electoral politics which—in every Western Capitalist state—brought parts of the working class into the state via conventional parties. The past thirty years were marked by the rise to power of social-democratic parties committed to expanded growth and an interventionist state which nominally served both capital and fractions of organized labor. Even in the United States, the Democratic Party, through its support of high military budgets combined with increased social welfare expenditures, took on some of the characteristics of social democracy. Working class parties were in many ways the ideal vehicle for this period. Their relationship to the state made them more effective representatives of economic growth than conservative coalitions worried about inflation. Their base in the working class gave them the legitimacy to impose political passivity on their primary constituents. Their mediating role between labor and capital meant that they could promote policies of benefit to the latter while pursuing an electoral strategy oriented to the former. Social democracy in power depended upon economic growth, fostered it and fought for it.

One of the consequences of the brokered relationship between passivity and prosperity was the expansion of the public sector. State activity was needed for the growth coalition to reproduce itself, while at the same time the state was forced to intercede in those arenas outside the growth coalition—the unemployed, the cities of poverty and racism—as the excluded demanded more from the expanding economy. Welfare expenses joined massive investments in armaments, infrastructure, research and a myriad of other social investments. Expanded accumulation was accompanied by, and reciprocally financed by, the state. The symbiotic relationship between an expanding economy and an expanding state provided the ground for what became a greater emphasis on managerialism and planning on the one hand and the consultation of interest groups in policymaking on the other. That is, the state increasingly became a manager of social life just as it was devolving upon private interests its authority in the interest of winning their compliance to its decisions.

As the state expanded, so did its power and its tendency to rely on bureaucratic decisions making, giving rise to wider and more detailed attempts at social planning. (At the same time, however, the power of interest groups in the broker state undermined its ability to plan for the whole society and injected considerations of power and politics into formally neutral bureaucratic processes.) An ideology of managerialism developed, but it was one limited by the inability of managers to manage. Nonetheless, the emergence of experts who ruled through their command over arcane forms of knowledge and information had implications for democratic rule. The alleged complexity of the institutional world, combined with scientistic interpretations of that complexity tended to legitimate the further inaccessibility of the public issues from the public. The managerial ideology offered its own vision of democracy, one long familiar to bourgeois social scientists. It was a passive vision: people realize their democratic potential by allowing experts to design a society that will yield to them the benefits of prosperity.

Managerial ideologies have run into numerous problems as the wave of post-war (post Vietnam war, this time), economic growth ground to a

halt. The managers find themselves unable to manage, partly because as public monies have contracted, those groups who have been mobilized through the state come into conflict with one another and with the state. Far from being easily managed institutions of bureaucratic order, many arenas of public policy are tangled webs of local power, competing interests, contradictory claims. The failure of management has become known, derided and ridiculed; as inflation, recession, energy shortages, prices, and social violence all seem out of control. And at the same time effective brokerage is breaking down, for part of the state's ability to negotiate away discontent was based on a rate of economic growth which made serious class compromise unnecessary. The result of the current recessionary passage is struggle: around social and economic issues, around union structures and policies, and around state agencies and state benefits, people have been organizing in response to the failures of the broker state in practice and managerial ideology in theory. As the relationships between passivity and prosperity break down, the state loses its ability to win adherence to compromises negotiated in the public sector.

One fatality has been the collapse of the growth coalitions of the seventies—witnessed by the debacles faced by social democratic and labor parties in Sweden, Britain, Canada, Israel and elsewhere. Perhaps a more important casuality has been the general acceptance that the traditional order can work at all. But this collapse of the popular acceptance of government is an ambiguous development, for it means either an intensified conflict between social groups and class fractions over the narrowing of the pie (a conflict made all the more harsh because people may no longer believe that the broker state can satisfy all demands) or it could be the occasion for a reexamination of the system of brokered demands as such. Both results are evident in the current period; we will return to this question in a moment when we examine the subject of class struggle.

Within ruling classes, if any class can still be said to rule, the breakdown of the broker state and the managerial ideology has been met by the popularity of laissez-faire and the longing for authoritarian corporatism. Many public figures argue for a return to the market. A resurgence of political power on the part of a sector of business that never believed in corporate liberalism is evident, witnessed by Thatcherism in Britain or by the success of the Business Roundtable in the United States. This flirtation with a non-existent "free market" that currently dominates public policy discourse seems to have emerged from a fantasy-land. Given an advanced capitalist society in which the pursuit of accumulation has become insidiously linked with the role of the state, of what significance can be the maxims of Adam Smith? At one level, the movement toward reprivatization represents a breakdown of

the social contract within the ruling class. The theory of corporate liberalism made sense only so long as accumulation expanded, for that was the condition that persuaded capitalists to sacrifice immediate profit needs for long-term gain. Without the promise of long-term gain, a Hobbesian concern with private interest dominates, and tamer "liberalism" goes out the window. In this sense, the popularity of privatism at the present time is a strategy of reaccumulation, one to be fueled by removing all constraints on business and putting back into the center of capitalist culture a ruthlessness long held to have been transcended. The "soulful" corporation, finally, will be buried.

Hobbes, however, justified not only atomism but also authoritarianism. In this sense an emphasis on corporatist planning does not contradict, and even complements, the reliance on privatization. If one acknowledges that effective power in advanced capitalism—power over jobs, wealth, and hence community—lies in the "private" sector, then to shackle the state is to strengthen power. For all its talk of decentralization and individual choice, free market solutions in an era of advanced capitalism can have no effect other than to strengthen the effective centers of power, if not the nominal ones. In this sense, a close correspondence exists between the "conservative" notions of Milton Friedman and the "liberal" ones of Samuel Huntington: the former, after all, worked for Pinochet and the latter wants to put constraints on capitalism in order to preserve it. Huntington's corporatism is as depoliticized as Friedman's market—it also proposes to insulate further political choices from the people who will be affected by them. Just as laissez-faire theorists want to return to a situation in which groups no longer engage in brokerage function, so the authoritarians want a more directed state that transcends liberal representation. One group wants to narrow the purview of government and the other to expand it, but both seek an exclusion of popular forces and groups from political management.

Our own judgment is that the state will take the authoritarian route, and that experiments in deregulation will be detours on that same path. The deregulation already taking place, such as in airlines, will lead to a resettling of power between the larger industries, a Darwinian shaking down of the least fit, at which point the industry will reregulate itself to correspond to new realities. Deregulation is thus a periodic necessity so that effective state power can be reformed and tightened up. Meanwhile, the ideology of deregulation will be used against less concentrated centers of power to divide them in the face of organized power blocks. Without effective resistance from popular forces, in other words, deregulation can be used to prevent progressive reforms while at the same time insulating major corporations from public purview. The present period is a minor replay of the English Civil War, and out

of it will come not only another Cromwell to restore order, but another Hobbes to justify it.

So much will take place if there is no effective popular resistance. But can such resistance be ignored? Obviously the extent to which emerging authoritarian sentiments can be checked will vary from one country to another. The point to be emphasized before passing on to that question is that we are now about to enter a new period of restrained growth, managed recession, and "austerity" for the many. Advanced capitalist societies are clearly entering a phase in which the arena of brokered negotiation contracts. One result of this contraction could be stronger passivity, imposed through force if need be, including the indirect force that comes from the threat of unemployment on depression. Another possible result is for a revitalization of popular movements as centrist strategies are increasingly exposed as hollow and expensive. The cynicism of working people about the electoral process and about government in general, and the further alienation of poor people and minorities from the older vision of an electoral solution to their situation, make for an extremely volatile set of circumstances. In a context in which bourgeois democratic institutions come under attack from those who have benefited from them, people can move outside them and against them. These moves may be progressive or regressive; our responsibility is to understand why these moves occur and to try and direct them into constructive avenues.

III. *Democracy and Class Struggle*

Marxists have long maintained that bourgeois democracy is an essentially alienated form of politics, a ritualized expression of symbolic popular sovereignty that simply ratifies class rule. We are then troubled when we see Huntington and others argue that capitalism may no longer be able to afford its own most favored regime. Why should the ritualized rights and elections of bourgeois democracy, so stripped of effective meaning, still be troublesome for capitalism? One view is simple: it holds that under the current conditions of accumulation, the institutions of bourgeois democracy are simply in the way. Their cumbersome rituals and symbols slow up and confuse the centralized mechanisms required in the current international context.

There is some truth to this notion, for if legislatures debate plans to imposes charges on corporations for leaving their state, in return for all the benefits given in the past, then formal democracy has become an obstacle to accumulation. Yet more must be added, for bourgeois democracy has been contradictory from the beginning insofar as it always contained an element of popular impulse and struggle. Does this

mean that an electoral strategy for socialist transformation becomes a preferable course, since the electoral process can become a vehicle for the articulation of a broader range of democratic discontents? Some may conclude this, for as the rule of capital tightens, the possible routes of resistance broaden. Yet we want to suggest that these questions of strategy depend on consideration of a number of issues of structure and political action—issues familiar to the left, but which need to be recast in the current passage. And in the process of raising these issues, we want to pose the question of which struggles are progressive in an age of austerity, including the tax revolt and other movements against the state.

A. The first issue to be explored is the relationship between bourgeois democracy and genuine democracy, taking the latter to mean popular sovereignty and the rule of a community undivided by deformities of class. Three different aspects of this issue can be suggested.

First, it is important to examine the relationship between political institutions and class society. We are all familiar with the criticism that the institutions of bourgeois democracy, however "popular" in their structure (i.e., free elections, representative government) fail to generate genuine democracy. The arguments are well known. Formal democratic systems have no effective control over the means and institutions of production and investment. Bourgeois democracy is ruled by a regime of law which fundamentally protects those institutions of private property that create and enforce class rule, and the rules of the game work to effectively limit class alliances. Further, the institutions of bourgeois democracy generate a sense of power, an illusion, rather than the real thing. All this can be accepted as given, yet many questions are begged. Does this criticism mean that these institutions are an integral part of a class society and will disappear when the tyranny of class is abolished? Would a socialist democracy have federalism, parties, elections, checks and balances, an independent judiciary? If not, why not? In other words, we need to clarify the relationship between the maintenance of bourgeois class rule and the political forms it has taken. Our tentative assumption is that what needs to be rejected is the content of class rule, not the form. In other words, once there is a movement to genuine democracy, many problems will remain unsolved, including age-old problems of representation, elections, and pluralism. Socialist transformation, therefore, is not the accomplishment of democracy but the accomplishment of the prerequisites that make democracy possible. A struggle will remain after the struggle is completed.

B. Second, there is a cultural question involved in the relationship between bourgeois democracy and genuine democracy: whether the

institutional practices of bourgeois democracy bear or "teach" a culture of popular sovereignty. That is, does political activity in these institutions—our experiences of political, legal, and bureaucratic procedures—create any sensibility of what popular power would resemble in a future society? One assumption of traditional socialist strategy since the Second International has been the notion that participation in the affairs of the bourgeois state prepares the working class for assuming power. Perhaps it does, but then the question becomes: what kind of power? For recent experiences both with social democracy and with state socialist societies indicate that it is not only the possession of power that matters but the kinds of power that one possesses.

It is our view that popular experience with these forms of alienated power has created a cynicism as strong as it is justifiable. Facing institutions that are alienated, frustrating, isolated, and disheartening, popular feelings toward politics—"That's just politics" "All politicians are crooked" etc—are understandable. What then to make of people's tenacious defense of democracy as a central part of belief and patriotism? On the one hand, this defense is purely ritualistic and ideological, rooted in no experiences of popular or participatory rule. On the other hand, it expresses, ironically, the frustration and anger of people about their actual powerlessness in their social/economic life. As people proclaim the virtue of democracy, they ritualistically reassure themselves of a power that is in fact missing in their daily lives.

What are we to make of a culture so rooted in pure symbolism, so detached from daily experience? It is scary, because people can do horrible and despotic things in the name of democracy of which they have little real experience. It is, ironically, also hopeful, because it does express a deep part of popular culture: the belief in equality and the desire not to be despotically ruled: the fantasy of self-determination.

C. These considerations lead directly into a third issue which is the most troublesome and promising. It may be that the alienation and distance from the state experienced by many men and women who are also committed abstractly to "democracy" will constitute the space in which new forms of genuine democracy can flourish. That is, as the crisis of bourgeois and pluralist institutions intensifies, a new kind of politics in opposition to the rejected politics of liberalism may emerge. The hope that this evokes has been captured in a previous issue of *Kapitalistate* by James O'Connor, whose sense that a "democratic movement" is alive and well in American communities adds an important optimistic note to recent discussions of capitalist crisis.

D. Finally, we need to recognize the difference between those institutions of the nominally democratic government and the bureaucratic and administrative institutions of the State which are neither representative nor electoral. This distinction is at the heart of most recent critiques of the state, and has myriad implications for political analysis and strategy. These "non-democratic" institutions are those most directly encountered by citizens in their daily exchange with the state—encounters ranging from police arrests, small business licencing, environmental regulations, and tax assessments, to welfare supports and regulations, health care, social security, and unemployment. And for a great many citizens, the bureaucratic state is their employer. Far more than the democratic institutions of electoral politics, these are the institutions of "democracy" which most frustrate, alienate, and infuriate the people.

The political implications of this are contradictory. On the one hand, these institutions do not pretend to a directly democratic rationale, and their own bureaucratic logic is hard for people to challenge on democratic grounds. On the other hand, these institutions *have* been the site of some of the most progressive organizing during the past decade. Public opinion organizing, "client" organizing, and outside critiques of administrative prerogative and authority have all made these arenas potentially volatile areas of political movement. This has been especially true at the local level, where union organizing and community mobilization can often join together in strategies of either mass action or electoral reform.

Another implication of this institutional division is harder to assess: are the nominally democratic electoral institutions *less* likely to be the sites of progressive organization? Are movements which expess themselves through the "political" process movements towards a genuine democracy, given how alienating and frustrating politics has become—or how seemingly irrational. Our residence in California makes this question particularly compelling, for California is at one and the same time the home of what seems the most democratic form of participation possible within bourgeois political institutions—the initiative and referendum procedure that date back to the Progressive Era—and one of the most anti-democratic contents imaginable—the passage, by overwhelming margins, of propositions organized and financed by the right with explicitly negative consequences for poor people.

No wonder, under these circumstances, that popular electoral movements seem so contradictory. The Tax Revolt certainly expresses an anger at "big government" and a rage at an inflationary spiral that directly undermines the precarious prosperity of working men and women. It is nascent critique of bureaucracy, of state programs which seem to change nothing, of educational programs that lead nowhere. But, it also has profoundly rascist overtones, and embodies a rage against those most dependent upon the state. The tax revolt can be

reactionary, even if populist, since an assault on government programs can have the result of both intensifying the domination of the most dependent among the population and further centralizing the power of oppressive agencies. As people give their support to follow-ups on Proposition 13—limitations on government spending, constitutional conventions, the abolition of public schools—they can supply democratic legitimation to those elites who desire above all else the freedom to accumulate without regulation and to rule without public scrutiny on the issues that matter most.

It must be concluded, therefore, that not all demands by working people that are expressed through the political process are immediately democratic, nor are all claims by the dispossessed immediately progressive. To say this truism is to take account of democratic self-oppression, the unfortunate fact that people themselves may vote for policies that oppress the very people that vote for them. Indeed, California seems to prove that the most effective forms of reaction are "democratic" ones, that elites can benefit the most when the people, and not themselves, put into practice processes that work to their benefit. Expressed this way, we are saying that without conscious organization from the left, the alienated content of the political process may easily outweigh the democratic form.

At the same time, with an organizing input from the left that can identify non-mystified sources of the fiscal crisis and inflation, the tax revolt could become a progressive assault on the corporate grasp of public policies and monies. If progressive, will it be democratic? That can only be determined by the organizers who build democratic organizations at the local level, who seek to engage local communities in caucus activity and informal discussion, who seek through the tax issues to inform people about larger issues and thus bring them a greater measure of collective power over their lives. Democracy in such a movement will not come from its inclusion in the rational liberal democratic parties or its formal expression through referenda; it will be built by organizers who care that people gain real power.

One conclusion that can be drawn from these thoughts is that radical organizing is most likely to be successful where there is a community that can be organized, and it may be that at this stage, the "democratic" institutions of bourgeois democracy—elections, Congress, etc.—do not offer as positive an opportunity as struggles taking place where people live and work.

An implication of this argument is that electoral politics may be a more appropriate progressive strategy in *local* settings—and that until a more solid base is built through local struggles the democratic politics of state and national elections will remain a dead-end. Our point, in other words, is not an abstract condemnation of electoral strategies, but

a recognition that electoral strategies can be progressive only in those settings where concrete questions of state power can be directly connected to local electoral choices. Or, more importantly, where the relationship between nominally private power and the increased power of the state can be raised. One example of this is in the variety of rent-control initiatives which are springing up around the country. Here is an issue which directly raises class issues, and depends upon an analysis of local forces which has implications for national issues. It is an issue, moreover, which can demonstrate the connection between private corporate and land speculator power and the relationship of the state to that power. The entire question of housing brings out the complex connection between private power and state financing, zoning, and services.

Another example of electoral strategies which can have progressive implications is the wide-spread attempt to decentralize city council representation. Parading under the banner of bringing the government closer to the people, these initiatives have often resulted in far more progressive and responsive candidates and programs. These electoral reforms have allowed progressives to speak more directly to neighborhood constitutents about possible popular control over the non-elected boards and commissions which hold significant local power. In San Jose, California elected progressives have raised serious challenges to the bureaucratic processes of licencing building developments and reviewing police conduct.

Both electoral examples suggest a broader conclusion: that local organizing can integrate questions of power and self-interest. This is extremely problematic, but progressive movements are most often found in public-sector unionizing, where progressive organizers are able to raise truly democratic issues in the midst of union fights for decent wages and working conditions. As argued elsewhere in this issue of *Kapitalistate,* the issues of administrative power over policy, the exclusion of citizens from decisions, and the structure of work and service, can emerge out of the need for unions to examine questions of institutional reorganization as a part of any reasonable strategy during this period of cutbacks and limited spending. The most progressive possibilities here are in the linkage between union struggles and the demands of local communities for better services or supports.

These local struggles are not enough for a national strategy. We are not imagining an utterly localist rebellion for democracy. National organizing will be, ultimately, necessary. But these considerations suggest that in the transitional era we are entering, the most important political issues will involve the definition of democratic claims: whether genuine democracy is more likely to emerge from the "democratic" system or from institutions that are formally defined as outside of

"politics" in bourgeois society. So long as continued economic growth was the reality, pressure from below could be channelled into more of what existed as an alternative to restructuring what did exist. The closing of that option makes class struggle over the form of democracy as crucial as class struggle within any given form. Passivity, voluntarily granted in return for prosperity, cannot be expected to continue much longer now that prosperity is problematic. Some new solution to the tension between class needs and bourgeois democratic forms will have to be discovered.

There has always existed, in advanced capitalist societies, a dual political universe: an arena subject to popular debate and participation with little actual power and an arena with power subject to little actual debate and participation. Under the conditions being described, the gap between these arenas will surely expand. Pressure will be exerted to restrict demands from below into "appropriate" forums and institutions, while at the same time state managers will make attempts to remove crucial aspects of power even further from popular review. If this continues, the left will have to devise strategies to open up unresponsive institutions to popular engagement. It seems safe to predict that the contradiction between the democratic legitimations of the State and the actually unresponsive institutions of actual power—in *both* the economy and the State—will deepen. In such a context the left will have to initiate a struggle for democracy on two fronts: within the State, especially aiming at those institutions of power which are most deeply engaged in the social lives of working people, and in a whole variety of socio-economic institutions. Electoral strategies will have to be built in relationship to these struggles within the non-democratic state and in unions, neighborhoods, and families.

IV. *Some Conluding Considerations*

This analysis suggests that the issues surrounding democracy are still very much alive. The current situation—in which the postwar growth of both prosperity and passivity has run its course—simply does not signify an end to the relationships between them. Rather than rejecting democracy in favor of authoritarianism, ruling elites will first attempt to redefine democracy so that is impact is kept to a minimum. We are likely to see attempts to shrink the size of the state that is responsive to democratic inputs (while expanding the part that is not); an increasing gap between symbolic politics and that part of public policy that is subject to real class pressures; an intensification of political demands within "non-political" institutions like unions; and increased attempts to avoid democratization through international-

ization. So long as these options are available for experimentation, there is no necessary reason for the ruling class to drop their allegiance to bourgeois democracy entirely.

At the same time, the present historical situation makes it necessary for democratic forces to rethink their own stragegy. No longer does it seem sufficient to simply call for an expansion of the public sector at the expense of the private, when so much of the state is undemocratically involved in accumulation. In seems somewhat shortsighted to fight for control of the electoral machinery when even the traditional parties are unable to use it to gain their ends. Restricting oneself to the arena of what bourgeois society calls politics and ignoring the socio-economic arena seems a serious mistake. Finally, simply opposing internationalization without developing a strategy for relating to other struggles for democracy seems self-defeating. Each of these homilies, however, raises major questions for the left as it tries to develop a democratic strategy, and in this paper we have tried to point out what some of them may be. The present period seems one in which it would be foolhardy for the left to reject its movement toward democracy, but it would be equally foolhardy to simply proclaim oneself a democrat without realizing that in the present period over how democracy is defined will be the major political struggle that will take place.

We have already indicated much of the terrain on which this battle will be waged. In conclusion, we want to suggest that the reemergence of the question of democracy forces us to consider a few vexing theoretical questions which Marxists often avoid. One of the fundamental aspects of the Marxist criticism of bourgeois theory and practice is the criticism of the division between public and private, and the institutionalization of that split into the political rights of the citizen and the property rights of the private holder of property. Such a division can be confusing; it often masks both the public effects of private property and the public (or communal, or interdependent) character of all property and production. It ratifies private power behind the veil of private prerogative; it abstracts the "public" into a set of individual rights which protect the fact of private power. One of the implications of this theoretical critique has been the backbone of radical action: you organize where the *real* power lies, where the real social and public life of the individual is—in his or her social-economic life. In this critique, true democracy is social-economic democracy, or popular sovereignty over the means of production.

One implication of this argument has already been mentioned: struggles in the (abstracted) public arena remain futile unless they aim at the real (concrete) "public" arena of production and industrial power. Within this perspective, union struggles for control over production (or over control of the relations of production), have been primary sites for

democratic claims because they are about "real" power. And one of the most significant developments within advanced capitalism has been the emergence of the state as a primary locus of social-production and the major institutional location for struggles over social reproduction. State power is of course far more than military or ideological power; the state is increasingly embedded in all aspects of social and economic power in such a way that the older distinctions of public and private may ironically reverse themselves. The formally abstracted public may be increasingly a substantial form of public (or communal) power.

To raise these issues is to focus on the locus of power in contemporary society, and argue that no effective democracy will be built which is not about power. Abstract forms of representation will not do; elegant rituals of participation about nothing is not real democracy; political engagement must be more than its forms. But there are other considerations here, ones we can only mention in conclusion. If we are to speak of democracy we must speak of power in the hands of men and women, of people who are empowered. That means that the left must do far more than denounce the ritualized and abstract forms of bourgeois democracy, go further than a plea for popular power. We must begin to define the structures of participation and engagement which are really possible in the current political economy. What are, finally and really, the prospects for participatory rule in the current historical passage? Democracy is a political form, a set of institutions, a structure of power, sovereignty, accountability. These forms are rooted in a set of values, commitments, understandings, which in turn emerge from the concrete practices of men and women in the institutions of ruling. What are the prospects for institutions which genuinely afford participatory engagement as the substance of popular rule? If such engagement is the condition of the sensibility of committed generosity and respect we associate with a democratic people, then we have to ask those difficult questions asked by the right. *Are* we now inhabiting industrial and technological institutions so complex and so interconnected that popular rule becomes a sham, a ritual, a ratification *of* rule by the experts (however progressive)? Is the technical and bureaucratic organization of capitalism just an artifact of capitalism?

We cannot afford to be romantic about this. We often dismiss these questions as ideological nonsense and suggest that the relations of production will determine the means of production, that a revolutionary people will develop a technology which allows them to both produce and effectively rule it. If we are to be serious about democracy, we must try to design institutions of participation and accountability which are truly rooted in an industrial order, however we change that order. Will these institutions be participatory or representative? What is the relation between hierarchy and democracy in production, between management and engagement in public bureaucracies (call them whatever we want)?

The question we finally raise is the one the right has already moved on: is democracy a fleeting mirage, a weak historical moment wedged between feudal rule and either corporate domination or the bureaucratic state? Was it simply an ideological charade, that the people should rule, offered up as a salve for men and women who would be ruled when it mattered most? Is it a form of human action, a mode of collective engagement and self-determination which requires cultural coherence, geographic limits, rigid boundaries of citizenship and membership, forms of work and production capable of being understood and managed by most or all of the citizens? If not agrarian, is it not rooted in mechanical and not technological production?

These are not questions we can profitably avoid. Socialism is a democratic theory, promising a democratic practice. It is also a theory of labor and community, a practice of equality and responsiveness to mass needs and the life of the many. If we expect it to be both, we have to image and design the institutions which will make it so. As the social contract that emerged during the period of rapid growth continues to break down, these questions will become less abstract and of greater direct relevance to those struggling for social transformation in unions, neighborhoods, and other non-governmental institutions.

Democracy, Public Work and Labor Strategy[1]

Paul Johnston

State production, as a distinct world of work with its own particular contradictions and potentials, must be inserted into our picture of U.S. society and into any strategy for socialism. This article looks at the "decommodification" and "politicization" of work and labor struggle in the public sector and draws conclusions about inherent potentials for the emergence of political unionism. This development, called "public service unionism," is a description of an actual tendency in the public sector labor movement, a projection of a strategy that can help public workers and their unions deal with today's crises, as an historic vehicle for the democratization of state and labor.

The article starts with an observation that, though both union activist and left theoretical concepts of union labor struggle and work itself are grounded in the history of the *private* capitalist workplace, state production is in fact a distinct sphere of work and struggle. State workers are defined by unique social productive relations in a unique productive mode. That is why "economic" unionism and the "economic" strike fail in the public sector: they are imitations of tactics developed in and for different terrains. The unique class relations of the public sector promote and require a more overtly political unionism. Though a union may be political in many ways, there is a strategy open to many public workers, particularly in local non-commodity-producing agencies, that can win the immediate struggles that are now too often lost; equally important, it can project new definitions for labor in the public sector. This development is explained here by a description of a model public sector strike, and then by a discussion of the political versus the economic strike. Examination of the strategy shows that it demands the democratization of the workplace and the state together, and that it can only start with the democratization of the union itself.

The article focuses upon union strategy and organization. Too often social theory neither derives from nor returns to practice. The conclu-

sions in this article are, to this writer, less the product of the article's own logic than of practical lessons. The article is intended not only to explain but to help shape practice.

Unique Social Relations of Public Work

Too often, analyses of the state view it only as a political institution, or an executive, or a form of domination, or a distillation of class relations or an agency for general social reproduction. Though each of these perspectives has its value, a multi-dimensional view is required. One dimension usually ignored is the state as workplace. On the other hand, analyses of labor usually assume a workplace engaged purely in capitalist production. Moreover when labor in the state sector is examined, the focus is too often limited to those characteristics it shares with private-sector labor such as service production, white collar and managerial work. There is a general failure to grasp public work as an essentially distinct productive mode. Public workers have unique relations to taxpayers, to the electorate, to consumers (or victims) of public work, and to state power itself. The position they occupy is qualitatively different from private sector workers in the "pure" capitalist workplace. The meaning of work and unionism for public sector labor must be understood through exploration of these unique relations.

The private-sector worker is a direct employee of capital. Labor power is sold to capital as part of the process of capital accumulation involving the production of commodities to be sold in the capitalist market. What is to be produced is defined by the demands of that market. The public worker, in contrast, works for government or state power. Labor power is sold to the government for the production, not of commodities, but of "social use-values," which are goods or services defined as useful to society at large by those who hold state power. What is to be produced is determined through political decisions, not simply through the economic "laws" of the market.

To be sure, there is no actual sharp line between public production of social use-values and private production of commodities. Instead there is a great mutual interpenetration of these two modes, with each mutually perverting the purity of the other in a broad range of combinations and mutual interventions. Relations are essentially "political" in both sectors, but even as state production expands in the service of commodity relations, overt political mediation of formerly commodified relations expands. These two ways of organizing work and defining, producing and appropriating value, though not always or even usually existing in pure forms, represent two distinct productive

principles. Capitalist production, on the one hand, produces exchange as well as use values, and appropriates the surplus value generated in the wage labor relation from the producing worker to the ruling capitalist. State production in the non-commodity sphere, on the other hand, is not "productive labor" in Marx's specifically capitalist sense; it is a distinct set of relations, productive on its own terms. Though the capitalist state serves finance capital in many ways, pure state production produces not exchange value but social use-value, direct social production. Surplus value is not appropriated in its exchange value form. The distribution of power and resources, the making of rules, formulation of policy, and the processes of domination and exploitation are more direct. The maintenance of the wage and tax systems, however, means that in state production the government functions as a collective capitalist. The use-value produced by state workers is appropriated by those who hold state power. In exchange they receive wages based on private sector standards and upon the political power (or lack of power) wielded by the workers themselves. The use value produced is defined as "useful" to the extent that it *reproduces*—continues, defends, supports, feeds, legitimizes, adjusts—the social formation.

Therefore demands raised by state workers must be raised against the state itself. Issues and battles, then, that in the private sector may be limited to economic terms become political (or political-economic) in the public. Questions which for private workers exist only remotely—how taxes of all kinds are raised and distributed, how a public budget is composed, how elections are conducted, how the political community views the workers—are immediate workplace facets for public workers. On the terrain of labor struggle, a battlefield that has historically precluded political struggle in the U.S., public workers are finding that every question (including the amount of a pay raise) is a political question, that power is political, that labor relations are political, and therefore that labor strategy must be political.

Thus the elimination, or partial elimination, of commodity relations in state production brings public workers closer to the meaning in their work; to the definition, satisfaction and frustration of social needs, including their own. Who does what to whom is determined by political power legitimized by explicitly justified views of social reality and social needs. The "veil" of commodity relations is partly lifted and public workers find themselves in practical, working relationships to the collective needs of society. Whether they keep society's parks and buildings clean, fix society's potholes, clean society's water, teach society's children or regulate society, questions concerning the meaning of the work begin to come clear as the object and the product of the labor is, visibly, society itself. For the public worker subject to the state as both citizen *and* employee historic divisions between private and public

domains becomes blurred. Work relations, from patronage to "merit system," are political. Battles over taxation, over the maintenance, expansion or destruction of particular public programs, and all the social contradictions that cluster around the state connect directly with pay, working conditions and union power. Public workers are brought face to face in their work with the problems of society, as reflections of their own lives. Working in housing projects inhabited by rats, roaches and hopeless people, in schools degenerating into urban prisons for the increasingly uneducated children of the poor and working classes, in the depravity of a health care system geared for profit, in a welfare system promoting the degradation and waste of human beings, in the horror of mental institutions, they are faced daily with the arrogance of those who hold power in the big public bureaucracies that supposedly serve the people. Trapped inside whole systems, the vast majority of public workers find themselves not only blamed for this cluster of failures, but, through pay cuts, lay offs, speed ups and contracting out, they are forced to pay for them as well.

This means that questions of workers' control emerge in a different form than in the private sector; for the institution to be controlled is not a commodity-producing enterprise but rather an agency of social production supposedly accountable to and serving "the community." So while the most immediate questions of control over work and working conditions, safety, and so on are contested as in the private sector, this is not within the context of a company dependent upon capital movement for its life. In order to achieve power to defend their interests, public workers have an interest in challenging basic questions of public policy, development, finance and management of the agency. In rejecting inherited models of greedy "me-first" unionism, public unions can turn the legitimizing ideologies of democracy and public service against the capitalist state by demanding that they be made real.

Labor relations in the public sector are strongly influenced also by the stratification, hierarchy and incredible diversity of the workforce. The local public agency, for example, employs a virtual cross-section of the community, varying levels and kinds of blue collar, clerical, technical, professional, administrative and managerial positions, hierarchically organized and segregated by nationality, race and sex. An agency will commonly include many different industries in one political and fiscal entity—such as transportation, education or health. Just as the organization of the CIO required that workers overcome craft and skill level distinctions to achieve necessary power, so public sector organizing requires a still broader unity, bringing together workers whose sole common denominator is supposedly serving the democratically determined needs of a single community. As with earlier private sector unions, this unity was less evident in the early organization of craft

groups, such as teachers and social workers; later, especially since 1970, has come the emergence of the broader union of miscellaneous workers. Not surprisingly, the old craft unions are weaker and the new agency-wide unions are stronger since the present crises. This diversity and its unification is also significant because the public labor force intersects such significant parts of the community: whites and different minorities, renters, taxpayers, health care consumers (or victims), and so on. Alliances built here weave together a new and significant kind of labor-community alliance.

Also, the service character of some public work renders social relations more direct and visible. It is wrong, however, to see this as a distinction between public and private. Commodity production includes many services, and state production includes many functions outside a direct service relationship. But in the direct service relationship and contradiction between the public sector legitimizing myths of democracy and public service and the realities they conceal cannot help but intensify the political and human, personal impact of social needs falsely defined and inadequately served.

What is the relation between public and private-sector work and labor strategy? Despite crucial differences mentioned above, the two sectors have certain things in common. Public workers are subjects of a state in the service of capital; private-sector workers are employees of capital backed by the state. On overlapping battlefields they face the same enemy. Workers move from private jobs to public and back again. Most important, the expansion of the state as a workplace had been accompanied by the general expansion of political intervention in formerly non-political sectors, including the lives and jobs of private sector workers. The Chrysler bail-out, the nuclear power controversy, rent control measures and wage guidelines are but a few examples. Much that was formerly private and economic is now socialized and politicized for private as well as public workers.

As a democratic socialist movement grows in the United States public workers will certainly be part of it. But debates about free enterprise versus state production have only a limited significance to the employees of the great public bureaucracies. Public workers must, if the movement is to make any sense for them, project a *different kind* of public work than hitherto seen in the U.S.; not blind subordination to a state bureaucracy but work motivated by the determination to serve the democratically defined needs of the community. For these workers, progressive organizing centered at the worksite is also centered upon the state, and must deal directly with questions of state and democracy—the unanswered questions of socialism—in the visibly *political* economy of the public sector. This effort to exercise collective and personal mastery over both work and government in coalition with the

larger community served provides an avenue toward that old communist dream of social liberation: the supercession of both the state and the employer as such. Then work becomes public service, and government follows democratic dialogue concerning human needs.

Crisis in the Public Labor Movement

The past decade has seen an explosion of organization and militancy in the public sector unmatched by anything since the CIO drive of the '30s. Organized labor would have declined instead of growing in absolute numbers if it were not for the growth of the public unions in that period. Since the mid-'70s public workers are more unionized, percentage-wise, than private. At the same time, these new unions are facing crises on at least three levels.

First, there is the external political-economic attack: pay freezes, speedups, layoffs, contracting out and so on, due to the general U.S. economic crisis, the fiscal crisis of the state and the "new right" mobilization underway to cut those sections of the state that are supposed to provide human services; union-busting, scapegoating public workers with the image of the "$17,000 streetsweeper," making public workers the victims of the "taxpayers' rebellion," taking the heat those who dominate the arrogant and wasteful state bureaucracy itself.

Public labor's inability to confront these crises leads to crisis number two, the crisis of the labor strategy. Even teachers', building trades', and other craft unions, who with their own "me-first" political strategy which had often succeeded in the past, are losing today. Exclusive focus upon the wage demand and exclusive reliances upon the strike tactic limit the union's power and helps management consolidate its base to prevent any meaningful gains. Consequently public workers on strike are often isolated, politically disarmed and defeated.

In a typical public sector strike situation, newly unionized workers face their first great battles with the government. The bargaining begins, patterned on the private sector and patterned by laws copied from the private sector. Labor starts with unrealistically high wage demands, to leave room for the "negotiations game." This process works its way toward the withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of labor in a strike. The union threatens to let the grass grow, the children go unschooled or the poor and ill suffer until management comes around.

Management has its own ready-made counter-strategy. The union serves as a *convenient political scapegoat* for public officials caught between relatively declining tax revenues, spiraling demands for and cost of public services and taxpayers' rebellion. The union as villain takes the heat off management for its bureaucratic corruption and

ineptitude, its criminal priorities, corporate profiteering, and so on. Management and politicians, in league with chambers of commerce and the press, seize the time to crush the upstart workers and their new unions. In what could be called the "$17,000 streetsweeper formula," they move to build a reactionary base in defense of the public treasury against the greedy unions. The union loses. After the strike the membership is confused, demoralized and bitterly divided, and the stage is set for further attack.

Not all public strikes end in such disaster. But examination of strikes which *do* succeed shows that they owe their success not to the direct destruction of capital investment, as in the private sector, but to the generation of political power. Without the recognition that labor's power is political in the public sector, public unionists do not do the things necessary to win and use that power. And they lose.

Third, the public sector unions face an internal crisis. Though 59% of the workforce supports unionism *in principle,* only 19% support the present U.S. labor bureaucracy. Overpaid "managerial" staff leadership faces a deeply distrustful rank and file. The power of the bureaucracy depends little on organized worker participation, largely instead of labor law, on management and on its controls of the union machinery. Such a bureaucracy is wonderfully vulnerable to organizing from below; but public workers are unaccustomed to democracy and participation, and even left activists find it difficult to rise beyond an oppositional role to responsible leadership. This proves to be a key problem in the public sector, for public labor strategy requires a stronger rank and file infrastructure than in traditional economic unionism. In the open shop conditions of the public workplace, actual union membership rarely reaches byond 70%, though the union is required to equally represent non-members as well as members. *Without* a strong infrastructure, the membership stays below 30%. This means too little money and too little organizational strength to meet the many demands on the union organization. Most public unions are more open to rank and file participation than many private-sector unions; but even the more democratic unions are saddled with the reputations, the roles and the expectations earned over the years by labor unions in the private sector.

How can these three crises be confronted? How, specifically, can labor tap the real power of rank and file organization to not only repel painful attacks but also progress toward some degree of liberation? How can we correctly define the issues we face, our organization and our strategy? What is the potential for a political unionism in the public sector? We can find the answers to these questions in the story of a successful public sector strike.

The San Francisco Housing Authority Strike of 1979

In the San Francisco Bay Area there is a growing history of failures, partial failures and, increasingly, successful efforts to apply a public service strategy to strikes and other campaigns. The Housing Authority strike of 1979 in San Francisco is a dramatic example of what can be done. Unfortunately, space does not permit the full examination of even this one example.

The Housing Authority had long been notoriously mismanaged. It had been looted over the years by the local Democratic political machine, craft unions, Jim Jones (of Jonestown infamy, ex-chairman of the Commission) and others. The Authority was the biggest slum-lord in the city. Hundreds of apartments were vacant, havens for crime; housing projects were filthy. People were (and still are) robbed and children raped in the projects as an ordinary occurrence. At the time of the strike the Authority was in a deep fiscal and political crisis.

The workforce included about 120 Local 400 members[2] (clerks, police and other tenant service workers), and about 150 craft workers, each represented by their own union. Local 400 members had conducted a strike two months earlier in August of 1979 against management's intention to implement contractual pay raises 10 months late. The strike was settled in the workers' favor on the first day. The membership, mistrustful of management's good faith, decided to keep the strike structure intact. The structure included a tenant relations committee, which in the August mobilization had launched a rent strike in support of the workers. So when the strike broke out in October, the workers were well-prepared with a strong internal organization for large-scale mobilizations and picketing, for tenant/community relations, food, fundraising, and so on.

In the months preceding the strike and during the strike itself, the mostly black female clerks began for the first time to organize within the union. They consistently pushed the leadership and the rest of the membership to take a stronger, more vigorous stand. In response to this the leadership structure changed and was changed. Importantly, all the decisions concerning the strike and its conduct were made by the general membership of the section (at its own repeated insistence).

The strike began in late October when the 12 Authority carpenters walked off the job demanding a raise. Then, although the craft union leadership had not bothered to seek strike sanction, the Local 400 workers decided not to cross the picket lines. They came out too, along with the rest of the craft unions which were also seeking raises (plumbers, laborers, etc.). Though the Local 400 contract had a no-strike clause, Local 400 members decided to place their own demands on the table. They observed that, since management was violating the contract, they had the right to do the same. A week into the strike Local 400 put up its own lines.

At the beginning of the week during which Local 400 stayed out behind craft lines, Local 400 members requested and received directly from all the craft strikers the commitment that they would honor Local 400 lines in return, if ever asked. Meanwhile, the Housing Authority police (who had very recently organized into Local 400) chose not to join the strike but to contribute part of their pay to the strike fund instead.

The issues were well-defined. Local 400 had a set of 10 demands, ranging from implementation of the earlier pay settlement, to a set of health and safety demands, to demands against specific acts of discrimination against CETA employees. On the first day of the strike the workers decided to define their central issue as mismanagement, and to demand that in order to resolve the strike not only must all issues be resolved but steps taken to end mismanagement of the Authority. Many of the Local 400 strikers were tenants and ex-tenants of the Authority. As a group they were fed up with being blamed for the failures of the Authority and very resentful of the authoritarian administration.

During the first week of the strike the Public Housing Tenants' Association (PHTA) stood on the sidelines. Then, when Local 400 picket lines went up, they joined the strike. A call for a rent strike went out to 21,000 tenants. Many tenants came to the picket lines, brought food to the strikers and, through the PHTA, placed their demands on the table.

At this, the Housing Police asked that their safety demand (two persons to a patrol instead of one) be added to the strike issues. They were invited to join the strike as a condition for making that a strike demand; on a close vote they decided to do so and joined the strike. At this point, for the first time in San Francisco labor history, craft, miscellaneous and police employees were on strike in mutual solidarity.

The November mayoral elections were drawing near. The strikers made use of the elections by focusing upon the Mayor's office, demanding that the Mayor curb Authority management (which is subject to their appointment powers). During the strike the workers did far more that picket their work locations. They took such actions as a march (by municipal transit bus) to invade HUD regional offices (Housing and Urban Development, the federal funding agency), coalition marches and demonstrations with craft workers and tenants (including a "garbage march" which deposited piles of the accumulating garbage from the housing projects on the steps of the Mayor's office on the day before the election), a "Solidarity Disco" fundraiser, and so on. Had they quiety stayed at their picket lines the strike could have continued for months as management anticipated; instead they repeatedly grabbed the City and federal bureaucracy and shook it until they got the action they wanted.

Craft strikes have repeatedly lost in the public sector over the last decade. But craft unions rarely receive support from other workers and from the public. They were pleased and amazed to receive it now. The craft unions negotiated settlements on Friday of the second week. A Local 400 settlement was negotiated on the following Sunday on all issues. But no settlement was reached with PHTA. Local 400 had been conducting "coalition bargaining" (sometimes conducted by allied unions) with the tenants' association. City management, rushing for a settlement prior to elections on the coming Tuesday, stood by in amazement when Local 400 members voted Monday morning not to consider or vote upon their settlement until the tenants had an agreement. Craft union leaders were amazed too as their membership honored Local 400 picket lines for three more days until final settlement with the tenants was reached.

In addition to fully satisfactory settlements on all strike issues, the Local 400 strike settlement included affirmations by management that employees had valuable insight into how the management and operations of the agency should be improved, and that the existing mismanagement was a legitimate source of employee outrage. Management agreed to improve specific parts of its operation (including demotion of the personnel officer), and further agreed to a year-long process, called a "Work Improvement Project," to give employees and tenants participation in improvement of management operations at both work unit and Authority-wide levels.

Worker problems in the Housing Authority are by no means over. As of this writing the Authority appears to be moving toward another collision with the craft unions over pay. Regardless of what happens, however, the Local 400 section now knows how to strike and how to win in the public sector. They know how to unite the workforce, how to build a strong strike structure, how to target mismanagement while dramatizing their own desire to be of service to the tenants, how to build a tight coalition with tenant organization and, in general, how to gather and wield political power. Through the strike activity they have strengthened their own investment in better service and increased both worker and tenant participation in management.

The Housing Authority is a microcosm of the 31,000-member San Francisco City workforce, where Local 400 represents the large "miscellaneous" group of workers. The success of this strike is certainly due, in part, to the small size of the workforce; similar resolutions to the same contradictions in the City would be far more complex and difficult. However, because of its very simplicity, the Housing Authority strike provides clear lessons about the character of an effective political strike.

The Political Versus the Economic Strike

We can generalize from the experience of the Housing Authority strike to define the distinctive features of the political strike. The economic strike moves only in the realm of market relations. In what is traditionally called an "economic contest," workers put their determination and willingness to suffer immediate loss of work and pay against the company's ability to endure disruption of production and thus destruction of investment, in order to win a higher price for labor. A public strike based on this model may be successful *if and only if* by some means it delivers political power. Perhaps it threatens a function politically vital to the government, or it demonstrates or threatens to galvanize effective political support for the strikers' demands or against the officials opposing the union. It could also be politically effective if it has economic impact on business or public revenue. Whenever such a strike succeeds, and the circumstances surrounding its success are analyzed, it invariably proves the rule that labor's power is political in the public sector.

The political strike is not a sudden work stoppage called upon contract expiration but a continuously developing political mobilization of union members and allies, around demands carefully defined in a politically potent manner, basing itself upon the activation of rank and file organization, the testing and proof of solidarity in the workforce, the mobilization of labor-community coalition resources, and creative actions to support negotiations and achieve a settlement.

The strike mobilization is the best possible opportunity to expand rank and file organization and leadership in the union. Suddenly the union has staff resources of creative, responsible people that may number in the hundreds or even thousands. Both the immediate impact of the strike and the long-range effect on the union's strength and internal life depend now on the ability of strike leadership to open up its structure, and the ability of the membership to become involved in a responsible way.

The strike organization unfolds from a strike preparations committee building each of the eventual strike committees, building a strike threat, consolidating and preparing the membership for strike duty and carrying out pre-strike mobilizations and work actions, into the actual committees including negotiations, press, food, relief, transportation, internal communications, picket/field action, community relations, emergency services and, finally, the strike leadership council itself, composed of chairpersons of each committee. The emergency services committee is a public sector innovation; it deals with the effect of the disruption of services upon consumers, potential allies of the strikers. Community relations is also such an innovation. It moves on a broader

level to mobilize community resources, political allies of the union and public opinion in general on the side of the workers. The picket committee is modified; its duties include mobilization of the strikers to take various forms of creative direct action.

The rule of the game is that there is no rule of the game for political action in a strike. Creative "guerilla" tactics are needed to respond to the unexpected circumstances, opportunities and dangers that will develop during the course of the strike, upon which the outcome may ride. Should the union salvage sewage treatment plant operations before irreparable damage to the environment occurs? Is it possible to win over the police to the strikers' side? Should certain workers remain on the job, receiving pay and contributing to the strike fund while others strike, continuing, perhaps, certain vital services? What about a rotating strike? A one-day work stoppage as a political protest? A unilateral modification of work rules to improve services? Leaflets in the community? Disruption of billing and tax collection? Joint action and coalition bargaining with consumer interest organizations? Electoral action, including the circulation of voter initiatives?

The economic strike is a one-time mobilization; the political strike is part of a year-round political mobilization. The single focus upon contract expiration time disregards budget determination hearings, elections, passages of particular laws and other government action that may require equally strong mobilization. The political strike as described above contains strategic principles that seem to be necessary for a year round program of political unionism.

Public Service Unionism

The class relations and the struggles faced by public sector workers provide the basis for organizing democratic public service unions. Five main strategic principles emerge. First, because relations in the public sector are directly political, *union goals and strategies must be evaluated from a political standpoint.* Potential resources for political power, politically achievable goals, politically effective issues in coalition building and in isolating management when necessary must all be combined to promote politically effective tactics. The union's main political resources are: a) the organization, unity, and general political activity of its membership (in workplace, electoral and other community spheres); b) the coalitions it can build with sections of the community, including other unions and even sections of public sector management; c) the membership's knowledge and potential control of the work process; and d) its ability to define the struggle in terms favorable to itself. Pay levels much higher than normal make lousy strike issues. Coalitions organized against layoffs and the service cuts they entail,

around public-sector mismanagement, around democratic demands can all be politically potent.

Political power must counter public sector management's attempts to scapegoat and bust the union by blaming painful effects of strikes, high taxes and other public problems on workers' *greed.* Strategies that wield economic clout in the private sector can play right into the hands of management's strategy. This doesn't mean abandoning the strike, however, but developing a more sophisticated political strike strategy.

Second, *issues should be broadened to include the potential for a democratically organized agency:* how the agency should be run. When labor begins to deal directly with "the merits, necessity and organization of public work," excluded by labor law from collective bargaining, strong political impact can result. The mere impact of the concept of worker participation in and dialogue with public sector mismanagement can be explosive. The $17,000 streetsweeper strategy mentioned above can be turned around by politically mobilizing a community base which supports union demands by exposing issues such as mismanagement and political favoritism for big business. As those most intimately informed of the inner workings of public agencies—and as those who do the work—public workers are in a unique position to criticize. This can be very helpful in making management move in wage negotiations; it can also help the unions dramatize to the community the difference between those who control and benefit and the workers at the bottom of the bureaucracies. In this way public workers are defined as public servants in a new sense: as responsible public servants, intent upon serving the needs of the community. The intention to serve the community, and to participate in defining community needs and how they are to be served, *in opposition to* government and business forces that stand in the way and define those according to capital instead of to people; the utilization of vestigial democratic forms and the demand for their expansion to accomplish a restructuring of public agencies, giving priority and power to self-organized workers and a self-organized community. These demands for the realization of the myths of public service and democracy are not just good for morale and public image; they provide basic guidelines for public labor strategy that can help shape our struggles in a politically potent manner.

Third, *solidarity within the public workforce should be organized.* Because the public workforce is one of such diversity, the challenge is to bring all the distinct groups of non-management workers into a single organization, a single union or close coalition of unions, providing mutual support and working in a unified manner. The common mistrust between different groups under the same employer, and management's manipulation of this mistrust into cycles of mutual scabbing are too familiar to public workers.

Union leadership and negotiating structures can be established to provide unity *and* autonomy, both essential for solidarity. Each unit can be guaranteed autonomy and support in return for its own commitment to the others.

Important is the relationship between the relatively privileged workers and the ever-present "second class worker." The relatively privileged group is often quite comfortable with its status. But no alliance is solid unless the privileged workers are willing to recognize and reflect the second class treatment of their co-workers.

This inequality usually falls between whites and nonwhites and/or between men and women, because structural inequality in the workplace is part and parcel of patterns of national and sexual domination in the whole society. One error often made when dealing with such issues as affirmative action and racial or national tensions on the job is the tendency to separate and counterpose work issues and discrimination issues. To the extent that the union can define its struggle against discrimination as, simultaneously, a campaign on behalf of second-class workers, it can unite the democratic struggle against, for example, racial oppression with what is often the main issue in the workforce.

"Temporary" workers in San Francisco, for example, are anything but temporary. They are an underclass, one-third of the workforce, hired outside regular civil service channels, doing the same work as "permanents" but for less pay and no fringe benefits, not even social security. They often work for five, ten, fifteen years in this status, and they are mostly minorities, usually women. The permanent workers are mostly white, usually male. A union campaign against the abuse of temporary employment must combine labor and affirmative action issues, and to the extent that it is supported by permanent workers, it can build solidarity within the entire workforce. It is not always possible to convince relatively privileged groups to support such a plan. Workers often must achieve a certain amount of personal growth or enlightenment in this and other areas before they can become "good union members." But with a small, organized core of the more progressive among the privileged workers it is at least possible to neutralize chauvinist tendencies and work toward certain unity.

Fourth, public sector unions should *build new urban coalitions and establish a labor-community alliance.* Solidarity inside the workforce connects directly with labor-community coalitions, for the diversity of the public workforce reflects and intersects the diversity of the community. For example, if the progressive potential in today's public unions, even at present levels of organization, is allied with the progressive potential of minority communities, then the core of an explosively powerful and progressive urban coalition can emerge. For this to happen a break with the racist history of much of the white-

dominated labor movement must occur. Public unions can become known as fighters for affirmative action. The large agency-wide unions that emerged in the '70s are naturally equipped to make this break, for they generally include major concentrations of minority workers and they *need* the labor-community alliance. The growth and progressive organization of Black, Latino, Asian and other minority communities in urban areas has occurred alongside the growth and progressive organization of the public workforce. Alliances can take many forms in campaigns against discrimination, against service cuts and layoffs, in grassroots initiatives and election campaigns, in struggles over the management policies of schools, hospitals and utilities.

Finally, public sector unionists should be able to *build a broad organization of participatory rank and file leadership.* Such an infrastructure is necessary in the public sector open shop just to sustain membership and dues. And effective political mobilization further requires it. Some public union bureaucrats must be replaced. But public union leadership is, by and large, more responsive to rank and file pressure because of the open shop situation, and more likely to be relatively progressive because of the recent origins of the unions and the severe struggles most are encountering. No doubt it is difficult to break through a top-heavy bureaucracy. But "the bureaucracy" *includes* and survives *only with* passive, subordinate and dependent attitudes of those at the base. Without this foundation it crumbles. When this foundation begins to organize itself, the union bureaucracy is enormously vulnerable. When this foundation is organized it has radical new power in the union, and the union has radical new power to win political contests. Without its support the union lacks its most basic political resource and can be defeated. Without the member's initiative and collective action the best-intentioned union leadership can accomplish little; with them no bureaucracy can stand in the way.

In summary, the socialization and politicization of labor in the public sector mean the socialization and politicization of formerly private and commodified issues and forms of struggle. The unique conditions of public work demand a new unionism. When public unions grasp this they can fashion a strategy that will allow them to successfully confront the crises they face, a model of political unionism increasingly applicable in the private sector as well. Potentially democratic socialist consciousness, organization and effective struggle are implied and can be "surfaced" by effective organizing. Public workers can thus serve as a democratic counterforce, and contribute to far-reaching social transformation.

FOOTNOTES

1. This article is essentially a development of *The Promise of Public Service Unionism,* Monthly Review (September, 1978). It is the product of dialogue with the editors of that journal, as well as Bay Area Kapitalistate, the Public Sector Crisis Reader, and various unionists in the San Francisco bay area.

2. Local 400, Service Employees International Union, represents most of the lower paid "miscellaneous" public workers in the city, and is the author's employer.

The State, the Patriarchal Family and Working Mothers*

Zillah Eisenstein

It is important to understand what it is at stake in the latest discussions of the "crisis" of the family if women are to give direction to the policy decisions which are supposedly addressing the problem.[1] *Newsweek, The New York Times,* popular film culture, T.V. and academic literature all share a concern about the present instability of the nuclear family. They appear to be trying to absorb the 'crisis' by shoring up what remains of the nuclear family rather than analyzing the concrete relations of power which are involved, and understanding how they need to be changed in the interests of women and a more just society.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the family as a social and political unit, with a history to be understood, characterized by relations of power and domination. Instead of assuming that the changing nature of the family today reflects its abnormal functioning, I will argue that the family as a product of historical processes has and is always changing. Hence, the important question to be explored here is how and why the family does change and how these changes reflect and at the same time construct power relations. History is defined in terms of class struggle, patriarchal conflict and racial domination, although the present paper focuses primarily on patriarchal conflict. The family reflects these three processes and structures the way they are histor-

* This article was first published as "El Estado, la familia patriarcal y las madres que trabajan," *En Teoría,* no. 1, april-junio de 1979, pp. 135-168. It is an outline of the argument presented in the last three chapters of my new manuscript, tentatively titled *Patriarchy and the State: The Origins of Liberal Feminism.* For a fuller elaboration of the theory of the state and the concept of the working mother one should see the larger manuscript.

ically played out. The so-called "crisis" of the family must be understood as a part of this history.[2]

Outside of this historical context it is impossible to understand the (a) patriarchal family as a major element in structuring (b) social patriarchy.[3] The above distinction is between the (a) hierarchical sexual organization for the reproduction of sex-gender[4] as it exists in the family, and (b) the organization of sex-gender as it exists throughout the society understood as a totality. The two realms are related and structure the other, but as I will argue, are not one in the same thing.

For instance, by understanding the family one begins to comprehend the stuctural relations of power between men and women to the extent the family reflects and structures these relations. But one cannot assume that *all changes* in the organization of the family reflect a parallel change in the relations of power either in the family, or in society. Nor can one assume that all changes in patriarchal relations in the family are always paralleled in the system of social patriarchy. In fact, the very opposite may occur. I will try to show here that as some of the patriarchal relations of the family have been undermined by changes in women's consciousness and position in the economy, the state through the system of social patriarchy is trying to reinforce familial patriarchy. The two domains are utterly related, but they never can be reduced to the activities of the other. Hence, it may appear that changes in the family have given women more power in the system of social patriarchy. However, before this can be assessed, one must examine how these changes reflect the political needs of social patriarchy itself.

Although it is true that men have less legal power in the family as fathers today (he no longer owns the woman or the child outright), one would not say that the base of social patriarchy is less well defined if we are still defining it in terms of the ability to reproduce the sex-gender system. Even for those who define patriarchy in more legalistic terms, it does not necessarily follow that the system has been weakened. After all, the particular expression of patriarchal privilege changes with new social relations, and these changes are reflected in the law. We will see that the particular legal expression of patriarchal privilege is expressed differently with the development of the bourgeois state's separation between politics and economics and the ideological distinction between public and private realms. It becomes more difficult to understand what the patriarchal base of power is as it becomes more mystified through bourgeois patriarchal law, bourgeois ideology, and bourgeois practice.

In order to demystify patriarchy as a system of power, and its use by particular economic modes, one needs to understand that it is not a static system of power. One cannot look for a static structure to express the relations of patriarchy. The changes and processes one sees are part

of the system of patriarchy. They express its historical formulation,[5] and have been ideologically defined and politically structured by different internal relations in the transition from feudalism to capitalism. By understanding this we begin to grasp the real history of patriarchy in relation to the particular class needs of a period. We also begin to see the unifying element of history through the use of the sexual division of labor and society for mothering. And we shall see that part of patriarchal history is the attempt to mystify this unity. Therefore, we first must discuss the meaning of the patriarchal family as part of the social and political system for reproducing gender, before we discuss the family's transition from feudalism to capitalism, and before we analyze the state's role in managing the current "crisis" of the family.

The Dynamic of Patriarchy

The patriarchal dynamic of the family involves the hierarchical sexual ordering of society which is carried over into each economic period. The following discussion will suffer from a sort of abstraction because the patriarchal dynamic, located in the patriarchal family, always is expressed alongside and through the economic system of society. But it is important to understand what this patriarchal history and system is unto itself. Only then can we really understand its import to the different economic modes, and its political meaning in its totality.

It is interesting to note that some historians believe that because the "form of community in which the father is the supreme authority in the family . . ."[6] no longer exists that it is incorrect to use the term patriarchy for the largely changed present day relations of legal power. Male privilege may not be protected through as repressive a legal system structured around the male as father and proprietor in familial patriarchy, but the redefinition of his power both in family and social patriarchy speaks to the changing nature of male supremacy.

Patriarchy as a system of sexual hierarchical relations is not fully embodied within the law to begin with. The law does define and protect particular male privileges through marriage law, etc., but many of the privileges derivative of sexual hierarchy remain in practice without laws to define them as such. For instance there is no specific law that says women will rear children, do laundry or be the cooks. It is the economic dimension of patriarchy that is openly embodied in bourgeois patriarchal law—woman's relationship is explicitly stated in relation to property, possessions, income. The law more indirectly tries to control her sexual life (abortion law)[7], although there are instances of direct interference (laws against homosexuality). This is part of the way the

state, through law, protects the ideological notion that sexual questions are part of the private realm. The law in the bourgeois state is premised on the clear distinction between private and public realms. Laws directly dealing with sexuality in terms of prostitution or homosexuality are developed on the premise that they affect the public realm, and hence still operate in terms of the above ideological distinction. As a result, patriarchal privilege is often protected by its indirect presence in the law. Whether a woman chooses to bear a child is supposedly her "private" affair. Whether the law gives her options to do otherwise is not understood as a reflection of indirect patriarchal control. Even with the changes that have occurred in the law from the 13th century, there are still many statements of patriarchal privilege within the law today. This is what the struggle for the Equal Rights Amendment attests to. To cut these struggles off from the historical struggle against patriarchal control is to destroy a sense of the *continuous* power relations of patriarchy and the struggle against it. After all, history reflects the process of changing needs, and patriarchy, as it attempts to organize itself in terms of these needs, changes and develops itself.

Patriarchy's dynamic of power is centered in the controls which are developed to limit women's options in relation to motherhood and mothering. This locates the universal dynamic force of patriarchy within the social relations which define women as mothers and which reproduce within women the need to mother. These relations are defined historically and therefore are always changing, although the need, as such, for the sex-gender system does not. Women reproduce and yet changes in contraception change our relationship to reproduction. Women have constantly borne and reared children as mothers, and this changes as the culture, economics, medical health of a society change. The mother of ten in the 16th century was a different kind of mother and the mother of the 18th century. The woman who labored in the fields and in the house in the 17th century was different than the mother of the Victorian era. The middle class mother of the 19th century was a different mother than the sweat shop laborer of the earlier 20th century. And yet they all are mothers—responsible for the bearing and rearing of children in many different forms, but responsible nevertheless for the reproduction of a new generation.

Let us look more carefully at this universal cultural phenomena of motherhood. Dorothy Dinnerstein[8] rightly argues that it is the very activity of women's childrearing which helps lay the basis for the persistence of male domination and that this is at the root of the history of women's oppression. She points to the unity of patriarchy, whereas historians like Aries,[9] Stone[10] and Shorter[11] emphasize the lack of unity of these patriarchal arrangements. Both Aries and Stone emphasize the historical relativity of chidrearing per se. In the 13th and 14th centuries

many children did not live past the age of two. Those that did were defined as pre-adults rather than children. Shorter argues that women didn't mother in the emotional sense because of the great likelihood of their child's death. Upper class children in the 16th and 17th centuries, according to Stone, were sent to boarding schools. Women were not really responsible for their educational rearing, and he rather does not explain that women were certainly responsible for their initial education.

Dinnerstein instead presents a static view of the mother/child relationship both in terms of historical variations upon this theme and in terms of the all-encompassing effect this relationship has upon a particular individual. We need a blending of the two approaches because we need to see how the *universal* dynamic of patriarchy gets its *particular* definition through specific historical relations. Dinnerstein's argument is ahistorical and therefore limited, but the *changing* dimension of motherhood is overstated by those who accept that "women didn't mother in the emotional sense" in medieval society. I rather think that mothering is historically conditioned and first took political form (woman as mother) with the emergence of state societies when the reproduction of people as slaves, soldiers and taxpayers first became important. But this provides us with a *unity* through most of recorded history.[12] In other words, my position is that woman as mother is both a universal political condition and it is historically defined.

There is enormous room for relativity in what constitutes levels of attachment to children without denying it has always been an integral part of motherhood.[13] It seem likely that with the early death of children that parents were always defending against the possibility of loss by not allowing as great an attachment to children. The argument that "childhood" didn't exist as it does today can be true without denying all sentiment between parent and child. In fact Peter Laslett[14] discusses how it was the love that the pre-industrial family had for its children that was at the core of their sending them off to apprentice in other families. The exigencies of life were so harsh that they thought surrogate parents would make better administrators for them. The literature of Chaucerian middle English and the English renaissance shows us profound feeling between mother and child. This begins to document a relationship between parent and infant child which always had an emotional life. Because of this relationship between mother and child (the lactating mother/wet nurse), a differentiation in attitudes between child and male and female is at the root of all cultural life. Patriarchy defines culture as a result. It never exists in a vacuum, but is blended into the economic modes of life, which alter the relationship and shape the attitudes and create the ideology which protects the totality.

This political definition of woman as both childbearer and rearer is

used to maintain a system of male privilege which is thereby used to sustain the economic class arrangements of society. This definition of woman is kept potent by the activity of daily life which reproduces these mental images as reality. The potency of this sexual logic is protected and reproduced through the institution of motherhood and the process of mothering.[15] Because early child care is female dominated, boys and girls alike learn that it is the women who will rear the children. Of course this activity in and of itself is not the problem, but rather it is how this activity becomes sexually assigned within the family and within the larger social, economic and political setting. Women's biological assignment to bear children and their political assignment to rear them are both part of the life-force of patriarchy. The connection between bearing and rearing children is a political one—the logic derives from the patriarchal power relations of the society. The organization of the rearing of children reflects these political priorities.

Any system of power must deliver the goods. In this case it is the newborn child and the mother to rear them. In order for this system to perpetuate itself it must provide the relations necessary to produce and reproduce mothers. The process of mothering reproduces within individual women the value system of motherhood, which is patriarchally defined. Women as bearers and rearers of children rear their female children to bear more children. The structures of patriarchy are the relations of male privilege which limit women's existence to this through the ideology of the society, and through the actual oganization of family life and the labor force as well. Although almost 50% of the married women in the United States are "working mothers," ideology still defines all women as mothers first. And the limited options most women face in the labor force reassert this.

Patriarchy, then, is largely the sexual and economic struggle (because these are never separated in practice) to control women's options in such a way as to keep primary her role as childbearer and rearer. Power reflects the activity of trying to limit choices. That is why the "freedom of choice" is always an inadequate model for those who do not have power. The choices have already been limited and defined for them. For instance, women's choices exist within the political context of the sexual division of labor and society which defines woman's primary role as mother. The priorities of patriarchy are to keep the choices limited for women so that her role as mother remains primary.

Patriarchy doesn't merely exist because men hate women. It exists because as a system of power it provides the mothers of society. This involves the caring and love they provide, the children they reproduce, the domestic labor they do, the commodities they consume, the ghettoized labor force they provide. The starting point for all these realities is motherhood itself. Trying to understand the force of

patriarchy is basically trying to understand what it does. And what it does in the end is reproduce a new generation of mothers, which reproduces gender, i.e., masculine and feminine personality structures.

This is why the struggle against abortion and lesbianism is fought so strongly. The right to abortion is basically an acceptance of a woman's rejection of her pregnancy—of her motherhood. And the choice of lesbianism is most often a direct assault against heterosexual relations and patriarchal motherhood. The lack of choice and alternative is necessary to maintain women's position as childbearer and rearer. This doesn't mean that women cannot or do not exercise choice (infanticide, self-induced abortion, withdrawal, contraceptives) but ultimately in a society where your major worth is judged as a mother the "choice" is curtailed. The struggle for reproductive control[16] and lesbian motherhood is a struggle directly at odds with patriarchal needs, as is non-female childbearing.

The Feudal Patriarchal Family

By examining the family in feudal society one sees that there have been significant changes in woman's activity within the family as well as changes in the role of the family in the larger economy. But one also sees that these changes occur while the basic system of patriarchy is maintained. What we need to understand better is how these changes reflect the history of patriarchy itself and not its demise. I argue that with the advent of wage-labor we have the fuller differentiation of familial patriarchy and social patriarchy, just as we have the differentiation in bourgeois society between the state and the economy, domestic and wage labor, and the ideological mystification of these realities through the distinction of the public and private realms. It is important to note here, however, that the public/private distinction gets redefined in bourgeois society, it does not originate with it. This distinction is not a development of bourgeois society but rather is inherent in the formation of state society itself. The formation of the state institutionalizes patriarchy; it reifies the division between public and private life as one of sexual difference. The domain of the state has always signified public life, and this is distinguished in part, from the private realm, by differentiating men from women. The state's purpose is to enforce the separation of public and private life and with it the distinctness of male and female existence. Bourgeois society has its own particular ways of rewiring this patriarchal reality; the separation and differentiation of men from women.

One needs to clarify how today's ideology about the family differs from both the reality and ideology of feudal patriarchal family life. With the

development of the bourgeois partriarchal family and state arose the ideological distinction between public and private life based in the actual reorganization of work away from the self-sufficient home of feudalism toward the wage-labor system. Arising from this change came the separation of work and home both in actual terms and its ideological representation. Whereas the feudal patriarchal family was an integral part of the system of production, the capitalist patriarchal family is based on the distinction between domestic and wage labor, and hence is represented ideologically as separate and apart from the world of work (wage-labor).

One should not assume here that because the economic organization of the family shifted with the growth of capitalism, that the sexual ordering of the family changed as well. For although the economic systems change and redefine and manipulate the patriarchal family, there is a continuity to the relations of patriarchal power which does not readily change. Practically and ideologically defined by the integration of work and home, the family in feudal society was still structured by a hierarchical sexual division of labor which maintained a system of female reproduction and mothering. Today, although the place of the family in relation to the wage-labor system is changed, as is the ideology which describes the family, there still exists a sexual division of labor. In fact it exists in a more rigidified form due to the further separation of public and private spheres. Thus, the relations of sexual power which only take on meaning in historical context, point to the dynamic of the patriarchal family as a real organizing force in history. Today, defined and protected differently, the family continues to maintain patriarchal history, through different economic modes.

With the development of the capitalist wage-labor system the feudal home, as a self-sufficient unit supplying its own needs, disappeared.[17] The unity of the feudal patriarchal household was rooted in the unity of capital and labor. The needs of capitalism, requiring the destruction of the self-sufficient worker, also required the destruction of the self-sufficient home. Moreover, the decline of the family and domestic industry and its replacement by wage-labor provided the material basis for a redefinition of the patriarchal division of public and private life into one of the home and work. Women's lives, within the family, became redefined as their place in the world of work, and the actual world of work came to be defined in terms of the wage-labor process.

The displacement of the family by the wage-labor system affected different classes at different times in England, beginning in the 16th century and not ending totally until the 19th. The gentleman's wife of the 16th century England was still responsible for making her country house self-supporting. This involved her in year-round planning, especially in preparation for winter. Bread was made and butter was

churned all year round. Ale was brewed once a month. Fats were saved for the candlemaker. Soap was made from leftover fat and lye. Feathers from the poultry yard were cured for mattresses and pillows. Spinning was constant and vast laundries would be done every three months.[18]

Besides the gentleman's home, there was the yeoman home and the wage laborer's home. The laborer's home defined the difficult work for women of trying to stretch limited wages. Wives and daughters of the laboring class had to sell their own labor more and more and had les time for their own households.[19] As wage-labor developed, the more differentiated home and work became for the laboring classes. Their homes became less self-sufficient more rapidly than the country-woman's. The sexual division of labor still defined all feudal family life. It only operated in a less isolated manner in the self-sufficient homes of the gentlewoman, and became more burdensome as wage-labor became an additional responsibility for women of the waged family.

The changes which the feudal patriarchal family underwent were related to its place in the process of production, not with the patriarchal structuring of sexual reproduction and mothering. Although women were an integral part of the work process, their work assignments reflected the sexual division of labor related to mothering itself. Women's particular choices in relation to reproduction itself were limited by a lack of medical knowledge about contraception. Although women tried many metho ls of birth control[20] on their own initiative, they often found themselves pregnant. Given the high infant mortality rates at this time the birth rate also needed to be high. Hence, women as reproducer and mother were necessary to the system of feudalism, as they are, although historically redefined, for capitalism.

In summary, the feudal patriarchal family was more a part of the society than the capitalist patriarchal family in terms of the integration of work and home, in terms of the lack of a child-oriented existence, and in terms of existing before the development of a whole culture of privacy, intimacy and individualism. The family in this sense was more public both ideologically and practically because its private role had not yet been developed. Patriarchy, as a system of power, manipulates this relationsip between what is private and public and what appears to be public and private. The whole realm of law mentioned earlier helps in doing this. During feudal society the family is discussed as public, and as such one does not ask whether there are relations of power other than feudal class relations operating here because no differentiation is made between patriarchal family and feudal economic relations. As such the sex-gender system operates but is totally mystified through the economic relations of society. With the development of capitalism and the differentiation of the family and the economy, the distinction is manipulated once again to interfere with understanding the patriarchal

base of the family. This time it is said that the family is so disconnected from the economy and the public world that it is protected *from* the relations of power in society. Either way, the family is not understood in terms of its patriarchal base.

Capitalist Patriarchal Family

After discussing the relations of power which give unity to the history of patriarchy in feudalism we need to explore how this unity gets redefined in terms of the needs of capitalism. How are conflicts developing between the sex-gender system and capitalism due to the development of the split (both ideological and real) between work and home which is distinctive of capitalism? As capitalism tries to mold patriarchy to its needs, some of the relational and ideological needs of patriarchy have been undermined, and as a result the system of familial patriarchy appears less able to sustain the system of social patriarchy. Capitalism, however, needs the system of social patriarchy[21] (capitalist patriarchy) and therefore cannot afford to undermine it, nor can it sustain the conflicts which arise as a result.

In order to understand the political totality that is involved here, it is necessary to examine how the priorities of the system of patriarchy (mothering) and the priorities of capitalism (the class relations of private property and profit maximization) may come into conflict with one another. By focusing on these conflicts it becomes clearer that we are talking about two systems of power which have to organize in relation to the other. The conflicts are proof of the autonomy each must have in order to operate in the interests of the other. Otherwise their respective power bases are undermined. We shall see that today's conflicts reflect the undermining of certain patriarchal relations at the same time that the capitalist society needs them. The most important political dimension of these conflicts is the new level of consciousness they are creating among women.

Although the conflicts addressed here are said to lay the basis for the weakening of patriarchal controls, they do not do so by themselves. Even though the family today seems to be undergoing fundamental changes, both structurally and ideologically, the underlying power relations between women and men within the system of social patriarchy have not *yet* changed *fundamentally*. As a matter of fact, there are significant attempts to reassert patriarchal power through antifeminist activity.

The particular conflicts I will examine will be studied as representative of the tensions between the capitalist economy (and its supportive liberal values of equal opportunity and rugged individualism) and the patriarchal relations of the hierarchically-organized sexual division of labor and its related protective values. The state's objective is to try

and create cohesion between these systems as they need to function as one, with one set of priorities . . . protecting the capitalist patriarchal order. But at present the cohesion is disrupted by conflicts between the relations of patriarchy and the ideology of liberalism, i.e., the lack of opportunity for women in patriarchy vs. the ideology of equal opportunity; the relations of capitalism and the ideology of patriarchy, i.e., the need for women wage workers vs. the ideology of woman in the home; and between the ideology of patriarchy and the ideology of liberalism, i.e., the ideology of woman's inequality vs. the image of equal opportunity.

(a) The first of the series of conflicts which is appearing today is the contradiction between the dominant liberal ideology of equal opportunity and the reality for most women of continued dependence. In actuality equal opportunity becomes the equal opportunity to remain unequal.[22] Liberalism defined as the doctrine of equal opportunity has not replaced the patriarchal relations of female dependency in the family.[23] Rather they both exist somewhat antagonistically within the family today. More specifically, to the extent women have taken seriously and internalized the individualist values of bourgeois society for themselves, they are in conflict with the patriarchal relations of the family which define them as a dependent rather than as an independent being. This antagonism becomes amplified when women seek jobs and are still faced with the responsibilities of a family and household which are organized in terms of a system of male privilege.

Within capitalist patriarchy the conflict exists between the ideology of liberal individualism which is reproduced in the economic relations of the society and the male privilege structured and protected through the family. Once women internalize the liberal individualist values of self they find themselves in conflict with the hierarchical dependent relations of male dominance. And these do not only come into conflict within the family but between the family and the economy and the economy itself. In other words, the male privilege of the family both in ideological and real terms stands in direct conflict with the ideology of rugged individualism of capitalism. Once women apply this rugged individualist ideology to themselves the basis for conflict between the world of work and home is laid.

Capitalist Patriarchy



Given our earlier discussion of the feudal family, the relations between the family and feudal patriarchy do appear to be in greater harmony than those of capitalist patriarchy and the family.

Feudal Patriarchy



As conflict between the ideologies of liberal individualism and male privilege develops and heightens in capitalism, so do the real needs of both capital and the family in terms of women workers. Within feudalism the male privilege of the family supports the paternalism of the economic order, whereas the male privilege of the family comes into conflict with both the needs of the market and its ideology of "individualism." The transformation of capitalist patriarchy appears to be presently rooted within the conflicts between the patriarchal relations of the family, the relations of the economy, and their respective ideologies.

(b) A second and related level of conflict arises between the patriarchal values of society which define woman's responsibility and place in the home as mother vs. the growing needs of the capitalist economy for women to enter the work force. This conflict has a long history of development and accomodation.

During the 1890's till World War I in the United States, the conflict arose between the reality of women working and the ideology defining womanhood.[24] In this sense women who labored for wages in this period until World War I were denied entry into the world of femininity as ideology defined it. The Victorian image of womanliness excluded the working woman. Woman was defined in terms of the home and

motherhood. Work was seen in conflict with this. Women who did work viewed marriage as a way to escape the toil of the factory. And for those women, married or unmarried, who remained in the work force, it was viewed as acceptable as long as they didn't attack or question the conventional standards of womanliness. As Sarah Eisenstein has stated, "this meant that she did not force others to recognize that she worked and that she did not identify or think of herself as a 'working woman.'"[25]

Although the image of Victorian woman has undergone an update, the rest of this description of pre-World War I women can be accurately applied to women in the 20th century, specifically the depression era of the 30's and the McCarthyite 50's. The ideological shift which has taken place since the 50's is mainly a move from "woman's place is in the home" to the notion of woman as "secondary earner," or "working mother." Hence, there have been multiple attempts to reconcile women's labor outside the home with their (still) primary definition as mother. This means that however women enter the labor force (needs of capital), they must have their patriarchal existence reinforced in order to protect the unity of patriarchal history and hence its political effectiveness. This is reflected in the sexual segregation of women in the labor force itself which simultaneously "allows" them into the realm of wage-labor while reinforcing their inequality there and hence their role as mother.[26] It is also reflected in the growing number of part-time and seasonal jobs which "allow" women to maintain their double responsibilities as both wage worker and mother.

Although wage-labor is still considered within the cultural language of the society to be primarily male, there is more recognition than before World War I that women are also a part of this world of work. The recognition, however, is troublesome on several counts. First, it does not recognize the large numbers of women involved in the labor force, nor that this work is still sexually segregated. In other words, when Robert Lindsey entitled his *New York Times* article, Sept. 11, 1977, "Women Entering Job Market At An Extraordinary Pace," he should have qualified that they are entering the service and clerical part of the market.

In 1900 only 6% of women in the United States worked outside the home. In 1970, 48% did. Today, 53% of all women between the ages of 18 and 65 are in the labor force.[27] Forty-two percent of these women are unmarried and 29% are married to men who make less than $10,000 a year. We are speaking of approximately 40.5 million women who now work in the labor force as compared to 57.2 million men; these women account for 98.7% of all telephone operators and 94.2% of all clerical laborers.[28] Juanita Kreps has noted that more than 1/3 of married working women are clerical laborers, and 1/5 are service workers.[29]

Speaking of women's movement into the labor force Eli Ginzberg states:

"It is the single most outstanding phenomenon of this century. It is a world wide phenomenon, an integral part of a changing economy and a changing society. Its secondary and tertiary consequences are really unchartable."[30]

Women's entrance into the labor force is an important new phenomenon, yet it reproduces the patriarchal relations of male-female relations.[31] These relations of the sexual hierarchy of the home are carried into the labor force, both in terms of job options and one's wages. The earning gap between men and women in the labor force is wider than ever before. The differential was 75% in 1974 compared to a 56% differential in 1955. In 1970 only 7% of American women earned more than $10,000 a year compared to 40% of American men. Half of the women who worked full time earned less than $5,000 a year.[32] The median income for women in 1970 was $4,977 and $8,227 for men. This wage structure reflects the present sexual ghettoization of women into clerical, service, waitress, nursing and teaching jobs. It is the utilization of this sexual division of labor, emanating from the home, within the labor force which is at the base of excess economic gain for corporate owners. Simultaneously the reinforcement of the sexual division of labor in the labor force protects its operation in the family.

"If in 1970 women who worked had earned the same amount per hour as men who worked, it would have cost employees an additional $96 billion in payroll alone . . . that figure would have risen to $303 billion if hours as well as jobs and pay had been equalized."[33]

This sexual hierarchy which is used within the labor force is maintained through the primary definition of woman as mother first. Sexual ghettoization in the labor force maintains this definition of woman as mother in that it places her in a secondary position within the labor force which reinforces her primary position within the home. If woman has few options as to job choice in the world of paid work and her wages are as low as I have presented here, her dependence upon a man has not *fundamentally* changed, particularly if she is married with children. Only 46% of all jobs in the economy pay enough to sustain a family at a "reasonable" level.[34] This may explain why 96% of the population eventually does marry and even though 38% of these people will get divorced, 79% of those who divorce do remarry.[35] It is important to recognize that however insufficient job opportunities are for women, and however insufficient the pay, that large numbers of women are singly responsible for family households.

This economic dependence is part of the system which maintains marriage, the family (even if it is the single parent family) and mothering. Besides this ultimate priority, the structuring of these sexual hierarchical relations maintains a system of domestic labor.

While utilizing a definition of women within a sexual division of labor which increases the profit system for individual corporations it also maintains a system of domestic labor within the home which reflects woman's union with childbearing and rearing. In a Chase Manhattan Research Report it has been noted that if a housewife were to be paid for her household labor, she would be worth $257.73 a week. Each housewife therefore performs a job worth $13,391 a year, whereas the aggregate housewife services would be worth $250 billion a year.[36] This work is done, and is not recognized as work by the system of capitalist patriarchy as long as woman is defined in relation to motherhood via her biological activity of reproduction.

The accommodation of this conflict between women as wage workers, mothers and domestics is not as successful as it may first appear. Primarily this reflects the fact that as more women enter the labor force they expect the ideology of equal opportunity (discussed earlier) to apply to them. Instead, women see their limited options within the labor force as they become a part of it. Because of this conflict between the ideology of equal opportunity and women's real lack of it within the labor force itself, woman's second-class status becomes, for them, highlighted.

They become more conscious of the work they do in the home against the backdrop of their waged labor. The arbitrariness of the sexual division of labor which assigns them the labor of the home seems less justifiable as they also go off to work each day and come home tired. Women's expectations about a fair division of labor change as they are forced to carry the burdens in both work realms.

(c) The discussion above points to the conflict which arises from the changes women's lives undergo as they enter the labor force while the patriarchal relations and values of dependence both in the home and on the job are maintained. Awareness of this conflict has heightened as women who identify as middle class have entered the world of wage-labor, alongside the women of the working class. Women of the working class have always worked in greater proportion to women who identify as middle class in the United States. But as women who identify as middle class have begun to work in large numbers due to structural changes in the labor force[37] (and high inflation), they have made the "double day of work" more visible to society.

Activity which is defined as middle class is always more visible than working class activity in a society which identifies itself as middle class. This involvement of middle class-conscious women in the wage-labor force has begun to alter the previously accepted patriarchal view that woman belongs in the home. Rather liberal patriarchal ideology now specifically speaks about the equal opportunity for women as well as men, although this opportunity is spoken of alongside woman's primary responsibility for childrearing. This is the lastest attempt to define the

consciousness of wage-working woman as inclusive of her responsibilities within the sex-gender system itself as well as the labor force. This attempt at adjusting ideology, to protect the reality of the working mother, is only partially successful, because it heightens the demand and political relations of the two work worlds at the same time that it tries to smooth over them.

The interesting phenomena we are presently experiencing is that the recognition of women as workers in the United States cannot be connected to a recognition of women's equality with men or a fundamental reorganization of the mothering process as women's responsibility. Rather, women who used to work within the home instead of the labor force and now find themselves working in both realms, are faced with a new understanding of the sexual division of society and the inequalities connected to it. They become more conscious of the work they do as childbearers and rearers as they have less time in which to do it. Women themselves begin to question the hierarchical organization of their lives as their existence in both worlds crisscross. The pressures of the home are exacerbated by the added pressures of the work place. Boss and husband seem more and more alike. As this has now affected the woman who identifies as middle class as well as the working class woman, the sexual division of labor becomes structurally highlighted for more women than ever before.

The argument hinges on the acceptance that the particular development of a large middle class consciousness among women is part of the present political reality which helps lay the basis of liberal feminist consciousness. Whether or not one thinks that many of these women who identify as middle class perform working class jobs (as they have been defined in terms of the particular needs of monopoly capitalism,[38] they (typists, clerks, waitresses, secretaries, etc.) often identify as middle class. It is true that most women who work in the labor force do waged and salaried work which is alienating and exploitative and can easily be defined as working class in this "objective" sense. But this does not help one understand that these very workers may identify as middle class. It is this disparity between one's reality and one's consciousness of it that is important to understand, because it highlights the role of ideology in inverting reality for us.[39] Once one has internalized aspects of the society's ideology, reality has been internalized in its inverted or manipulated form. In this process ideas and reality are no longer totally separate.[40] Hence, a woman who performs a working class job and identifies as a middle class person has to be defined in terms of the totality of these two spheres and must be dealt with politically in these terms. Her feminist consciousness reveals a dynamic particular to her middle class expectations as it reflects the rhetoric of equal opportunity and the limitations placed on these expectations by the sex-gender

system itself. As liberal feminists they still do not understand the particular collaboration of capitalism with patriarchy which is involved here.

There are real economic class differences among women which cannot be fully explained by speaking of the middle class woman as merely a reflection of false consciousness, i.e., as a mystification of her true working class nature. Without becoming involved in the larger definitional and political question of the contours of the working class in the United States (as distinguished from the middle class), I want to use the distinction between these two classes because it is politically real. I realize the distinction used here side-steps the major political question of the relation between the subjective and objective dimensions of class. It also assumes that one's class consciousness can differ from one's class reality, and hence seems to reify the separation of consciousness and reality. However, I do not mean to say that there isn't a middle class reality as well as a middle class consciousness, but rather that a majority of women's realities are not middle class, although their consciousness is. There are class differences among women, but there are also real similarities that the distinctions between different economic classes of women do not point to. Working class and middle class women share much more in reality than their consciousness of their economic class might lead one to believe. The shared existence of working mother cuts across these class lines, as does the definition of woman as childbearer, rearer and domestic. The fact that 97% of the telephone operators are women cuts through traditional class divisions. The way ideology intervenes to distort reality and the way this becomes reproduced through our consciousness is highly important in understanding how working class reality and middle class consciousness can be reflecting similar relations of the sex-gender system itself, while supposedly representing different political realities.

What are the needs of our society as they presently define working class and middle class women? What effect does the acceptance of woman as working mother have on the system of male privilege? Will supports for "working mothers" continue in such a way as to protect the basic sexual hierarchy of society or will they undercut it? While the need (in terms of unemployment) is to limit women's options in the labor force, inflation requires that women remain as working-mothers. As such the conflict which exists has developed out of woman's role in the labor force and her life at home— the ideology of liberal individualism and the reality of sexual dependence.

These conflicts are partially reflected in the divorce rate which has doubled in the last ten years. It is now estimated that two out of every five children born in this decade will live in single parent homes for at least part of their youth. The number of households headed by women

has increased by more than a third in this decade, having more than doubled in one generation.[41] These changes have begun to challenge the present organization of the family. The question is whether these changes can be guided by feminist priorities, or whether the state will retain its control in this latest stage of the historical and political development of the family.

The Capitalist Patriarchal State and the Family

How does one begin to understand the state's role in the maintenance and reproduction of patriarchy? Is there an official governmental position on the family which does not necessarily coincide with other interests in the state? Is today's problem for the state that it has not arrived at a cohesive policy on the family but rather has multiple and conflicting ones which reflect the several levels of conflict which have arisen between capitalism and patriarchy?

The question of how the state chooses to deal with the arising conflicts between the needs of capital and the needs of patriarchy has to be understood in terms of the political relations and purposes which define the state in the first place. Instead of thinking of the state as an abstract thing one needs to understand it as a political relation which grows out of the political need to mediate conflict and to create order. The state intervenes to maintain and reproduce social cohesion[42] of the political totality. In order to do this the state must maintain the hierarchical relations which structure both the relations of capital and the sex-gender system, through a system of social patriarchy.

The state involves the (a) governmental apparatus with its relatively autonomous[43] relation to the (b) economic class structure and (c) sexual hierarchical order of the society via the family. The state represents these interests, but because they often are in conflict with one another today, it must stand apart from the whole, while it sorts through how to promote the totality. The bottom line for the state is always the protection of the capitalist patriarchal system as a whole. However, the choice of *how* to go about this ultimately reflects the relative autonomy of the state. It is within this limited realm of choice that conflicts internal to the state appear.[44] The structural aspects of the state are supported through the system of ideological supports— the media, etc., and through the entire system of law. The ideological apparati[45] involve the media, defined as newspapers, journals, magazines, television, radio, movies, theatre; the church, as it operates as organized religion; and the education system, defined as the formal cultural training structured through the schools. The social relations involved in these networks, which are primarily responsible for the presentation, maintenance and reproduction of patriarchal ideology, reflect the state's involvement and investment in patriarchal relations. The system of law organizes the above relations at it regulates all social relations. The legal formulation of the sex-gender system, through marriage law, divorce law, abortion law, day care law, etc., monitors the relations of familial patriarchy. The state oversees the way the law connects the ideology of patriarchy with its practice and with the needs of the totality.

The institution of marriage through the system of law directly connects the family to the relations of the state and indirectly maintains its ideological justification. From its inception the family is political. Levi Strauss has stated that ". . . the structure of the family always and everywhere, makes certain types of sexual connections impossible, or at least wrong."[46] Legitimacy of children becomes part of the system of control. "The important thing is that every society has some way to operate a distinction between free unions and legitimate ones."[47] The organization of such relations is most definitely a concern of the political order and as such is dealt with by the state. The question is not whether the state, a representative of the power relations of society, has a policy on the family, but rather what the policies are.

The difficulty in understanding the state's policies on the family is related to the way ideology tries to cloak them. For instance, the family is presented through today's ideology as private, and hence unrelated to the public functions of the state. Even discussions like Christopher Lasch's,[48] which accuse the state of invading the privacy of the home, are premised on the division, and hence reproduce the mystifications about the family as historically apolitical. This ideological cloaking, which is a part of the political relations of the state in the first place, tries to cover up the fact that the legal system as an arm of the state operates both directly (abortion law)[49] and indirectly (marriage law) to define woman's options as a mother within the family.

Today state intervention is being used for the purpose of smoothing out the conflicts between the ideology of liberal individualism and the ideology and reality of male dominance. Factions within the state are trying to reassert patriarchal control by challenging existing abortion rulings, publicly-funded day care, the ratification of ERA and homosexual rights. These four policy areas represent the arena for conflict between the Conservative Right and the Center Liberals, inside and outside the state apparati. The Center Liberals, represented by Carter, support the program of stabilizing the patriarchal family while protecting the image and reality of the working mother. Their problem is to figure out how to do this, given the real conflicts which exist within the state itself between the Center and the Conservative Right headed by Reagan, as well as the new levels of liberal feminist consciousness in the

country. The state's activity serves to mediate these conflicts and grows out of the irreconciliability of these conflicts.[50]

For instance, Carter's support of the ERA can be understood and hence reconciled with the huge political mobilization against it when one sees that he is trying to reassert some sense of order to the sex-gender system through the family without denying woman's role in the economy. After all, the ERA does not address the question of patriarchal control or sexual hierarchy, but rather legitimizes it in liberal equal opportunity terms. Carter understands this and therefore supports the ERA in the hopes of demobilizing the liberal feminist movement and at the same time gaining electoral support. Liberals within government know how large the liberal feminist movement and its support is.

If the state through the ERA (and the whole structure of law) can appear to bring satisfaction to liberal feminists, a great victory will be won by the state in its struggle to reassert the patriarchal control of the system, by once again demobilizing liberal feminist activity by letting them think they have won something, when they haven't. That is why the state has been trying to coopt the feminist movement through the Houston conference and now through the ERA. Carter's faction of the state realizes that women's equality before the law is an adjustment which the state has to make in order to stem the tides of liberal feminist struggle, which otherwise might lead to more radical indictments of society. Carter understands that a law cannot make equality or *by itself* change dominant social relations. Representatives of the state know this although they disagree among themselves on how best to manipulate the pro-ERA feeling of the liberal feminists who believe real equality can be won through the law.

Joyce Kolko's point that the rulers never believe the ideology they use rings clear here. It is only the people who internalize the ideology as their values that do. That is why Nixon one day could espouse anti-Communist rhetoric, and the next day push for detente with the Soviet Union. And it is why Carter can support the ERA while at the same time anti-feminist campaigns rage on. People internalize the ruling patriarchal ideology of society and therefore are slower to change their political positions than politicians. As a result they are in conflict with the ruling class when it begins to embrace a new form of patriarchal ideology. Phyllis Shafly is an example of this. Her political claims have become unworkable in terms of societal and feminist demands. The Central Liberals know this. Elements of the anti-feminist backlash do not accept the ideology or practice of the working mother, nor do they understand why elements of the state support it. This is why the anti-feminist campaign, supported and led by the "Right" both inside and outside the state, is working at cross purposes with the Center Liberal factions of the state. Anti-feminist activity heightens the conflicts

which the 'Center Liberal' dimension of the state wishes to mediate. Carter understands that as long as women are to remain in both work worlds, this will be reflected in their liberal consciousness, and as such must be recognized through the law. Carter's support of the ERA reflects this recognition.

The Right obviously believes it needs to reassert patriarchal control by denying many of the feminist gains made by women for abortion and daycare and equal rights. Those of the liberal Center know that these gains are also related to women's ability to work and remain in the labor force, and understand that this is a necessity in an economy in which the wages of 46% of the jobs are unable to support a family of four. The decision by the Supreme Court that employers may refuse pregnancy sick pay raises some interesting questions for our discussion. The court ruled:

"The private employers who have programs temporarily compensating out of work employees for a broad range of disabilities may refuse to compensate women for absences caused by pregnancy."[51]

One could interpret this ruling in simple economic terms which would explain that the cost to industry would be 'too great' to pay women for pregnancy leave. But on the other hand, this policy appears to discourage women from continuing their childbearing activity by making pregnancy detrimental to them in the world of work. This is a specific case where the needs of big business may not be the same as the state's as a political totality in terms of protecting and reproducing the mothering process. Given the present needs of the economy and society for working mothers, it would appear that it is in the interests of the state to provide paid pregnancy leave although it may not appear to be so for elements of the capitalist class on a short-term basis. As a result of these conflicting issues, this ruling is presently being reconsidered by the House.

In other words, because the state does not operate independently of the struggles which take place between conflicting class and patriarchal needs, its policies can often be contradictory. The conflicts can reside within the federal government itself, as they do now, between anti-abortion forces and those who support population control and hence support abortion. This conflict reflects the tensions between the Right and Center Liberals which exist in agencies like HEW. In other words, the state is not unified on a position on abortion in the same way the Trilateral Commission and Cowboy forces conflict over aid to the flow of capital to the Southwest. It is these conflicts within the state which both reflect and reproduce the present conflicts in society.

If we are to understand the family as a part of patriarchal history, we have to understand the family as it develops through real struggles with the state. This is part of the present day politics of the family which

needs to be understood so that liberal feminists do not once again misunderstand the role and purpose of the state in instituting reforms which affect the family, and hence the political lives of women.

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FOOTNOTES

1. I wish to thank Beau Grosscup, Miriam Kramnick and Mary Ryan for reading earlier drafts of this paper. My very special thanks are due to Ros Pechetsky for her extraordinarily careful and precise criticisms of an earlier draft. Whatever level of clarity emerges from these pages is due to her systematic critique.

2. See Wini Breines, Margaret Cerullo, Judith Stacey. "Social Biology, Family Studies, and Anti-Feminist Backlash," in *Feminist Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 1, (Feb., 1978), pp. 43-69; and Elizabeth Pleck. "Two Worlds in One: Work and Family," *Journal of Social History*, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Winter, 1976), pp. 178-195.

3. My thanks to Mary Ryan for clarifying this distinction for me.

4. See Nancy Chodorow. *The Reproduction of Mothering, Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender*, (Berkeley: Univ. of Calif. Press, 1978); Dorothy Dinnerstein. *The Mermaid and the Minotaur, Sexual Arrangements and Human Malaise*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1976); Gayle Rubin, "The Traffic in Women: Notes on the 'Political Economy of Sex'," in Rayna Reiter. *Toward An Anthropology of Women*, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975).

5. The movement from the two parent nuclear family to the single parent family is wrongly understood as a move away from patriarchal relations. It is a reflection of the present challenges to the system of male privilege, but it is already being re-adapted to the needs of patriarchal power.

6. *The Random House College Dictionary* (New York: Random House), p. 974.

7. See James Mohr. *Abortion in America*, (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1978).

8. *Op. cit.*, Dinnerstein.

9. Phillippe Aries. *Centuries of Childhood, A Social History of Family Life*, (New York: Random House, 1962).

10. Lawrence Stone. *The Family, Sex, and Marriage in England, 1500–1800*, (New York: Harper and Row, 1977).

11. Edward Shorter. *The Making of the Modern Family*, (New York: Basic Books, 1975).

12. I am indebted to Ros Pechetsky for clarifying this point.

13. Miriam Kramnick articulated this discussion of the mother/child relations for me in her critical notes on my paper.

14. Peter Laslett. *The World We Have Lost, England Before the Industrial Age*, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1965).

15. *Op. cit.*, Chodorow.

16. See Linda Gordon. *Woman's Body, Woman's Right*, (New York: Grossman, 1976).

17. For an excellent discussion of the breakup of the self-sufficient family as a unit of production with the advent of capitalism, see: Roberta Hamilton. *The Liberation Women, A Study of Patriarchy and Capitalism*, (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1978).

18. *Ibid.* Also see Christina Hole. *English Home Life, 1500–1800*, (London: BT Batsford Ltd., 1947).

19. *Op. cit.*, Fussell, p. 184.

20. *Op. cit.*, Gordon.

21. See my "Developing a Theory of Capitalist Patriarchy and Socialist Feminism," in *Capitalist Patriarchy and the Case for Socialist Feminism*, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1978).

22. See C. B. MacPherson. *The Real World of Democracy*, (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1966), and *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism*, (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1962), for a full explication of equal opportunity theory and its limitations.

23. See John Stuart Mill. *On the Subjection of Women*, (Conn: Fawcett Pub., 1971), and J.J. Rousseau. *Emile, Julie and Other Writings* (New York: Barron's, 1964).

24. My discussion here is indebted to my sister, Sarah Eisenstein. Her dissertation "Working Women's Consciousness in the United States, 1890–W.W. I" remains unfinished due to her long battle against cancer and her early death. Also see Mary Ryan. *Womanhood in America*, (New York: New Viewpoints, 1975).

25. *Ibid.*, S. Eisenstein, Chapter 3, p. 42.

26. See Baxandall, Reverby and Gordon. *America's Working Women*, (New York: Vintage, 1976); Heidi Hartman. "Capitalism, Patriarchy, and Job Segregation by Sex," in Eisenstein, *op. cit.*; and Sheila Rowbotham. *Woman's Consciousness, Man's World*, (London: Penguin, 1973), for a discussion of how women's role as mother is reinforced by her options in the labor force.

27. Louise Kapp Howe. *Pink Collar Workers*, (New York: D. P. Putnam's Sons, 1977).

28. *Newsweek*, December 6, 1976, p. 70.

29. See Juanita Kreps. "The Future of Working Women," *Ms. Magazine*, March 1977, pp. 56-57.

30. "Vast Changes in Society Traces to the Rise of Working Women," in *The New York Times*, November 29, 1977, p. 6.

31. *Op. cit.*, Hartman.

32. Karen Lindsey. "Do Women Have Class?" in *Liberation*, (Jan/Feb. 1977), Vol. 20, No. 2, p. 18.

33. *Dollar's and Sense*, No. 21, (Nov. 1976), p. 4.

34. *Newsweek*, December 6, 1976, p. 69.

35. *Newsweek*, May 15, 1978, p. 67.

36. Gerder Lerner quoting from Sylvia Porter's, "What's A Wife Worth," in

Lerner. *The Female Experience: An American Documentary,* (New York: Bobbs Merrill, 1977), p. 110.

37. See Harry Braverman. *Labor and Monopoly Capital.* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974), for a discussion of the structural changes in the labor force and the effect on clerical labor.

38. *Ibid.*

39. See Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. *The German Ideology,* (New York: International Pub., 1947), for a discussion of the meaning of ideology and its relation to material forces.

40. See Antonio Gramsci. *Selections from the Prison Notebooks,* (New York: International Pub., 1971); and Nicos Poulantzas. *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism,* (New York: Schocken Books, 1974), for a discussion of the importance of ideology and its place within the dialectic.

41. "The Family in Transition: A Challenge From Within," in *The New York Times,* Sunday, November 27, 1977, p. 74.

42. See Poulantzas, *op. cit.,* for a discussion of the state's role in social cohesion.

43. See Ralph Miliband. *Marxism and Politics,* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1977); "The Capitalist State: Reply to Nicos Poulantzas," *New Left Review,* Vol. 59, (Jan./Feb., 1970), pp. 53-60; and "Poulantzas and the Capitalist State," *New Left Review,* Vol. 82 (Nov/Dec., 1973), pp. 83-92. Also see: Nicos Poulantzas, "The Problem of the Capitalist State," *New Left Review,* No. 58 (Nov/Dec., 1969), pp. 67-78; "The Capitalist State: A Reply to Miliband and Laclau," *New Left Review,* Vol. 95, (Jan/Feb., 1976).

44. I am indebted to Miliband's discussion in *Marxism and Politics, ibid.,* and Poulantzas, *ibid.,* for their discussion of their discussion of the relative autonomy of the state, although neither one discusses the question of autonomy in terms of the needs of patriarchy.

45. See *op. cit.,* Poulantzas. *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism,* for an intriguing discussion of the role of ideology in relation to the state.

46. Claude Levi Strauss. "The Family," in A. Skolnick and J. Skolnick. *Family in Transition,* (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1971), p. 63. Also see Claude Levi Strauss. *The Elementary Structures of Kinship,* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969).

47. *Ibid.,* p. 57.

48. Christopher Lasch. *Haven in a Heartless World,* (New York: Basic Books, 1977).

49. *Op. cit.,* Mohr.

50. See Hal Draper. *Karl Marx's Theory of Revolution, State and Bureaucracy,* Vol. 1 and 2 (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977); and V.I. Lenin. *Selected Works,* Vol. 1 and 2, (Moscow: Progress Pub., 1970), for a discussion of the state, although their understanding of the irreconciliable conflicts stemmed from the relations of the economic class structure of capitalism. The sex-gender system has no identity on the state level.

51. *The New York Times,* December 10, 1976, p. Al.

Planning, Austerity, and the Democratic Prospect

Dudley Burton and M. Brian Murphy

Abstract

This paper raises questions about democratic planning in the current context of austerity, itself characterized by increasing division between wealth and impoverishment. To this end, the paper analyzes the problem of democracy as it is the problem for capital. We argue that planning embodies a contradiction between its ideological function and democratic role. But to explain this contradiction requires an analysis of austerity conditions and possible responses, a critique of the political-economic understanding of planning and democracy, and a reconstruction of concepts pertaining to the culture of democracy and freedom.

We argue that democratic planning requires the engagement of a set of contradictory processes and relationships—centralization-decentralization, bureaucracy-equality, etc. The concrete and specific activities of democratic, critically oriented planners will derive from, and inform, emergent movements in worker control, mass resistance, state enterprise, appropriate technology, and others. We conclude that only in such grounded activities can planners help to realize democracy both as the concrete opposition to the domination of capital and as the dialectical creation of humane and liberalizing social visions.

I. *Introduction*

Contemporary Marxist criticism of the capitalist state is careful to distinguish between the formally "democratic" institutions of representative government and the bureaucratic structures of administration and management which are not directly (or even indirectly, in some instances) representative or democratic. James O'Connor (1978) thus distinguishes between the "state," consisting of the "undemocratic and bureaucratically-organized 'executive branch,'" and the "government,"

or "representative branch." The heuristic function of this distinction is to bring attention to the historic erosion of the formally democratic state in favor of an increasingly powerful administrative and bureaucratic state.

This essay concerns itself with two aspects of this historic passage. First, we examine the ideology and practice of *planning* which legitimates the emergence of the managerial state. Second we explore the prospects for democratic struggle in those undemocratic arenas dominated by planning. We use *planning* to refer to a variety of data collection, analysis, forecasting, and review processes in the public arena. Whether in technology and environmental assessment, economic management, program evaluation, budgeting, regulation, or the provision of public services, these activities have the effect of rationalizing and even scientising policy decisions (Habermas, 1970, 1975). But because planning issues open up policy processes even as they centralize and coordinate them, they provide very real political opportunities.

This analysis is prompted by the conviction that the current period of austerity will be marked by increasing struggles over state policies in the areas of social life most penetrated by the managerial state: education, health, housing, social welfare, jobs training, mass transit, urban social violence, aging. These are the areas of social life most affected by the state's attempt to reduce costs, "efficiently" trim budgets and "rationalize" programs in order to effectively lower the social costs of the reproduction of labor. Those elements of the working class caught in this move—the elderly, the poor, racial minorities, women, state workers—encounter massive bureaucracies which regulate their practices by appeal to a liturgy of rational planning, social equity and efficiency.

This legitimating appeal to rationality and efficiency proposes a complex theory of democracy—one having very little to do with the political democracy of interests, representation, electoral accountability, mass engagement. It is a theory which emphasizes rationality in the service of the common good, efficiency in the service of the many, order and bureaucracy as a hedge against the depredations of the corrupt and greedy. This is a democratic theory which legitimates an anti-democratic practice, and yet one which may provide the ideological basis for a truly democratic critique of its own practice. This is the double irony of planning: it has been wedded to the corporate world the administrative state has striven to serve, and yet it holds out images of collective purpose and social equity which could be a profound critique of capital. It has legitimated an insulation of the state from the people, and yet it proffers a vision of the state in the service of the people.

Our argument will be that this irony is not simply theoretical. The practical impact of planning has been to isolate and silence those people

who have become increasingly dependent upon the social goods designed by the managerial state. This isolation and silence is ending, we suggest, as austerity creates conditions in which people increasingly move practically against the state—if only initially to secure the benefits they see themselves losing. As many critiques suggest, the state becomes an area for class struggle—over the allocation and even the definition of public goods, the definition of social goals, the justice of both bureaucratic procedures and planning decisions, and the level and quality of transfer payments (Esping-Andersen, Friedland, and Wright, 1976). In such a context, planners will find themselves increasingly in an explicitly political situation. This is a context of more than competing *claims;* it is a context of struggle over what should count as a claim, what role the state should serve, what counts as a constituency.

The intensifying condition of struggle may be seen as democratic in itself, insofar as it might represent the repoliticization of hitherto privatized market allocations or bureaucratic decisions. We think this is too simple, but this context surely does provide the opportunity to explore what *is* democratic about those struggles. And so we hope to identify which is democratic about these struggles, beyond the single recognition that they occur. By being more sure about what we hope for in a meaningful democracy with which to face the symbolic and ideological practices of bourgeois society, we can help create a vision which can animate our choices.

II. *The Ideology of Democratic Planning*

Planning emerged in the United States in the 20th century as part of the transformation of the role and the structure of the state. The ideals of rational planning, efficient management, and technical control were first proclaimed during the Progressive era, from 1895–1920, following the most intense period of labor warfare and social conflict in the country's history. Visions of bureaucratic order and centralized state power appealed to theose who wished to insulate the state from direct popular rule, at a time when the state would become increasingly central in all aspects of an urban industrial society. Planning was part of a broader vision of an administrative state, one capable of coherent intervention in all areas of social reproduction. The creation of such a state, especially at the local level, was a direct attack on the bosses and working-class political machines which controlled big-city politics. The municipal reform movement was the creation of business elites who sought a more managerial city government, one whose policies would not depend on the politics of patronage or votes (Hays, 1969). In this

aspect, Progressive reform offered planning as the "rational" alternative to working class politics.

But at the same time the Progressives suggested reforms which aimed at the common good and proclaimed the ideals of social equity. If planning was part of the vision of the administrative state, it was also part of the regulatory state, aimed against the selfishness and evil of laissez-faire. Progressive reformers proclaimed an attack on the Robber-Barons: the Rockefellers, the Vanderbilts, the Goulds, the Morgans. And Progressivism proposed to provide some measure of social welfare for the poor, uneducated immigrants who were flooding into the country. The ideology of reform, regulation, conservation, and democratic improvement came from philosophers like John Dewey, sociologists like Benjamin Ward, bureaucrats like Gifford Pinchot, and settlement house workers like Jane Addams. This was the age of "good government"; politics was to be taken out of the hands of corrupt politicians and bosses; the management of both industry and society was to be scientific and efficient.

These Progressive goals seemed democratic; the reformers spoke of the public good, liberating the people from party machines and corruption, increasing the opportunities of the most oppressed through social welfare programs, protecting the public resources through conservation, reorganizing government so that it more effectively and efficiently serviced the common weal. But this vision of democratic reform linked the public good to the bureaucratization and scientization of politics, the creation of a professional political caste (including planners), and the "management" of political struggle. In practice this meant the centralization of public power in organizations less dependent upon popular control, removing government from working class constituencies and creating greater opportunities for the centralization and concentration of capital.[2]

Planning was an integral part of the progressive program, and bore its peculiar ambivalence. Its private embodiment was Taylorism; its public form was bureaucratic organization and the rationalization of politics. In both instances, "planning" represented the coherent and rational management of resources and policy—separated from the unpredictable and disparate voices of actual popular constituencies. Its democratic claim rested in its pretension to *public* rationality and efficiency. More critically, this efficiency was part of an emerging new role for the state, of active intervention in social reproduction. Insofar as the state would undertake massive investments in infrastructure, energy, transportation, and eduction, as well as ever-expanding social welfare and police costs, the state would presumably be serving the public good by serving growth and economic development. Planning became part of the state's service to growth by "rationalizing" the

process of policy-making in a whole variety of new areas. In the development of electrical systems, water and gas systems, streetcar and trolley systems, then urban and regional development, land-use and resource management, planning as part of the state's effective management of an ever-expanding intervention. From capital's perspective, the state was lowering the costs of production and reproduction; from the liberal ideologue's perspective, the state was efficiently serving the public good.

Two developments in economic and political analysis were central to the democratic legitimation of planning. These are, first, the theory of non-market goods, and second, the notion of the public interest. *Public goods* and *merit goods,* do not fit in the framework of competitive Neoclassical economics. Public goods are those from which individuals cannot be excluded even if they might wish (e.g. national defense), and merit goods are those which the collective judges to be worthwhile even if they may not be sufficiently valued by individuals (e.g. education). Hence, even within the theory of competitive markets, there is a fundamental place for planning, collective production, and society-wide allocation of certain goods and services. Of course, liberal economists have argued that this realm is not as large as it ought to be, nor is it sufficiently well-funded. Conservatives have argued that markets can be constructed and made to operate for more of these goods than we imagine. But neither view resolves the problem, for some levels of both collective goal-setting and allocative planning are necessary in either case. The important point here is that the theory of public and merit goods has an implicit (and sometimes explicit) democratic focus. In the narrowest sense, the theory is about arenas of choice where competitive processes do not work. But it still assumes rationality, consumer sovereignty, individual autonomy, and collective satisfaction as relevant parameters. In other words, there is a genuine concern for the people as individuals and as a whole. Nonetheless, the identification of democracy with individual, autonomous consumers who can only express preferences for political alternatives through political markets rather than through more direct forms of engagement, illustrates the narrowness of this democratic conception.

The other basic development of relevance here is the political theory of the *public interest* (Meyerson and Banfield, 1955; Schubert, 1960). This notion developed in part to contrast with the language of self-interest and competing factions found in the Constitution. The basic idea is that there are genuine problems which are shared, which are above immediate or self-interest, and which require some fully collective choices. The problem has been whether the public interest is to be found, or whether it is to be construeted. In either case, the question is who determines it. Planners often represent themselves as repositories

and spokespersons for the public interest. Because they presume to listen sympathetically and critically to all the competing and allied claims, because they are not elected representatives and hence have no direct obligations to particular groups, and because their success is judged in the long-term rather than by the results of the next elections, planners have felt themselves to be sufficiently distanced and sufficiently comprehensive to define and pursue the public interest. And in this view, planners are genuinely democratic, for they try to determine collective welfare and the implications of specific choices for it (Friedmann, 1973; Klosterman, 1979).

The public interest view makes some basic assumptions about the unity of various individuals and groups into a "public," including the assumption that, ultimately, there is a coherence of interests. The theory requires that every relevant position or group have a voice; for those without their own articulate position, the planner himself must define and advocate it. The theory does recognize that there may be a difference between the rational merits of various claims and the money and power required to present them forcefully. The planner is presumed to be aware of this and compensate for it.

As it stands, the public interest argument is inherently flawed. It has an inadequate conception of public or collective matters and it fails to recognize (indeed obscures) the existence of fundamentally contradictory interests within Capitalism. As a result, when planners presume to speak for the public interest they speak ideologically even if they do not intend to. The notion of the public interest legitimates the domination of the society by Capital in the name of an abstract public. Planning most often integrates or dissipates legitimate popular demands through processes of rationalization and organization, all in the name of the "public."

Two examples of strong anti-democratic effects in planning will suffice to illustrate the point about how planners have seen themselves working for the public good while distorting or suppressing democratic initiatives. One of these, urban renewal, is a national issue of continuing significance. The other, agricultural mechanization, has recently come under criticism, especially in California. (Other examples in this same general category include oil and nuclear energy policy, mass transit programs, especially "high-tech" options like the San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit, and health service programs controlled by the medical profession.)

National urban renewal programs began in the 1940s, and they very quickly gained a reputation for "urban removal." While they tried to promote functionally and aesthetically improved housing and urban facilities, they quickly became co-ordinated with urban highway and real estate development programs. Putting in freeways and building

office complexes justified breaking up poor and ethnic communities. The freeways in turn transformed local sub-economics into a centralized urban economy, promoting capital concentration and often increasing the time and travel necessary for urban dwellers as a whole to attain services. Public transportation was subordinated, if not sacrificed, to the automobile. The communities displaced by these processes became more proletarianized: They lost political strength through diffusion of populations: their economic opportunities were constrained and more highly structured; and ethnic sub-cultures were destroyed. Wealth and political advantage accrued to the banks, developers and real estate interests—all those who were able to anticipate or to influence the massive changes brought about by urban renewal, and who continue to profit from the displacement and impoverishment of some urban populations. (Anyone who wants a particularly vivid portrayal of how this process worked and how it was manipulated using the planning process, read the chapter "One Mile" in Robert Capro's (1975: 850–891) study of Robert Moses and the transformation of New York City.) A review of urban renewal in general and of the record of Robert Moses in particular raise questions about how a democratic society can undertake large-scale programs of social reconstruction. The political and economic costs of unanimity in decisions with many parties is obviously very great. But the record of urban renewal overall shows that nothing is gained in the long run unless communities can be shown that the anticipated changes are to their advantage, and they are thereby willing to co-operate. Of course, mistakes might still be made, but the question of whether a freeway or a skyscraper is more valuable than an actual neighborhood becomes a concrete, rather than an abstract one which can be manipulated to concentrate power and dominate the very people who are supposed to be made better off. In a genuine democracy, urban renewal would still be possible but it would be far more organic and more integrated with existing communities and interests than the massive, power-centralizing process we have seen in this country over the past decades.

The second example is smaller-scale, but also illustrates the pattern of one-sided planning principles. Ever since the formation of the land-grant colleges, the state has encouraged research on agriculture, particularly in technology and mechanization. The rationale has been to reduce the drudgery of farm labor, to increase output, and to lower costs—all good capitalist objectives. However, it has become increasingly clear that there are direct losers and beneficiaries in this process. The costs of the research and development have been borne by the state, while growers and farm equipment manufacturers have benefitted enormously. At the same time, there is an argument that the implementation of technological changes, or the threat of it, are used to control

labor unrest and the composition of the agricultural work force (Freidland, 1978). The social costs of larger scale and economic concentration in agricultural production brought about by these technological changes are enormous and unpaid (Fujimoto, 1977). While overall production and employment may have increased with technological intensity, some groups are almost entirely displaced, and they are the ones with the least training or alternative opportunities.

Agricultural planners working in the government and in universities thus failed to take account of the actions they promoted on some major sub-populations in the industry, especially workers. This orientation reflects a "maximum net benefits" approach to the impacts of policy change, where a policy is to be adopted if its benefits exceed its costs, no matter who receives the benefits or whether the costs are actually paid. It is another of the rationalized abstractions planners use to subvert democratic voices by making the concentration of power legitimate whenever it accompanies "industrial progress." In short, the wealth and power of growers and manufacturers is legitimate because the public at large benefits from their entrepreneurship, never mind how they might exercise that power or what its effects might be on a specific relevant "others."

In these instances—and in a myriad of others—planning is an embodiment of the contradiction between democracy and capital, rather than its resolution. While its legitimations are popular and public spirited, its practices and constraints are rooted in the state's relationship to capital. Planning has been important to the state's role in reducing investment uncertainty, creating specific investment opportunities, and covering part of the costs of private accumulation. Through its regulation of social investments and social expenses, and through both allocative programs and constitutive policies, planning has functioned to aid and orient private capital. It has softened resistance to capitalist development, but it has by no means controlled that development—think, for example, about metropolitan or regional planning efforts. Its languages of technocratic expertise, rationality, and efficiency have served to intensify the commodification of social life and culture, as in education, health, recreation, welfare, and employment protection. Rather than critically informing, its use of cost-benefit accounting, system analysis, and management sciences have reduced qualitative questions of "public" concern to formulae and abstract calculation. This language has obscured the conflictual, tension-ridden, contradictions implied by Capital's growth, and thus served to further alienate popular constituencies from the political decisions affecting their social and economic lives.

The current setting of austerity, fiscal crisis, and popular unrest threatens to undermine this functional relationship among planning,

capitalism and democracy. This threat appears in both the structural and ideological level. Structurally, the increased reliance of Capital on state planning (in its many aspects), coupled with an increase in demands from the bottom, thrusts planning into a newly politicized position. In many ways we hope to explicate, austerity may force new confrontations aimed at realizing planning's democratic pretensions. Ideologically, the public interest claim in planning may become an avenue for truly democratic organizing. That is, at least, the scenario upon which our analysis will depend. Planning will be an interesting example of the State's crisis of legitimacy, because an analysis of the legitimations of planning may open it up to an assault on its role in capital accumulation. Planners can then be in more pivotal and important places than their current frustrations allow them to recognize.[3]

III. *Austerity*

The phenomenon of austerity is itself part of a complex dialectical process involving the creation of prosperity as well as poverty. In this historical period, austerity emerges as one part of the heritage of the 1960s. It is the era of a lean economy and regressive social policies which are the product of lavish spending for the Vietam War and domestic social programs. The combined effects of this differentiated spending have been inflation and recession, work intensification and unemployment, and an apparent scarcity of resources for most of the population.

The social investment provided by Capital during the 1960s took the form of military spending, research and technology (especially in health and transportation), incentives to create international markets, investment in job-specific education, and the establishment of state programs to absorb excess production. The effect of this investment has been to further centralize the control of capital, to decrease employment opportunities for those who need them most, and to create a crisis of profitability. To resolve the crisis, business has been willing to use inflation and unemployment to encourage labor discipline as well as to diminish labor's share. In this context, state workers and state clients find themselves in an even more vulnerable position: ravaged by inflation and attacked as part of the state or dependent upon it. The rhetoric deriving from the crisis of profitability makes it appear that the state is insignificant in the creation and enhancement of private investment opportunities. As a result of these paradoxes, workers, state employers, and state clients find themselves in a powerless position to confront the imperatives of investment and accumulation, since they know they depend upon them; but they also do not want to bear alone the

the brunt of investment decisions which are likely to exacerbate even further the maldistribution of wages and profits (Mermelstein, 1977).

The political implications of this situation are already emerging in a number of particularistic struggles and conflicts. Leaving aside (for our purposes) struggles over wages and working conditions in the nominally private sector, we want to suggest that the state will become increasingly a locus for confrontations around both the distribution and creation of public goods. As more people depend directly upon the state, and find their allocation skimpy in relation to inflation, they can be encouraged to move against this increased dependency to demand either increased benefits or transformations in the program of dependency. As groups not directly dependent upon the state become increasingly hurt by inflation and labor's relative declining share, they will turn to the state in anger or in despair to seek either redress from their curent burdens or political guarantees against further loss. Examples of this complex and contradictory politicization of what once were market decisions are demands for wage and price controls and the search for a coherent national energy policy. (At the same time, those with established power will argue for a return to the market in order to forestall political encroachments on that power; see Burton, 1979). While the historic pattern of both wage and price controls and economic planning has been to subsidize capital, the era of austerity makes it unavoidable that these issues will capture the more critical attention of both labor and state client groups as well as others on the "bottom."[4]

In brief, then, the state, and therefore, planning, emerges as the focus for a number of claims by groups who despair of their ability to solve freely their economic or social problems by private action. As a result planners will find themselves barraged by quite contradictory demands around policy areas directly and indirectly bearing upon the definition and production of public goods. The class character of these demands will not always be clear, as organized labor may seek accomodation with capital in certain policy areas, at the expense of the unorganized, as wage earning home-owners indirectly strike out at social welfare in their attempt to save themselves from regressive taxation, or as diverse groups of the disadvantaged fight each other and a nominally inefficient state over scarce resources. But, even if the class character of many demands were clearer, is this a context in which we can see a truly democratic potential? Or, is this politicized planning environment the opening for planners themselves to engage in fundamentally critical and transformational democratic political organizing? The fear we all have is that this emerging context will be the occasion for a more *etatist* formulation of policy, a more technocratic control over social planning, and an extended management of social conflict by the state in the further service of Capital. In the face of right-wing and fascistic

possibilities, can planners or the many constituencies of planning use the public context of planning or organize among the constituencies of planning to build a democratic claim?[5]

We want to suggest that there are democratic possibilities in the current situation. There is certainly a welter of local conflict around virtually every area of public policy in which planning is a part. As James O'Connor (1978) points out in his recent article on the "democratic movement," the state's attempt to lower the costs of social reproduction is met on all fronts by groups who seek not only to retain their own marginal benefits but also to transform the state structures which dispense those benefits. This confused arena of particularistic struggles and widening critique is one in which democratic organizing is surely possible.

But "democratic" organizing in the planning context is problematic for a variety of reasons. In those areas of health planning, urban development, environmental protection, transportation systems, even education, where struggle is now occuring, the "public" arenas are often constitutionally isolated from popular access. That is, the bureaucracies are designed to limit public access to decision except through carefully screened modes of technical representation or advocacy. To be sure, we can expect in these settings that there will be a variety of popular claims about the quantity of public goods or the quantitative transfers—a variety of public protests about the quality and cost of health care, the level of employment benefits, the destruction of neighborhoods by urban planning. But will these popular claims be democratic, or aimed at democratic reforms? This is a question which is not adequately answered by noting simply that there is struggle in the administrative state. We agree with O'Connor and others that the emergence of popular movements which make claims about the allocation and definition of public goods—and about the structures which create and deliver these goods—is an historic development which provides an opportunity to "democratize" the bureaucracies of planning. But the opportunity is not the fact. For these movements to be democratic they must be more than populist; "democratic" reforms require more than opening up bureaucracies to specific publics or securing benefits for particular segments of the working class (both admirable goals in themselves). Any analysis of the democratic prospect in these settings must do more than identify the structures blocking mass participation. It must also articulate a substantive vision of a democratic social order.[6]

IV. *Popular Movements and a Democratic Vision*

We have argued that the state will become increasingly the site of intensified conflict during the current period of austerity. In this we simply agree with most analysts who argue that as the state attempts to lower the costs of the reproduction of labor, those groups most directly affected will move to protect their marginal position and even to transform the state which provides these benefits. In the most basic—if meager—sense, these movements are democratic insofar as they express the continuing struggle of the working class for "participation and equality." Especially during a period when the working class is increasingly disaffected from the party combat of electoral politics, these movements express a search for representation, a defense of class claims.

What is, of course, immediately obvious about the great majority of these movements and the struggles through which they emerge is that they are not self-conscious movements of *class*. With the notable exception of public sector unions, most movements at work in the administrative state define themselves in non-class terms: welfare clients, pensioners, neighborhood groups, women, the unemployed, and ad-hoc committees. In the complex politics of administrative brokering—planning disputes, budgetary trade-offs, program development or dismantling—these groups can often come into conflict with one another. And during such conflict it is sometimes difficult to determine which movements are progressive, and which are democratic.

Therein lies the analytic and practical difficulty. The fact of struggle is not itself democratic. It may represent the continuing ability of Capital to subdue or repress popular demands; it certainly represents the administrative state's inability to reduce all social questions to expertise, policy analysis and bureaucratic management. In these limited ways the continuing struggle of particularistic groups are defensively democratic: Struggle forestalls autocracy. And in one other specific way these movements suggest a democratic potential: in their demand (when it occurs) to restructure the inaccessible relations of production in the state sector so as to ensure community control, public engagement, and popular determination of policy. But these various demands for popular power equate power with democracy, and thus avoid a variety of vexing problems.

The most vexing problem is that an equation of popular power with democracy is excessively formalistic, and does not question the substance of any popular claim. If, as Alan Wolfe (1979) puts it, democracy is rooted in "demands for participation by ordinary people in the affairs of interest to the entire community," is democracy simply the formal fact of public engagement? Are all movements seeking access to public

policy seeking democracy? Are they democratic? Surely we want to differentiate between the anti-abortion movement and the feminist movement, between the tax revolt and the organizing of teachers. Surely there are grounds for differentiation: Is democracy one of them?

This question becomes crucial during the present epoch precisely because of the shift of struggle from the nominally democratic arena of electoral politics to the formally undemocratic structures of administration and state management. Here is the opportunity to define a substantive vision of democratic power, in a context lacking the institutions and rhetoric of bourgeois democracy. And in these administrative organs of state power it is important not to recapitulate the paraphernalia of interest—group pluralism, the complex of divided representation and competitive dealing which characterizes the electoral arena. In the struggle to define a democratic politics in the context of state power we can define much of the socialism we seek.

What are a democratic politics, though? How can we carve out a substantive vision of democracy from the ideological baggage we associate with bourgeois democracy? We know it must mean forms of popular power, institutions of collective determinism—expressing a sovereignty and consent which is genuinely communal. It was on these grounds that Marx saw democracy as "the resolved mystery of all constitutions . . . the essence of every political constitution." Democracy is, in principal, the political expression of human *community,* of a participatory *engagement* in the creation of history; it is the active *making* of common concerns. Democracy is thus *more* than the formality of ruling; it is a culture and a practice as well.

If democracy is popular rule, it implies a substantive culture of values and commitments among the people who rule. If it is a sovereignty of popular needs, it requires a conception of action in which the people *constitute* their own needs. If it is a regime of freedom, it demands a vision of citizenship and equality animating that freedom.

So we wish to speak of democracy in the following way. Regimes or movements are *democratic* when the people within them rule, and in that ruling constitute themselves as a community of active citizens.[7] In such a movement (or union, or community action groups) citizens understand themselves to be both equal (socially and politically) and interdependent; citizenship is rooted in the recognition of reciprocal need and the necessity of collective action. Truly democratic citizenship is more than a fact of formal residency or legal standing; it is the expression of a substantive understanding of everyone's fragile dependency on the community which everyone actively creates. The democratic community is free—and its makers are free—insofar as the community determines its common life. This means not only the effective power over social/economic resources, but the conviction that

the institutions and structures of society are themselves the creation of the men and women who live through them. Democracy is thus the regime of action, in which people *constitute* their own community, its organization, and its social agenda. It is simultaneously a culture of conviction, a sociology of equality and reciprocity, and a politics of participation and creativity.

If democracy has this meaning of community and action—as it does for every critical thinker from Aristotle to Marx—then it is also associated with a conception of plurality and diversity. Democratic regimes and movements have been those which acknowledge a multiplicity of claims and visions, but which also protect the unique and the individual. The fact that bourgeois democracy has abstracted this acknowledgement into interest-group politics and civil rights should not obscure the more fundamental vision—that any community will have diversity and that diversity can be the source of great strength and richenss. But this creates the tension which always *defines* democracy: the communitarian claim is seldom neatly synchronized with the diversity of the community. The political implications of this tension are two: the insistence on political education and the instituting of participatory structures.

The latter defines democratic principles, and is the heart of any serious vision of self-constituting community. But the condition of any serious participation is civic commitments and convictions among diverse people. It is a political education which makes this possible, for it teaches the substantive dialectic between individual and community. Any democratic movement will thus engage in such an education, one which does not "balance" the two opposites, but integrates them into a more substantive understanding of the self and his or her relationship to the movement and to the larger community. In a larger context than the personal, this integration takes the form of a federated reciprocity among groups which speak through their diversity for common needs. In democratic theory, political education emerges from the practices of participatory engagement; it is less "taught" than learned. It emerges from the very process of a community or movement setting its own agenda and defining its own problems and dilemmas.

What are the themes of this view of democracy, and how do they inform our conception and activity of planning? Let us consider three central themes: 1) the relation between popular demand and popular rule; 2) the relation between democratic culture and democratic process; and 3) the relation between education and action.

Consider the relationship between popular demands and popular *rule*. The socialist critique has traditionally understood that popular demands are implicitly democratic because they are popular, that working class claims bear more than their specificity (wages, working

conditions, etc.). Within the contradictory structure of bourgeois society such claims for the many can imply a critique of power and hierarchy even when that critique is not explicit.

But there are two problems with this position. The first is obvious and is the substance of every cliché about reformism and revisionism since Lenin: that mass claims may be accomodated within capitalism without a radical demand for the restructuring of society. Demands for access to state resources or more egalitarian policies by state agencies are not always demands for popular power. However implicitly democratic claims from below, most often, are not concerned with the question of mass rule. We argue that only those claims which are about (but not only about) power and ruling—or which can be made so—are democratic. Demands for access to planning decisions can be democratic, for example, if they are for effective participation in decisions rather than for "adequate representation" before officials who will finally make the decision. The second problem is somewhat the obverse of the first: popular demands for mass rule, or participatory action, or public engagement in bureaucratic organization, can often be only *formally democratic*. It has long been a standard critique of bourgeois democracy that its form of mass access only ratifies elite control. This critique can move well beyond parliamentary questions, and focus our attention on the real issue: the relation between formal power and effective power. If a movement demands access to a state decision process, or moves to "democratize" a bureaucratic structure through ensuring mass participation, we must recognize that this only become substantially democratic when this power means something in concrete ways—when investment decisions or planning results are critically changed away from corporate interests.

The second theme of this democracy is moral, and connects what we call a democratic culture to a democratic process. When democrats speak of community (as we have) and of a citizenship which recognizes interdependency and reciprocity, we speak of a delicate interrelationship of personal values and institutions. This has been a critical focus of every theory of democracy; it is especially evident in Aristotle, Rousseau, and Marx. What is at stake is the substantive difference between a regime of interests and a regime of virtue. When Rousseau speaks of the sovereign community which is free because it obeys only the laws which it has made for itself, he is speaking of more than a formal process of participatory engagement. He argues that such an engagement requires—and dialectically "teaches"—a kind of citizen: one who self-consciously takes up the concerns of the community as his or her own because he or she sees (intuitively) the interpenetration of the needs of the self and others. Rousseau, like Tocqueville, goes so far as to identify the "habits" of mind and sensibility which make self-governing more

than a formality: a kind of generosity and humanity, a willingness to engage in debate and refutation, an aversion to the suffering and hurt of others.

Thus, the moral interior of a democratic movement might look like this: In my appreciation of my own dependency upon others I am humbled and elevated. I recognize my need for these others and their need for me. Insofar as this is reciprocal it gives me no special power, but empowers us together. My generosity to others is not gratuitously moral; it is grounded in my recognition of the mutual fragility we share. I can demand respect for my participation and my unique contribution while I grant respect to those upon whom I depend or learn from. This moral interior—sketched so weakly through the phrases of moralism—is sought by socialists everywhere. It is false to reject it as utopian or antiquarian, for it animates virtually every distinction we make between an oppressive society and one of liberation. It demands from us, however, an appreciation of the relationship between institutions and values. These democratic values can only come from a process of democratic participation, but they are not guaranteed by it.

The implications for our time are many. We seek a democratic order which is more than a balancing of "interests" because it is animated by people who are virtuously seeking a common good. But in the current context of domination, popular demands might quite properly dismiss any "common good" as ideological and stand firmly for their interests. For those of the working class, or local communities, or the excluded poor, these interests are in most sense "democratic." But we must be critical in our engagement with even those movements we support to move beyond interest to solidarity, and even generosity. We all know that in the current regime the immediate "interests" of the unionized working class, the welfare-poor, and the nonunionized third-world workers are often opposed, and that the interests of domestic workers often conflict with those of foreign workers. What constitutes a "democratic" claim is complex here, but we can make assessments and offer proposals. The refusal of the International Longshoreman Worker's Union to load bomb parts headed for Chile was more than "anti-Capital"; it was truly democratic because it transcended immediate "interests" to force solidarity. Conversely, the demands of unionized teachers to control their workplace *can* be anti-democratic if it ignores (or combats) the claims of local communities to have control as well.

The third theme of this democratic claim is more subtle, and connects participation with action, engagement with education. Democracy has traditionally meant more than the formalities of "mass rule" because the process of participation demanded a kind of action from democratic citizens. This "action" is informed, laden with judgement and knowledge, "constitutive" and creative, balanced between the equality of

participation and the substantive form of leadership and authority which emerge from debate and engagement. From this perspective, democratic movements are those which engage their members in the broadest possible range of tasks and debates, which seek many kinds of public action, which actually "teach" their membership in many ways which empower men and women to successfully apropriate decisions affecting their lives. Just as one of our most bitter denunciations of bureaucracy is for its effective isolation of its dependents through its enforcement of popular ignorance behind the veils of its own expertise, so we must demand more of popular movements than their formal opposition to this exclusion. We must seek movements which have agendas of education and participation. We must encourage mass action which empowers men and women beyond the action itself.

This implies that use of the central aspects of the democratic impulse will be the appropriating of institutions by men and women who progressively undo the reified alienation enforced by most state agencies. As Marcuse (1974, Ch. 6) has pointed out, institutions become dominated and anti-democratic when people have lost the sense that they were made by people and can be changed. This reified view reinforces an ignorance which reciprocally reifies the institutional world further. This circle is not broken by groups which formally participate in these institutions without having both an historical account of the institutions[5] or a substantive sense of how they might change in the structure through their own action. We must seek in our work to aid and organize movements which attempt to undermine the reification of the state through the engagement of their members in decisions affecting them.

All of this leads us back—or forward—to one of the oldest democratic themes: Freedom. The democratic possibility is rooted in opposition to Capital, and freedom surely consists partly in the process of liberating ourselves from the oppressions and alienations of the bourgeois world. But freedom is also the substantive vision of what we hope to create, informing the process by which we oppose Capital. But here our task is less one of hopeful integration than of creative tension. For if we want freedom to live in the vision of participatory community, we must know that not all liberating movements will be democratic. Put briefly, the premise of all democracy is the liberation from Capital, but not all liberation is immediately democratic.

Thus, we should be warned by Roberto Unger's claim that "until the central problem . . . of domination is resolved, the search for community is condemned to be idolatrous, or utopian, or both at once" (Unger, 1975: 252). But this warning need not turn into an easy equation between the mobilization of opposition to Capital and democratic freedom. Such an equation can reduce the latter to the former, as Brezhnev does when he

claims that "everything is democratic *which serves the interests of the people* and the interests of the Communist Party" (Bobbio, 1978: 45). We can move the equation in the opposite direction, especially in the current context. Those movements which truly seek a democratic form of freedom and engagement for their constituencies will inevitably come into opposition with Capital. They will also be in the process of dialectically creating the practical meaning of any future democracy.

This dialectic of opposition and transcendence, of critique and vision, must be animated by a fuller sense of what democracy can mean. We have tried to argue that the quite substantive meanings of democracy cannot be forgotten in the current epoch, precisely when so many popular demands and claims are emerging. A substantive sense of the democratic regime can make more coherent some of the tensions and choices experienced by political organizers or planners who could organize. In a context of increased public conflict, democracy can be the basis for a quite crucial understanding of the contradictions experienced by political actors. As we hope to show, however, these understandings do not add to simple prescriptions for strategy, for democratic strategies must themselves by understood dialectically.

V. *Democratic Organizing in the Planning Context*

Our discussion thus far has emphasized that democratic movements within the arenas of state planning are possible—both because of increased struggle within these arenas and because they deal increasingly with important social goods upon which the working class and society as a whole depend. We have suggested that the democratic prospect is one which does not emerge "naturally" out of the dialectics of conflict in the state; it must be organized by socialists animated by a democratic vision. We have tried to suggest some of the formal outlines of that vision, and how these questions arise in some planning contexts. We now want to step back and suggest a "democratic critique" of some of the contemporary conflicts in planning institutions.

Activists and organizers in any state agency—or those outside aiming to penetrate its fragile walls—are constantly barraged by a pervasive litany of planning truisms. These truisms take the form of the "great questions" with which theorists and managers are always embroiled. To enter any planning context is to encounter these questions. But they are not simply theoretical; they are also strategic questions leading to reform and change. Some of these questions involve structural forms, others involve questions of procedure and process. Should planning structures be centralized or decentralized?; should they be participatory

or representative?; should the criterion of policy be efficiency or equity?; who determines either?; what role should experts play?

How should democratic organizers address these questions? The answers to them may vary from one situation to the next, but we want to note some critical aspects of each which cannot be avoided.

Centralization/Decentralization

The important questions about centralization are the following: Who is doing? Against what opposition? What is achieved by it? For whom?

There has been a pervasive romanticism about decentralization, as it implies participation and direct access to power. But we can also recognize that there are important rationales for centralization. Many of the groups moving against the structurally embedded forces of Capital are themselves small and decentralized. Their quite legitimate democratic demands may not be *for* decentralization or localism at all. They may be for greater income, goods, and social share. Politically, such groups may need centralization in order to realize their *opposition*, so any analysis of such situations must take account of such social location and forms of struggle.[8]

On the other hand, claims by clients for decentralization of established powers and bureaucracies—social welfare, the schools, police, energy production, etc.—are very powerful strategies for expanding both oppositional and visionary voices and for improving responses from the bureaucracies. Such initiatives establish cracks in the solid wall of elite, bureaucratic, self-interested decision processes and thereby expand the range and importance of issues which can be engaged therein. Environmentalists and energy critics have used such strategies to affect changes in the composition of regulatory boards and to make state decisions more accountable.

Although the language and, perhaps, substance may be unattractive to many democratic critics, the general model proposed here is essentially *Federalism*. It is different, however, from the anti-democratic impulses of American Federalists. We seek to give explicit democratic content to the choices and justifications for choices in the determination of appropriate levels for political organization, opposition, and vision. In our world, single-minded arguments for localism will play into the hands of globally organized economic and political interests. And the necessary conditions for industrial organization, co-ordination, and direction cannot be overlooked. Yet the concrete forms of economic production, labor relationships, and local control can provide an oppositional force which starts from the bottom. The argument is only that Utopian socialist proposals of any sort are inadequate to confront the large-scale forces at work to prevent or limit democracy.

Participation/Representation

Participation can become confounded with centralization/decentralization, in the sense that we would probably assume that more effective participation happens in decentralized settings. Insofar as democracy is associated with participation, democracy requires decentralization in order to allow participation. Two problems arise, however: First, the critique which emerges from analysis of local government is that decentralization alone has little to say about the form of participation. Second, the claim that participation is an ethical good which ought to be increased in any circumstances still requires some analysis of the social conditions. In other words, such claims for face-to-face political participation may be utopian unless there is massive decentralization in the economy. While a democratic movement might want to keep participatory prospects constantly in mind, it must still ask itself about the conditions it faces and the projects it must undertake. Since only some of these will be radically decentralized, a democratic movement must find ways to organize itself to meet the scale of its challenges, both oppositional and visionary. In this regard, it is senseless to imagine fighting energy companies merely with backyard solar collectors or to assume there can be local democratic and communitarian efforts which can succeed in isolation from a more pervasive attack on the principles of the current socio-economic and political system. Such an analysis suggests that representation may be in many cases unavoidable, and in others quite desirable.

While representation is the backbone of bourgeois democratic theory, its abstractions can be articulated in far richer ways. The problem for democratic representation is to image ways in which representatives can actually reflect their democratic constituencies, rather than being merely a mechanism for power concentration. Single issue representation is one way; formalizing the requirement that representatives keep in close touch with their democratic constituencies in another.[9] Until the forces of differentiation and constituency-matching operate to control effectively the power which representatives are able to concentrate and exercise, the appropriate strategies for representation will be tension-ridden, as constituencies seek a powerful voice on the one hand, and accountability on the other.

Diversity/Homogeneity

The question of diversity is fundamentally the question of fragmentation and division among those groups dependent upon or employed by the state. In many cases their fragmentation is itself an artifact of state policy, resulting from the mobilization of factions of the working class

around certain policy issues. Thus, for example, poor women may find themselves brought together around the question of health care, day care, abortion and family supports, through those institutions which deal directly with these questions. Lines of solidarity and cohesion may develop around these issues more than around other class questions such as employment. Other divisions, of course, have roots in the social division of labor and in racist and sexist social structures. In all events, the vexing problem of diversity is how to bring together diverse claims into coherent harmony, into coherent and unified struggle.

In one critical way this is the issue of party building—an issue we will leave aside for this essay. But it is also a practical problem for organizers within the state who seek to aid critical movements. For any radical planner in any crucial bureaucracy, there are diverse claims always at work. There is a genuine tension between trying to honor those claims through balancing and trying to bring them together against an opposition fundamental to all. The problem for an organizer in such circumstances is to enrich and intensify diversity in dimensions other than those where a solid front is needed. In order to unite around particular issues, one does not have to give up differences. For example, unionists and environmentalists have begun to find common ground in their opposition to developments which degrade both the human and the natural environment.

In the long run, the challenge of diversity implies potentially different forms of democratic control and engagement for different folks. The emergence of democratic control in the coal fields of Appalachia is significantly different from that in the upper Midwest, and both are different from community re-development efforts in blighted urban areas.

In the short run, the problem is how to prevent the demands of diversity in social identity and experience from fracturing political opposition to the centralized forces which prevent it. In general, the achievement of democratic diversity will require the variety and pluralism which anarchists like Bookchin (1971) have encouraged. This problem, of course, requires strategies for leadership, organization, and disorganization in virtually all concrete planning contexts.

The Dialectics of Democratic Process

In addition to these structural issues which arise in almost all planning contexts, there are a variety of debates regarding the properly democratic process in any bureaucratic institution. Again, these are debates within the conventional literature of planning—but they are also issues worthy of critique by socialists and organizers who seek to build a more democratic mode of political engagement within adminis-

trative structures. These issues are efficiency-equity, organization-equality, expertise-amateurism and public-private dilemmas.

Efficiency/Equity

The language of efficiency and equity is itself a rather technocratic formalism to cover up an essential issue for democratic engagement. Decisions and policies can only be understood as efficient in the context of a definition. This definition itself implies standards, which may themselves need to be examined in the process of democratic decision-making.

The standard bourgeois critique is that social justice and re-distributional concerns are inefficient, wasteful, and unproductive. But such conclusions imply economic definitions of efficiency and waste, hence accepting the standards of Capital itself. Those programs which may be extremely inefficient from a quantitative or monetary point of view may be profoundly efficient in terms of human welfare, satisfaction, or sense of fair play. These are the standards which democratic politics and planning can bring to bear on the critical evaluation of social policies. Without such radical reformulation of the issues, democratic advocates will find themselves back-peddling against apparently legitimate demands for rationality in political choices, even though such demands may be highly abstract and manipulative.

It is certainly the case that bringing social justice considerations explicitly to bear on efficiency calculations renders the latter more complex and multi-faceted. But at the same time, it is one clear embodiment of an attack on the single-mindedness of Capital. It provides the occasions for connecting moral, welfare, and economic decisions in some fruitful way.

We require democratic definitions of efficiency, and this means calculations based upon the standards understood as appropriate by the people affected by those calculations. In Mao's China, for example, there were explicit commitments not to undertake paths and programs of development which would undermine already hard-won political gains, which would sacrifice rural development for urban development, or which would stifle agricultural for industrial development. These decisions may have been inefficient from the perspective of rapid Capital accumulation. But they were far more efficient than their alternatives, when efficiency was a measure of increased political engagement and participation and not simply a calculation of cost-per-unit production.

Organization/Equality

Bureaucracy and democracy have most often been thought to be blood enemies. Yet Max Weber showed how, in the Modern era, bureaucracy and democracy were necessary for each other. The elimination of feudal and aristocratic privilege made necessary the establishment of other arrangements to insure that the society's routine tasks will be performed. Bureaucracy, as a formalized, rationalized administrative apparatus arose in the context of presumed equality in liberal, bourgeois democracy. But in the context of systemic inequality and exploitation, such rationalized administration is a bulwark against an examination of the exploitative logic of the system as such.

Given the tendencies for bureaucracies under Capitalism to accumulate and centralize power, the democratic thrust must always be to struggle within and against such tendencies. Democratic planning must thus be to encourage popular access, to decentralize especially the service bureaucracies, and to redefine in democratic terms, bureaucratic structures, even as it might deny the legitimacy of bureaucratic authority as a good in itself.

Such strategies become especially important in circumstances where close bureaucratic associations connect private capital and the state, such as through regulatory, scientific, technological, and taxation processes. These all become loci to mobilize challenges to bureaucratic power and resources. In cases where democratic impulses are not actually weakened by the demise of bureaucracies, as they are now in energy and environmental de-regulation, we can encourage sunset legislation to require the re-design or re-organization of bureaucratic functions. While such maneuvers are never in themselves sufficient, they can provide the occasion for critical evaluations, organizing, and re-definition of missions in more democratic directions.

Expertise/Amateurism

Planners themselves embody this democratic dilemma. Typically, they are part of a priestly elite which uses its arcane knowledge, language, and access to the mysteries of scientific analysis to dominate and manipulate others. As a result, of course, the development of scientific and organizational expertise has enable planners to have access to centers of power. But it has also separated them from democratic constituencies. Expertise is the reflection in anti-democratic process of tendencies toward organization and centralization described elsewhere in this section. It is oriented toward the creation of closed fraternities and narrow, elite control which are antithetical to democratic access and engagement.

While there are specialized knowledges which planners have and which can be brought to bear on political choices, we must all recognize that these are not the only, or even the most important determinants of reasonable and just decisions.

At issue is really the question of *leadership* and *authority*. What is the source of a leader's vision and mobilization of resources? We must be candid and admit that this source is not science or specific knowledge per se. Hence, we must be more open-minded about the insight and imagination which all of us, the amateurs, have about our collective experience.

Appropriate mechanisms for the control of expertise range from the ideological to the institutional. If experts recognize, and are made to recognize, that they are fallible, then there can be more attention to conflict and alternative voices in the response to uncertainty. Insofar as there can be direct institutional control of experts by amateurs, there can then be subtle pressure on both the language in which conditions are cast and the selection of decision criteria.

Public/Private

The distinction between public and private is an ideological conception which enables the separation of economic, social, and political realms. Given their often unique opportunities, it is imperative for planners to engage this conception as part of a broader critique of ideology.

Planners, like all other citizens, are constantly facing debates about the relation between public and private. But as agents of the administrative state, planners are expected to juggle private claims in the name of the public good. However, the public good is too often an obfuscation of fundamentally contradictory interests. Moreover, the nominal division between public and private obscures the way in which private power determines public concerns. The defense of private prerogatives against the state is a kind of truism within democratic thought. But it obscures the difference between kinds of prerogatives. Private personal prerogative is one thing, different from the defense economic prerogatives. In a democratic society it is possible to protect a realm of private personal concern distinct from public affairs. Otherwise, the totalization of politics ironically means the annihilation of politics.

VI. *Conclusion*

The fundamental question which this analysis of planning raises is how we can face more progressively and critically the planning

questions in all our collective activities. Most citizens are deeply concerned with planning issues—with government budgets, the quality and kind of public services, housing policy, land-use, the environmental quality. These issues and the debates about them can be the occasion for public discussion about the broadest questions of history and social development. Struggles within different planning contexts can raise the most critical questions about the relationship of democratic concerns and corporate prerogative. Planning raises the question of the common good even if it does so ideologically; and debates about the common good are debates in which the contradiction between the needs of capital and the needs of the people can become apparent. But such a debate requires the mobilization of more than the planners; it requires the encouragement of popular constituencies, community groups, ad-hoc committees. In a genuine democracy we all become planners through our engagement in the basic issues of political identity and direction; we are all challenged to deal with the tensions between liberty and equality, between special and shared interests.

We have described the democratic pretensions of planning, as well as some of the ways in which planning questions can be the occasion for truly democratic initiatives. This analysis suggests that radical planners, or organizers inside planning institutions, must re-think their technical and organizational tool kit—cost-benefit analysis, management science, systems development—and focus on helping grassroots movements develop their critiques of public policy questions. This also means, crucially, a determination among grassroot organizers to develop democratic strategies in the face of the constant reductionism of administrative review processes, civil service hierarchies, the bureaucratic organization of work and services, and the elite pretensions of planning experts. In the broadest terms, this will mean that democratic movements will seek to fracture the boundaries between the administrative state and its constituencies, between the planners and the clients, between the administrator and the citizens.[10]

This struggle to fracture the structural boundaries between the state and its citizen can happen in virtually every planning context. Indeed, there are a variety of conventional mechanisms which can be used by democratic forces to move into the planning process in progressive ways. These mechanisms are not progressive in themselves, despite their origin, in some cases, in populist struggle. They are always ambiguous, capable of being subverted into conservative institutions. We are speaking of everything from Impact Assessment processes—which can be the avenue for progressive forces to raise quite critical questions about the tension between corporate needs and community life—to State Banks and Producer/Consumer Co-ops—which through considerable struggle could become modes of popular engagement.

The list of institutions or areas of struggle range from Public Employee Unions to State Client mobilizations, from ecology and environmental groups to anti-nuclear movements, from neighborhood issue-oriented committees to workers engaged in Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOP).[11] In all these settings—some already marked by significant struggle—there are occasions for democratic organizing, opportunities for movements to use planning conflicts to build democracy. Movements which aim at such a politics in the face of the administrative state will obviously need far more than a critique of planning ideologies or issues. To speak of developing a democratic claim is finally to speak of a broader culture of democratic commitments, and such a culture is not forged simply through struggles in the state. It is developed through the great variety of liberating conflicts in the society—conflicts in the state, but also in the areas of work, community, race, and the family. As we have tried to suggest, democracy is not simply a theory of political organization and public authority; it is a claim on the conduct of daily life.[12] Obviously, any democratic initiative in a planning context—be it about resource allocation or urban development—must rely on broad democratic commitments to values of justice and equity. These are commitments built through the broadest range of progressive struggles, commitments forged through the democratic experiences of men and women *in* struggle.

FOOTNOTES

1. This paper was originally presented at the Conference on Planning Theory, Cornell University, April 1979. A revised version of that presentation appears in Clavel, Forester, and Goldsmith (1980). The present version benefits greatly from the suggestions of readers and reviewers, especially members of the Bay Area Kapitalistate collective.

2. A French student poster succinctly captures some of these difficulties: "je participe, tu participes, il participe, nous participons, vous participez, ils profitent." I participate, you participate, he participates, we participate, you participate, they profit.

3. The difficulty and sensitivity of this task is more than evident to us. Almost everyone uses the language of democracy for what is desired and accuses opponents of being elitist or fascistic. As we proceed, it will be apparent that we agonize about Schaar's (1970: 288) warning: "Democracy is the most prostituted word of our age, and any man who employs it in reference to any modern state should be suspect either of ignorance or of bad motives."

4. It is indeed surprising and disturbing that more groups have not moved politically in the face of a generally worsening situation. Even "professionals" like professors and planners will have to protect their self-interest while also making structural analyses of the larger process. The theoretical significance of such developments will become apparent as the argument of the paper emerges.

5. McClosky (1964) and others of his ilk (see Finley, 1972) argue that the fact that voters are apathetic and subject to "working class authoritarianism" itself justifies elite control. But to democrats, this condition suggests the need for political education. As Manicas (1974: 257, n.5) puts it, "To the extent that persons are saturated with beliefs and feelings induced by their condition, they are both more easily tied, rationally and emotionally, to the existing order *and* when it seems that it is threatened, they become more easy prey for quick, simple-minded and *even more* authoritarian 'solutions' to their felt difficulties." Planners can help to clarify the issues in such authoritarian impulses and to indicate the implications of such solutions.

In a conversation about this problem, our friend Jeffrey Lustig remarked that McClosky has coined a remarkable new syllogist:

The ancients believed democracy required a committed consensus around democratic values and beliefs.

Americans do not share a committed consensus around democratic values.

Therefore, the ancients are wrong.

6. William Appleman Williams (1971: 383) represents this requirement for vision in the following way: "We must respond to the legitimate demands for clear and convincing proposals for the new American community. If we cannot, then we are irrelevant. Evasion of these demands is at best a disingenuous way of putting people down; it is at worst hard evidence of intellectual incompetence. We ought to be able to learn from Russia and China that the lack of clear ideas and programs can lend to all sorts of serious moral and practical troubles."

7. When Plato and Aristotle speak of a "regime" they are speaking of far more than the government or the ruling class (as in "the present Chilean *regime*"). By "regime" the classics identified the central and important values of a political culture, as they were expressed in and through the institutions of that culture. Thus Plato speaks of the Aristocratic regime as being that political system "ruled by the few," where the few rule according to the values of public-spirited commitment and a love of the city. On those substantive grounds an Aristocracy can be distinguished from an Oligarchy, in which the few rule in their own narrow interest. We use "regime" to identify a set of values as well as practices; a "regime of freedom" is a political system marked by belief in—and commitment to—freedom. In our critique, "regime" signifies the critical and subtle intersections between practices and commitments, institutions and culture.

8. Critics of the Left political economic literature claim there is an inconsistency between its democratic and socialist pretensions, the one implying radical decentralization, the other requiring centralized co-ordination and controls (Lindbeck, 1977: 49–57). Our discussion indicates that careful distinctions based upon democratic arguments are necessary to make productive the inevitable tensions here.

9. Marx, in his comments to the Paris Commune, believed in the implementation of democratic representation. He discussed delegate systems based upon conditional mandates, the immediate recall of delegates, the informational duty

of delegates vis-à-vis their immediate organizations, and the rotation of mandates. It is mechanisms like these which Abrahamsson (1977: 228) argues can provide the substantive democratic content to avoid Michel's "iron law of oligarchy." Since these mechanisms are dependent upon participation, they both limit the exercise of elite power and forestall oligarchy through explicit accountability.

10. While this discussion has a strong populist tone, the requirement for detailed structural analysis generates a realistic rather than a romantic populism. While the populist impulse is democratically valid, it cannot rest merely on the "will of the people." As a result, we cannot avoid the problems of organization and authority, but neither can we allow their determination by capitalist imperatives.

11. More specific information about issues, organizations, case studies, bibliography, and progressive stances on the movements and activities listed here is available from the Conference on Alternative State and Local Public Policy, 1901 Q St., N.W., Washington, D.C., 20009.

12. Efforts to show, teach, and encourage democratic developments in planning are underway. For example, the New School for Democratic Management (256 Sutter St., San Francisco, CA 94108) sponsors workshops and research for planners, administrators, and advocacy groups on topics like the following: (1) Democratic Management of Public Agencies, (2) Alternative Financing Strategies for State and local governments, (3) Community economic development strategies, and (4) labor-management relations in the public sector. It holds employee seminars in cities across the country and will soon publish a reader on democratic management.

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Perspectives of Class and Political Struggle in the Portuguese Capitalist State

Ronald H. Chilcote[1]

Three forms of a capitalist state appeared with the emerging capitalism in Portugal. Each form has been shrouded in ideology and mystique, yet each has reflected the transformation of Portugal from its pre-capitalist origins to the capitalist formations characteristic of Portugal today.

One form of the Portuguese capitalist state, authoritarian and repressive, manifested itself as fascism and corporatism during the New State rule of António del Oliveira Salazar. Its origins stemmed from the monarchy, which had fallen to republican rule in 1910, and from the conservative Catholic Church; and it represented a tradition of order and stability. A reaction to the volatile period of the Old Republic from 1910 to 1926, the New State was the culmination of military intervention in 1926, financial control under Salazar in 1928, and the promulgation of the corporative constitution in 1933. The political apparatus of this state was structured to permit rule by a minority, subject to the dictates of Salazar, through a national assembly, corporate chamber, and a single party. The repressive apparatus consisted of a military (whose senior officers were drawn from wealthy families and who were allowed positions of importance in the major industrial combines), paramilitary bodies, and a secret police. Salazar's incapacitation in 1968 and "liberalization" efforts by his successor, Marcel Caetano, did not substantially alter the structure of this repressive authoritarian state.

Another form of state, progressive and authoritarian, appeared with the military coup of April 25, 1974. While the repressive and political apparatuses of the New State were quickly discarded, under the Armed Forces Movement or Movimento das Forças Armadas (MFA), the state

was structured into competing blocs of power. The political apparatus comprised a president, government of ministers, a junta of seven prestigious military officers, and a council of state. A military apparatus complemented these official bodies, including the commands of army, navy, and air force, the MFA assembly, the MFA seven-man coordinating committee, and the special military unit, COPCON.

The formation and organization of political parties, their participation in elections for a constituent assembly in 1975 and national assembly in 1976, and the establishment of provisional and constitutional governments were accompanied by advocacy of rule under social democracy, democratic socialism, or socialist pluralism. Most groups, from center to far left, favored some socialism but they represented contrasting perspectives, resulting in considerable factionalism reminiscent of the splintering politics of the First Republic. One consequence of this political instability and the ensuing chaos was a consolidation of bourgeois forces in defense of their own interests and control of the state.

Given this evolution of a Portuguese capitalist state during the twentieth century, this paper now turns to an elaboration of theories of state and class advanced before and after the military coup of April 1974.

Theories of State and Class

Events from 1974 to 1978, a period of six provisional and four constitutional governments, were exceedingly complicated. The literature of the period emphasized the role of the military and the parties. It frequently overlooked issues of class, and class struggle, while often the role of the state was ignored altogether. Some observers attempted to interpret Portuguese politics in the context of Eurocommunism with comparisons to France, Italy, and Spain. Others noted similarities between the Portuguese and Chilean experiences, stressing the reforms and strategy of a peaceful road to socialism promoted by Allende. These comparisons remain superficial and prompt us to search for a theory of state and class in Portugal today.

The discussion below suggests that no single theory remains altogether satisfactory in a consideration of the recent Portuguese experience. While theories of instrumentalism, structuralism, and pluralism offer insights in a class analysis of contemporary Portugal, each theory also reveals limitations.[2] These theories are often confused with prevailing tendencies in bourgeois social science. Instrumentalism, for example, is identifiable with static studies of elites, power structure, and economic groups. Structuralism may be relegated to abstract structural-functional analysis of particular institutions. Pluralism usually may be linked to ethnocentric notions of political bargaining and consensus through competitive participation. The search for a Marxist

theory of state and class must clearly identify and isolate these bourgeois inclinations—bourgeois because they reflect ideological orientations of the capitalist state. Marxist theory would substitute ruling classes for elites while juxtaposing ruling classes with those who are ruled, examine structure of state in relation to the economic bases of society, and analyze conflict between classes. With these criteria in mind we turn to a brief examination of these three lines of theory in light of the Portuguese experience.

Instrumentalist theory assumes that the state is manipulated and controlled by the ruling class. The basis of this theory is found in *The Communist Manifesto* where Marx and Engels asserted that "the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie." Lenin in *State and Revolution* referred to the state as an "instrument" for the exploitation of the oppressed class.

The Marxist and non-Marxist variants of instrumentalist theory are evident in most of the writings which focus on who ruled Portugal prior to 1974. Generally these writings identify people in positions of power and authority in an effort to describe who really rules Portugal. Given the constraints on political writing and the dearth of information under Salazar and Caetano, it should not be surprising that only a handful of sources constitutes the basis for an understandng of the ruling class in Portugal.[3]

Instrumentalist theory assumes that the state is controlled by and serves the interests of the capitalist state. People in strategic positions exercise power directly through manipulation of state policies or indirectly through influence on the state. The instrumentalist perspective has contributed to an awareness of the relationship of the Portuguese ruling capitalist class to the state under corporatism and capitalism; it also has revealed conflicts within the capitalist state. For example, before 1974 many large industrialists became impatient with domestic and financial arrangements, while also being critical of the colonial wars which they believed limited capital for expansion and interfered with Portuguese economic integration of Europe. Yet the instrumentalist studies of Portugal have tended to emphasize economic groupings within the political economy rather than to relate classes to the means and forces of production.

Presumably the military government smashed the power of these economic groupings in March 1975 by nationalizing banks and insurance companies, thereby undermining the financial foundation of their corporate networks. Ensuing events demonstrated, however, that while the old structure of power had been overturned, the struggle for socialism had hardly begun. One problem was that even before 1974 conflicts were developing between the old economic combines. Many of them had formed joint enterprises with foreign corporations so that

their metropolitan and colonial ventures were offset by profitable investment in other parts of Europe, Brazil, and the United States. At least one observer portrayed this internationalization of the conglomerates as effectively ending the old alliance between large landowners and the financial and industrial bourgeoisie.[4] Clearly the latifundistas, owners of large inefficiently managed estates in the south, were hurt by the government's agrarian reform. However, the modern capitalist farmers whose capital most likely was linked with the financial industrial bourgeoisie was less drastically affected. From 1960 to 1970 foreign participation in Portuguese industry increased from 1.5 to 27 percent, yet after 1974 these interests were relatively untouched by the military regime.[5] Another obstacle to socialism was the reaction of other classes, including an intermediate industrial and commercial bourgeoisie, some indecisive professionals and government bureaucrats, and a timid petty bourgeoisie of shopkeepers in the cities and small towns along with numerous small commercial farmers, especially in the rural areas of the north where the conservative Catholic Church prevailed and the rural proletariat remained unorganized and insignificant. Revolutionary events after 1974 were too dramatic for these classes whose defense of property and fear of communism (inculcated through a half-century of fascist rule) bolstered the forces of counter-revolution.

While instrumentalist theory may be useful in a class analysis of the Portuguese situation, it does not account for policies which may emanate from the state itself rather than directly from corporate or ruling class initiatives. It often ignores analysis of how the state neutralizes or mitigates contradictions of class structure as rooted in the economy of society. It also obscures attention to issues of ideology. Such concerns are taken up by structuralist theory of class and state.

According to the Marxist theory of structuralism, the capitalist state is not necessarily subject to the manipulation of the ruling bourgeoisie but in fact operates in a way determined by capitalism itself. The state thus stands above the special interests of individual capitalist and capitalist class factions. In this autonomous position the state is able to protect the interests of the dominant classes in the face of demands and conflicting interests of the popular or working classes.

The origins of structuralism are identified in the thought of Marx, Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci, and French anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss. Structuralists turn to Marx for use of such terms as infrastructure and superstructure, the former relating to the material base upon which forces of production, relations of production, and mode of production are found and the latter denoting the ideology and legal forms upon which the state rests. Lévi-Strauss looked for underlying relations and hidden structures in society. While his work was not explicitly Marxist, it was assimilated by structuralist Marxists who

believed that Marx offered a scientific understanding of capitalism by discovering a structure hidden behind its visible operation. Understanding the functioning of these latent structures leads to the discovery of reality. This approach differs from those of American and British social science in which only those structures are recognized which are directly visible. Gramsci emphasized hegemony or dominance of some social group or class in power. In his conception of the state crises occur in the hegemony of the ruling class because it fails in some political undertaking and the masses become discontented and resistant.

Contemporary structuralist theory has been influenced primarily by French Marxists, Louis Althusser and Nicos Poulantzas. Interestingly, both these writers have commented on recent developments in Portugal which we discuss later. Althusser employed aspects of superstructuralism in Marx by conceiving ideologies as systematic elements of every society. He alluded to ideological state apparatuses which appear to the observer as specialized institutions such as churches, schools, political parties. These ideological state apparatuses operate generally in the private domain while the repressive state apparatuses in the form of bureaucracy, army, police, courts, and prisons are public. These repressive apparatuses permit the ruling bourgeoisie in capitalist society to perpetuate its dominant position, for example through the installation of an educational ideological apparatus. Poulantzas elaborated on this Althusserian structuralist model of class and state by arguing that the structures of society rather than influences of people generally determine the functions of the state. He looked at the structure of class in society in order to identify contradictions in the economy and to analyze how the state attempts to mitigate or eliminate these contradictions.[6]

Bourgeois social science alludes to the pluralist character of Anglo-American politics, which holds that democracy is premised on diverse interests and dispersion of power. Theories of pluralism stress individual property rights and private initiative, competing interests in the struggle for power and group and interest politics. Three principal positions are evident among pluralist theories. First, the elitist theory of democracy distinguishes between rulers and ruled by recognizing changes in elite membership over time. The second position assumes pluralism to be a fundamental practice of Western plutocratic society. Finally pluralism is related to socialist lines of thought; sometimes theories of conflict and consensus are employed, but more applicable to the Portuguese situation is the tendency to tie pluralism to a Marxist perspective and the ideal of a classless society.

Dahl for instance has argued that socialist economies can be highly decentralized and pluralistic, and that a decentralized socialist order

might create as much or more organized pluralism than exists in a non-socialist order. His conception of pluralism deemphasizes class which in its various forms "is only an element, albeit nearly always a significant one, in a fragmented pattern of cleavages and conflicts that is persistently pluralistic. . . ."[7] This academic stance approximates the position of some socialists in Portugal, but it does not necessarily coincide with the thought of all political groupings, especially those who explicitly follow a Marxist line with a focus on class society and the view that the interests of people are determined largely by their relations to the process of production. Later we discuss these political groupings and the implications of their pluralism and socialism.

Thus, these theories of instrumentalism, structuralism, and pluralism lead to a class analysis of Portugal, a country which apparently transcended fascism yet continued to struggle for a new democratic order. That scholars have related these theories to the recent experience is a consequence of their interest in determining if Portugal has also moved to a stage of transition from capitalism toward socialism. With most revolutionary groups advocating both democracy and socialism, the essential question revolved around whether Portugal, a capitalist state undergoing substantial change following the 1974 coup, would sustain a drive toward a transition to socialism. In an effort to respond to this question, the analysis below identifies the major Portuguese classes and their activity in the political economy.

Class Structure and the Political Economy

Although its level of development remains low in contrast to the rest of Europe and it exhibits some pre-capitalist characteristics, Portugal is clearly a capitalist country. Under capitalism the interests of those who control the means of production and those who work are opposed. The theories of class and state which we have alluded to in this paper suggest a myriad of classes. The ruling or dominant classes once comprised the big financial and industrial bourgeoisie whose monopolistic conglomerates controlled the banking sector and the major industrial and commercial enterprises. This class included a small number of family groupings whose fortunes were built on exploitation of colonial Portuguese Africa and on foreign imperialist connections. While government nationalization of banks and other holdings cut deeply into the strength of this class, it remained influential and joined with other reactionary forces to regain power. The financial and industrial bourgeoisie was notable for its interlinking through capital and marriage with the landed bourgeoisie and aristocracy of nobles and latifundistas who ruled the southern region of the country until their estates were invaded by rebellious peasants. Their lands, of course, were also subject to the

agrarian reforms of the revolutionary government but by 1978 these measures were weakened by the moderate and centrist parties which then headed the government. Intermediate classes in the cities included the medium and commercial bourgeoisie, professionals, intellectuals, and bureaucrats. Then there were the petty bourgeoisie and the lumpen-proletariat of unemployed. The most numerous classes were the urban proletariat, concentrated in medium and large production units in the industrial centers of Lisbon and Oporto; the rural proletariat, generally concentrated in latinfundias in the central and southern Ribatejo and Alentejo regions; and the semi-proletariat of partially subsistent agrarian workers as well as poor subsistence peasants on family-operated farms.

Until 1968 censorship and repression seem to preclude sophisticated understanding of Portuguese politics. Little was known, the opposition was badly organized and splintered, and intellectual life was tightly guarded. Brief reports of protest, manifestoes, and demonstrations appeared in the London and New York press, but no serious analysis of politics made its way into print. The exile press revealed incidents of imprisonment and torture. There were infrequent analyses of opposition activities, but there was no serious study of class and state.[8] After 1968 under Caetano there was the appearance of liberalization, electoral campaigns were carried on in 1969 and 1973, and the positions of the opposition were more clearly manifested. This also was a period in which some wrtiers attempted an analysis of the Portuguese political economy in class terms.[9]

Especially important was the effort, compatible with instrumentalist theory, to identify the major financial and industrial groupings which dominate the Portuguese political economy and to reveal the structure of the Portuguese ruling classes.[10] Some one hundred and fifty of the forty thousand privately owned firms accounted for more than one half of corporate assets just prior to the 1974 Revolution. These large firms were divided among a small number of financial groups, each identified with well-known families and major banks. A small number of interlocking financial and industrial conglomerates had formed under the aegis of powerful landowning and wealthy families, a process which had been consolidated in 1925 when landowners and bankers formed a União dos Interesses Económicos. The Melo family, for example, was influential in the Companhia União Fabril (CUF) through the Banco Totta e Açores; CUF aggregated more than one hundred firms whose activities extended throughout Portugal and the colonies. The Espíritu Santo family based its interests in banking, insurance, petroleum, paper, and communications in the Banco Espíritu Santo e Comercial. The Champalimaud family held major interests in steel, cement, and insurance and was associated with the Pinto e Sotta Mayor family and

its bank with the same name, the Duke of Palmela, a large landowner in the Setúbal peninsula, the Count of Caria, and the Viscount of Botelho. Several family conglomerates (Feteira-Bordela, Manuel Vinhas, Brandão Miranda, Albano de Magalhães, and Domingos Barreiro) were associated with the Banco Português do Atlântico, third largest in Portugal. Banker-industrialist Miguel Quina, a relative of the Count of Covilhâ, was a major figure in the Banco Borges e Irmão and related interests in textiles, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, and construction. The Sousa and Figueiredo families fused their investments in railroads and overseas exploitation through the Banco Funsecas e Burnay. The Banco Nacional Ultramarino represented national capital in the colonies. These banks accounted for more than three-quarters of the deposits and investments among the leading commercial banks. In March 1975, after the failure of a right-wing coup attempt supported by this economic elite, the military government nationalized these banks and detained dozens of prominent family figures, including José Manuel de Melo and his brother Jorge, Manuel and José Espírito Santo Silva, and José Carlos Champalimaúd, son of industrialist António Champalimaúd.[11]

These groups constituted the big financial and industrial bourgeoisie which the revolution sought to destroy. The possibility of achieving this objective, however, was mitigated by contrasting ideological tendencies and disruption of the Portuguese economy.

Ideological currents within Portugal's economy revealed the nature of the class struggle. Lines of thinking within the military, for example, exemplified this tendency. General António de Spinola, a war hero in Guinea-Bissau, served as President during the first two provisional governments. A moderate reformist, restrained and disciplined, and authoritarian, he opposed decolonization and communism, and his understanding of economic planning was based on international and monetarist models. Under Caetano he had participated in the higher circles of Portuguese military and corporate finance, and his interests were aligned with the big bourgeoisie. He was ousted from power on September 28, 1974, and forced into exile after leading an abortive coup on March 11, 1975. Vasco Gonçalves was prime minister in four of the provisional governments. He had aided the opposition prior to 1974, was the chief ideologue of the MFA, and sympathized with the Portuguese Communist Party. He favored a model along lines of socialism in Eastern Europe so that a rapid social transformation and economic development could occur. Otelo de Carvalho was the radical, non-communist, and charismatic leader of the MFA who headed the COPCON. He believed that the MFA should become a national liberation movement, and he supported formation of a popular base among revolutionary councils of workers, soldiers, and sailors. He advocated a model of revolutionary development along Cuban lines.

Two MFA junior officers, Melo Antunes and Vitor Alves were conspicuous. Antunes pushed for a non-aligned third world socialism which would permit a mix of state and private enterprise, while Alves sympathized with the Social Party which favored ties with Europe.

These divergent ideological tendencies accompanied the emergence of a state oriented to parliamentary democrary, but by 1978 a political and economic impasse also was reached. Under the second constitutional government the Socialist Party (Partido Socialista, PS) refused to ally with the Communist Party (PCP) and instead joined with the centrist (Centro Democrático Social, CDS). The CDS used its position to force the PS to compromise on many issue, but the PS would not agree to roll back agrarian reform, and their coalition collapsed. This political maneuvering in a period of democratization signified that Portugal had not yet advanced to a transitional stage toward socialism.

Analysis should also assess classes in terms of their ideological manifestations as well as the conditions of the economy upon which their existence is based. In contemporary Portugal such analysis reveals a deepening polarization of classes and class struggle. This class struggle became especially apparent after 1960 when the penetration of foreign capital increased along with industrial expansion. Foreign capital flowed to industry based on low-level technology so as to absorb semi-skilled labor in the production process. Profits realized directly from the production of surplus by this labor were largely expatriated. Capitalist relations of production were reproduced on a massive scale within Portugal, thus hastening the break-up of any remaining precapitalist relationships. Imperialist capital not only exploited labor domestically but also stimulated the export of migrant workers to advanced countries in Europe. Massive emigration was a consequence of distorted industrialization and internal dislocations caused by the foreign capital in Portugal. The proportion of agricultural workers fell from 40 percent of the total active population in 1961–1962 to 28.6 percent ten years later; two of every three workers leaving agriculture found employment abroad while the expanding manufacturing industries accounted for only a small increase in total numbers of workers over the same period. Remittances of emigrants eventually amounted to two-thirds of all import receipts and ten percent of total incomes. The conjuncture of international developments and world crisis, generated by rapid increases in commodity and petroleum prices, resulted in a deterioration of terms of trade between Portugal and foreign countries, thereby widening the trade deficit.[12]

By 1974 the impact of such changes was obvious. The national bourgeoisie, especially the intermediate classes, faced the big financial and industrial bourgeoisie which in turn served as an intermediary for the reproduction of foreign capital in Portugal. The inflation was a

particularly significant problem, reaching an annual rate of 33 percent by 1974 with the prices of imported production rising the most rapidly. Urban and rural workers especially suffered from this inflation, which undermined their real wages and purchasing power. International conditions also tended to depress foreign tourism upon which Portugal depended. At the same time military expenditures, generally for the wars in the African colonies, absorbed a major share of the national budget.

The political events in April, 1974 led, within two years, to the adoption of some new policy measures, including an overhaul of the tax system so as to distribute the tax burden more fairly, nationalization of some banks, and agrarian reform. Efforts to stabilize prices and wages failed, however, and Portugal was affected by widespread strikes in support of wage increases and improvement in working conditions.

With the deterioration in the economy negotiations began with representatives of the International Monetary Fund. Condition for financial assistance from the IMF necessitated the implementation of monetary and fiscal constraints, which would later result in a reduction in a number of jobs, increased unemployment, wage freezes, and lesser domestic consumption. At the same time the foreign trade deficit increased while the country's reserves dwindled in the face of a rapidly rising foreign debt.

Class and Revolutionary Strategies

Under Salazar the ruling class was concentrated in the large landowners and wealthy families, at least until about 1945 when they began to concentrate their capital in banks and to associate with foreign interests. Two decades later the hegemony of this class and the New State was threatened by rebellion in the Empire and abortive revolts at home. Divisions appeared within the ruling class and in the institutions that supported the regime. Some members of the ruling class, for example, favored ties between domestic and European capital; while others attempted to protect national capital from foreign penetration. At the same time progressives within the Church opposed the policies of the dictatorship while differences within the military followed class lines, especially between officers of wealthy families and those from the small and middle bourgeoisie. Eventually dissent, political opposition, and a faltering economy contributed to the fall of the New State.

After April 1974, at the outset of this revolutionary period the military attempted to ensure its own hegemony over Portuguese affairs, and it was supported by the Partido Comunista Português (PCP). As a result of ensuing political struggles, the military was divided into competing power groups and along several ideological tendencies led by

a number of strong and prominent personalities. Class lines also undermined the apparent solidarity among its progressive ranks. Since the sons of wealthy families of the old agrarian aristocracy and industrial bourgeoisie no longer predominated, the expanding recruitment of officers tended to draw from the small and middle bourgeoisie in small cities and sometimes from working-class families. Many of the captains and majors who participated in the April 1974 revolution, for example, were from these middle bourgeois and working-class strata. Below these officers were soldiers and sailors recruited from the poorest classes, some of whom were members of the PCP and most of whom had been disenchanted with colonial policy in Africa and with economic conditions at home. Senior officers were sharply distinguishable from junior middle officers. The older officers had dedicated themselves to colonial exploitation at the service of the large domestic capitalist groups and international imperialism while the younger officers opposed big capital interests.

Such categories of class are of little use when statically employed in a description of a particular situation, but they may be helpful in the formation of revolutionary strategies. For example, during the 1974 to 1975, and the 1976 to 1978 periods, the Socialists carried compromise to the extreme as they sought to hold the support of the medium and commercial bourgeoisie as well as segments of the petty bourgeoisie; they opposed the big financial and industrial bourgeoisie but their commitment to socialism was undermined by lack of influence in the working and peasant classes. The Communists, in contrast, attempted to combine their influence in the working and peasant classes with efforts to win segments of the medium and petty bourgeoisie to their strategy of democratic and national revolution.

The pluralist road to a democratic socialist state was advocated by the MFA as well as several leading political parties. Pluralism clearly represented a response to a half-century of dictatorship as well as the constitution of a democratic stage en route to a socialist transition. The advocates of pluralism believed that many parties, groups, and interests should participate in the revolution. The progressive military of the MFA, perhaps fearing a takeover from traditional reactionary forces or from extreme leftist elements, defined the pluralist path to socialism: "Socialist pluralism comprehends the coexistence in theory and practice of various forms and conceptions of construction of socialist society. . . ." This conception of pluralism implies the free expression and discussion of opinion, open dialogue in the construction of the new society. Socialist pluralism accepts party pluralism—the recognition of various political parties, including those who do not defend socialism. While socialist pluralism acknowledges that criticism of an opposition may be beneficial, it cannot tolerate opposition to the construction of socialist society

by democratic means.[13] The MFA envisaged itself standing above parties as a national liberation movement seeking construction of a socialist society. In the period of transition to socialism, the basic thrust of the MFA believed that the political parties served to mobilize and raise the consciousness of the people.

In a Marxist critique of the MFA position, Paul Sweezy predicted that the enemies of socialism in Portugal would declare themselves in favor of socialism but would "leave no stone unturned in their determination to sidetrack the revolution into a capitalist dead end."[14] In actual fact, the Partido Socialista Português (PS) and the centrist Partido Popular Democrático (PPD) soon thereafter withdrew from the Fourth Provisional Government while violence against the government and the PCP spread among the reactionary forces in the North.

In Spain, Communist leader Santiago Carrillo, in *Eurocommunism and the State* (1977), had argued that a peaceful democratic revolution could be secured by electoral means and by penetrating the state apparatuses and converting their individual members to socialism. This view, echoed in France and Italy, did not initially conform, at least in practice, to the position of the PCP and its leader, Alvaro Cunhal. After 1974 the PCP assumed that its long history of struggle and organization (the PCP was founded in 1921) qualified it to become the political wing of the MFA; and it penetrated important positions in all levels of government, mass media, and trade unions. The party sometimes supported unpopular government measures in order to enhance its role in government. For instance, it sometimes thwarted strikes and even opposed increases in minimum wages. These tactics were opposed by the far left and by moderate socialists and popular democrats in the center so that opposing centrist and some leftist forces, both within and outside the MFA, were able to combine their protest with demands for an end to any PCP and MFA collaboration. In the face of such opposition the fall of the Fourth and Fifth Provisional Governments in 1975 under Vasco Gonçalves was inevitable, as was the decline in influence of the MFA. Thereafter, the PCP seemed to waver between a policy of uniting with other revolutionary parties and groups to its left, on the one hand, and a policy of maneuvering in bourgeois electoral and parliamentary politics, on the other.

In theory the position of the PCP was not altogether opposed to democratic socialism, although party documents outlined a revolutionary policy devoid of the contradictions in the stance of the MFA. In 1971 Alvaro Cunhal affirmed that Portugal had entered a stage of democratic and national revolution whose character was popular and whose transformation to a stage of socialist revolution depended on the role of the proletariat, its party, and the popular masses. This transformation might occur if an antimonopolist front were to take power and

destroy the fascist state, eliminate the power of the monopolies, nationalize the banks, insurance companies, transport, and means of communication as well as foreign monopoly sectors, and expropriate the latifundias and large capitalist agrarian enterprise. In such a process the industrial and rural proletariat, representing two-thirds of the active working population, would have to occupy key positions during the democratic revolution in order to ensure the transformation to the socialist revolution. In each stage political alliances are necessary among various parties, groups, and individuals. In the democratic and national revolution the proletariat aligns itself with sectors of the small and medium bourgeoisie against the monopolies associated with imperialism and latifundistas. Since the socialist revolution directs itself against the bourgeoisie, some elements of the bourgeoisie active in the democratic and national revolution necessarily would become isolated.[15]

While some elements of this theory clearly were evident in the revolutionary events of 1974, Cunhal later described the process of the Portuguese revolution in terms of two components: the *military,* in the form of the MFA, and the *popular,* consisting of the organized democratic movement of the workers and the masses. The alliance of these components ensured the democratization of national life. At the same time, according to Cunhal: "There was no single leadership force with hegemony over the process. There was no centralized revolutionary power." The PCP was fundamental to the new Portuguese democracy through its defense of a policy of the unity of working class with popular mass, the alliance of the working class with small and medium farmers, the alliance of the popular movement with the armed forces, and the aggregation of all democratic forces, including communists and socialists.[16] The PCP sought to remain in the mainstream of party politics as it warned voters, prior to the March 1976 elections for the legislative assembly, to beware of reactionary parties on the right and the provocations and terrorist acts of extremist groups on the left. At the same time the PCP criticized the control of the PS and PPD over the mass media: "The state's means of social communication (television, radio, press) are monopolized by cupolas of parties which call themselves 'pluralists' and by sectors which again want to instill the fascist ideas of the past."[17]

The Socialist Party, formally established in West Germany in April 1973 and a member of the Socialist International, inherited a legacy of socialist ideals and aspirations dating to the First Republic (1910–1926). Mário Soares, its leader, had professed his creed of socialism before 1974: "Firmly I believe that man on his slow upward path will in time create a humanized society; a society where people do not exploit each other, whose collectivised means of production will benefit everyone and where the masses will have a democratic control over

decision-making. . . . This is why I support Socialism, Socialism with personal freedom, with the independence of the individual to manage his own affairs."[18]

Soares and the PS increasingly became suspicious of the intentions of the PCP after April 1974. Alleging that the Communists opposed elections in 1975 Soares proclaimed that "the road to socialism must pass through political democracy."[19] In his condemnation of the PCP Soares indicated that Eurocommunism had not influenced the PCP which remained faithful to Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy and the Soviet Union. He expressed interest in some tenets of Eurocommunism: "where Communist parties have publicly shown their will to reconcile socialism with democracy, and, above all, the liberties that they once considered to be *bourgeois* and *formal* but which they now call and qualify as *fundamental and irreversible conquests of the popular masses*."[20]

If the Socialist Party and its leader proclaimed pluralism and socialist democracy, what of its ally the PPD? Francisco Sá Carneiro, ideologue of the PPD, called for Portuguese social democracy along lines similar to the position of Soares. His social democracy consisted of a mixed system embracing *political democracy* since the people, through universal suffrage, control the apparatus of the state and ensure fundamental rights and guarantees for each person; *economic democracy* that includes both nationalist and cooperative sectors; and *social and cultural democracy,* ensuring access to health, housing, education, and welfare. The objective is "a socialist society in liberty."[21] The leadership of the PPD included many reformers of the old regime, and while the party advocated "socialism" in practice, its ranks comprised members of rightist parties and groupings excluded by the electoral process. Branded a centrist and moderate party, the PPD in reality was in fact a party of conservatism. In short, the PPD represented all the contradictions evident in the pluralist theories of democratic socialism and socialist democracy.[22]

Louis Althusser's observations of the Portuguese revolution consisted of a series of letters to Luiz Francisco Rebello, dissident Socialist who left his party because he believed it had abandoned principle and revolution on behalf of bourgeois liberalism and the defense of social democracy. Althusser considered the coup of April 24, 1974, an event which shook the imperialist world. Fascism had served the dominant bourgeoisie as a means of dealing with the contradictions of imperialism. In Portugal, as well as Greece and Spain, fascism occurred at an important historical conjuncture, facilitating the development of certain sectors of the economy while exploiting the poor rural workers and peasants. At the same time this fascism did not deter the development of national and international monopolies. Fascism had engaged in its own

political and ideological struggle by using repressive and ideological apparatuses of the state to control a mass base and smother all forms of working class struggle. This fascist mass base included not only the monopolistic bourgeoisie but also the non-monopolistic bourgeoisie, the middle classes, small and poor peasant farmers, and part of the working class.

Thus, according to Althusser, the MFA and the people joined together in a true revolutionary process which envisioned not simple but irreversible structural reforms. Imperialism mobilized itself against this process. First, the nations of the European Economic Community provided loans conditioned on the abandonment of the revolution. Second, there was the international campaign against communism which appeals to the old mass base of fascism. This combination of reactionary forces threatened the revolution. While the PCP may have committed errors, the PS and its anticommunism had contributed to the international imperialist and fascist campaign against the revolution. Therefore, it was incumbent upon the PCP and the PS to join together with the MFA to defend the revolutionary process and struggle against the enemy of reactionary and fascist forces, supported by international imperialism.[23]

Nicos Poulantzas elaborated on the nature of this struggle in an interview with Henri Weber. While contradictions within the state could enhance the revolutionary process, Poulantzas suggested that we view the struggle in two contexts: one within the state, the other outside the state. The struggle within the state would not follow the social-democratic conception of struggle through a series of reforms so that a workers state would eventually replace the bourgeois state, but instead would be a struggle of resistance to sharpen the internal contradictions of the state. The struggle outside the state would establish a popular power base. It would be:

> a parallel struggle, a struggle outside the instruments and apparatuses, giving rise to a whole series of instruments, means of coordination, organs of popular power at the base, structures of direct democracy at the base. This form of struggle would not aim to centralize a dual-power of counter-state, but would have to be linked with the first struggle.[24]

Poulantzas believed that a revolutionary crisis leading to a situation of dual power was unlikely in Western Europe and he attached the conception that revolutionaries in Portugal failed to centralize an alternative popular power to confront the state. He argued that a break need not occur between the state *en bloc* and the structures of popular power outside it. Instead the break may occur within the state apparatus between the fractions of the army. For example, the fraction of the state army supported by soldiers committees might break with

the regular army and the bourgeoisie and pass over to the side of the people. Thus a parallel popular militia need not necessarily be established to replace the state apparatus. The revolutionary break may occur within the state as well as in the form of a counter-state confronting the state itself.

In his *The Crisis of the Dictatorships* Poulantzas analyzed the internal contradictions of the repressive apparatuses, in particular noting that the army does not simply rule, as many observers claim, in its own interests. The army neither reflects the interests of the dominant classes nor subordinates those interests, but instead reproduces the class differences and contradictions which we have already identified within the armed forces. Poulantzas cited the mistake of the Caetano regime during July 1973 in conscripting large numbers of officers which affected seniority and privileges of career officers. He also noted that when bourgeois political parties are eliminated, the armed forces assume the place of the ideological state apparatuses and thus combine their repressive role with their ideological role.

Poulantzas also examined the internal contradictions of the ideological apparatuses in an attempt to show contradictions within the power bloc and between this bloc and the popular masses, especially in the working class and petty bourgeoisie. In the absence of political parties and under dictatorships this power bloc comprises connections with the upper echelons of these apparatuses—the Catholic Church, bureaucracy, universities, and judiciary. Poulantzas argued that the break with the dictatorship in Portugal necessitated the implementation of a stage of democratization, following an electoral path, prior to any transition to socialism. He disputed the view that a beginning of transition to socialism had occurred in Portugal between March 11, 1975 (when reactionary forces under General Spínola attempted to seize power) and November 25, 1975 (when the bourgeois elements in the army gained control and the transition stage was presumably replaced by the democratization stage).[25] Poulantzas insisted that events in Portugal never broke through the democratic stage. What in fact had occurred was a brief period in which under the Communist-leaning government of General Vasco Gonçalves the popular masses assumed leadership and hegemony of the democratization process, only to lose this to the domestic bourgeois after the fall of Gonçalves in September. This was a period of high politicalization, consciousness, and radicalization with large demonstrations, yet with moderates in firm control after November 25, the enthusiasm of the masses died, a sign, according to Poulantzas, that the masses not only lacked experience with class struggle but had not entered a period of transition to socialism.

Poulantzas offered several explanations. The class alliance which was created with the overthrow of the dictatorship suffered from splits—the

rural bourgeoisie in the North, the domestic bourgeoisie, many professional people, and fractions of the urban petty bourgeoisie fell away, and there were even divisions in the working class, precipitated by ideological differences between the PCP and PS. During this period the NATO military bases were not touched, nor were the assets of international capital nationalized. Given Portugal's dependence on advanced capitalism, constraints on the revolutionary process were evident; these constraints could not prevent the hegemony of the popular masses over the democratization process, but they did preclude a transition to socialism. The organizational structure of the state apparatuses also remained intact. Despite purges of reactionary elements in the ideological apparatuses of newspapers, education, and so on, the Church as dominant ideological apparatus was not affected even though its Renassença radio station was taken over by popular forces. Two of the repressive apparatuses of the dictatorship, the National Republic Guard and the Public Security Police were not eliminated. Poulantzas believed that the MFA only had minority support among officers. Further, no mass revolutionary party appeared able to lead the nation to the transition to socialism.

If socialism was not the immediate objective, then why the defeat of the hegemony of the working class and popular forces over the democratization process? First, there was the lack of powerful class organizations, especially a revolutionary party which could promote the socialist revolution and ensure the hegemony of the popular classes. Second, there was no popular unity among organizations on the left and thus no clear objectives or program. Poulantzas argued that since a parallel state was not established by popular forces on the left, these forces had to work within the existing state apparatuses, but they could not dismantle that apparatus because the bourgeoisie would quickly recapture its former hegemony:

> The dismantling and carving-up of the Portuguese state apparatus . . . due both to divisions of the left and ultra-left, enabled the bourgeoisie to maintain firm and unshaken bastions for itself, upset the effective neutralization of these bastions, and perhaps most important, prevented the left from obtaining state support for the new forms based on popular power . . . when these came under attack from the right.[26]

In summary, this brief examination of the Portuguese political economy reveals evidence of class struggle and the necessity of a class analysis in understanding the complex contemporary situation. As an effort in this direction, the present study has identified and described forms of the capitalist state as it evolved from the Salazar and Caetano regimes to the 1974–1978 revolutionary period. The military coup of April 1974 allowed the emergence of a new form of capitalist state under

the hegemony of the MFA. The MFA assumed a progressive and authoritarian stance in contrast to the repressive and authoritarian thrust of the Salazar-Caetano dictatorship, and through reform measures it attempted to undermine the dominant position of Portugal's ruling classes. In the guise of a movement concerned with democracy, the MFA soon tolerated the formation and organization of political parties as well as government under parliamentary rule. Revolutionary groups found themselves struggling within the political arena as various provisional and constitutional governments advocated social democracy, democratic socialism, or socialist pluralism. The ensuing ideological struggle tended to obscure the underlying class differences and class struggle which became evident around issues of state control over private capital and finance and the large landed estates.

This paper has briefly examined the instrumentalist, structuralist, and pluralist theories of the state and demonstrated their application to the revolutionary events. A central concern has been the search for a class analysis of a capitalist state confronted with revolution and the prospect of a transition to socialism. This has necessitated the linking of various classes to revolutionary strategies and to political and economic contradictions. The results demonstrate that the fervent mobilization and radicalization of broad sectors of the Portuguese population after April 1974 was not sustained, partially because of the lack of historical experience of class struggle and the repression of nearly half a century of dictatorship. Political and economic conditions also tended to undermine efforts to establish a broad radical alliance of classes. Such was the case of the disaffected rural petty bourgeoisie in northern Portugal. In addition splits occurred in the coalition of forces that emerged after April 1974: large segments of the domestic bourgeoisie pulled away as did many middle and higher level professional people and sizeable fractions of the urban petty bourgeoisie; divisions within the working classes immobilized revolutionary efforts, provoked in part by ideological differences between socialist and communist workers. At the same time the organizational structures of the state showed resilience and an ability to endure the political and economic changes. Despite divergent tendencies within their ranks, conservative institutions which had supported the dictatorship remained intact in the form of the reactionary Church and military. The effort to form a radical MFA out of the bourgeois military structure was doomed to failure as the MFA served the conflictual demands of the radicalized petty bourgeoisie and the domestic bourgeoisie rather than attempted to organize the working classes and rural peasants. The failure of the MFA to mobilize organizations of the left into a program with clear objectives also contributed to the collapse of the revolutionary experience and precluded the emergence of Portugal in a stage of transition to socialism.

FOOTNOTES

1. Ronald H. Chilcote has observed and written on Portugal and its former colonies in Africa during the past two decades. His published works include *Portuguese Africa* (Prentice Hall, 1967) and an edited collection of original essays, *Protest and Resistance in Angola and Brazil* (University of California Press, 1972). He is Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Riverside. The author would like to thank the *Kapitalistate* collective and in particular Pat Morgan and Sheryl Lutjens, who offered many comments and suggestions for revision as this paper evolved through several drafts.

2. A number of collective efforts around the journal *Kapitalistate* have contributed to a theory of class and state. Useful overviews of this work include David A. Gold, Clarence Y. H. Lo, and Erik Olin Wright, "Recent Developments in Marxist Theories of the Capitalist State," Two Parts, *Monthy Review*, XXVII (October 1975), 29-43, and (November 1975), 36-51; and Gosta Esping-Andersen, Roger Friedland, and Erik Olin Wright, "Modes of Class Struggle and the Capitalist State," *Kapitalistate,* Nos. 4 and 5 (1976), 186-220.

3. Probably the first serious effort to identify political power in Portugal is in a series of studies undertaken by the historian A. H. de Oliveira Marques. A. H. de Oliveira Marques, "Estudos sobre Portugal no seculo XX," Four reprints from *O Tempo e o Modo,* Nos. 47-48, 54-55, 62-63, 71-72 (1967–1969). He concentrated on aspects of executive power from 1900 to 1932 and compiled bibliographies of 350 important people, drawing data from the *Grande Enciclopédia Portuguesa-Brasileira* and other reference sources, as well as from a education, profession, party affiliation and position, political career, and government position. His approach allowed for comparison of political leaders across three historical periods: the last years of the monarchy, 1900–1910; the First Republic, 1910-1926; and the early phase of the dictatorship, 1926-1932. For example, he identified nobility who held ministerial posts from 1910 to 1932 (40% in 1900–1910, 11% in 1910–1917, 15% in 1917–1919, 11% in 1919–1925, 5% in 1926–1932). This decline in their participation was not necessarily accompanied by a diminished role in the national economy. Likewise, the conspicuous involvement of small and middle bourgeois elements in government did not overshadow the significance of the high bourgeoisie in economic affairs. Oliveira Marques also demonstrated the influence of the military by identification of military officers who served as ministers during the period (42% in 1900–1910, 44% in 1910–1917, 60% in 1917–1919, 36% in 1919–1926, and 56% in 1926–1932).

Another study, conducted by Harry M. Makler in 1965, focused on the Portuguese industrial elite by utlizing survey research and an elaborate questionnaire administered to 306 heads of manufacturing and service industries. This study yielded information on positions held by the industrial elite in *gremois,* the corporative institutions representing the interests of the industrialists (31%), and in public office (26%). Corporative leaders tended to be drawn from the upper class, were sons of businessmen or landowners, and inherited their enterprise from their fathers, while those who held public office were more likely to be older, middle class in origin, and sons of white collar and

professional workers. Makler found that those in prominent positions in the Salazar and Caetano regimes often became presidents in large corporations.

Some of Makler's findings are reported in "The Portuguese Industrial Elite and Its Corporative Relations: A Study of Compartmentalization in an Authoritarian Regime," *Economic Development and Cultural Change,* XXIV (April 1976), 495-526. His full study is *A 'elite' industrial portuguesa,* Lisbon: Centro de Economia e Finanças, 1969. Another example of a non-Marxist instrumentalist approach is Lawrence S. Graham's *Portugal: The Decline and Collapse of an Authoritarian Order,* Beverly Hills: Comparative Politics Series (01-053), Sage Publications, 1975, in which he refers to "policy instruments of the New State," meaning the hierarchy of authority invested in a small number of persons close to Salazar.

4. Kenneth Maxwell, "Portugal: A Neat Revolution," *New York Review of Books,* XXI (June 13, 1974), 19.

5. Robin Blackburn, "Portugal: Who Will Rule?," *Ramparts,* XIII (November 19, 1975), 36.

6. Marx's distinction of base and superstructure is in his famous preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy,* reprinted in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works in One Volume,* New York: International Publishers, 1977, pp. 180-185. For a Marxist review and critique of the structuralism of Lévi-Strauss, see Maurice Godelier, "Structure and Contradiction in *Capital,* Ch. 15, pp. 334-368 in Robin Blackburn (ed.), *Ideology in the Social Science,* New York: Vintage Books, 1973. Gramsci's thought is best represented in *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci,* London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971. Althusser outlines the structure of the state in terms of repressive and ideological apparatuses which serve the interests of the ruling class in "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes Towards and Investigation)," pp. 121-173 in his *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays,* London: NLB, 1971. Many of Poulantzas' works have been translated to English, including *Political Power and Social Classes,* London: NLB and Sheed and Ward, 1973.

7. Robert A. Dahl, "Pluralism Revisited," *Comparative Politics,* X (January 1978), 191-203.

8. Among the earlier published sources on the opposition were Ronald H. Chilcote "Politics in Portugal and her Empire," *The World Today* (September 1961), 376-387, and "Opposition to Portugal's Dictatorship," *Contemporary Review* (April 1962), 167-173; and Peter Fryer and Patricia McGowan Pinheiro, *Oldest Ally: A Portrait of Salazar's Portugal,* London: Dennis Dobson, 1961, especially Chapter seven, which reveals some detail on the large family combines and agricultural estates, and Chapter ten on the resistance within Portugal. Hugh Kay in *Salazar and Modern Portugal,* London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1970, writes on the opposition in Chapter 10, his account is sympathetic to the Salazar regime.

9. Four examples illustrate this movement toward a class analysis. First, Hermínio Martins tied class theory conceptually and empirically to market situations. His Weberian orientation accounted for labor-repressive measures by political authority; recruitment to bureaucratic positions for the politically loyal followers of the regime; and the use of public office for purchase of administrative and political favors. The class system was stratified into a small

upper class, the consequence of highly concentrated economic power; a relatively weak middle class, due to the low level of urbanization; and subordinate strata, including the smallholding peasantry, farm laborers, and industrial workers. Martins emphasized social mobility from lower to higher classes rather than conflict as the outcome of a modernizing Portugal. Second, Francisco Pereira de Moura, an economist and opposition candidate in 1969, identified eight class groupings, three in the agricultural sector (large property owners, small entrepreneurs, and salaried workers) and five in the industrial and service sectors (large industrial-financial groups, small and medium entrepreneurs, foreign firms, liberal professions and high-level technicians, and employees, workers, and bureaucrats). His analysis related class to political position. Third, an analysis of class by a group associated with the publishing house Afrontamento set forth the following proposition that Portugal was a capitalist nation with its corporate facade simply masking the class struggle and seeking to place the state above classes, when in fact the establishment of bourgeois democracy would permit true capitalist development. Finally, Manuel Sertório, socialist and prominent intellectual of the opposition, analyzed Portugal in terms of monopoly capitalism, arguing that the state is the political organization of the economically dominant class. The fascist state in Portugal evolved as a means of repressing the proletariat. Thus in its first phase this state permitted the development of financial capital and the emergence of monopolies under the hegemony of a dominant bloc of latifundistas and the banking aristocracy. The dominance of these groups was lost to the large industrialists and monopolists who brought monopoly capitalism to Portugal. This monopoly capitalism was characterized by its coexistence with small artisan enterprise; its desire to integrate with the European Common Market; its dependence on foreign imperialism; and its neocolonialist policy of continuity in Africa. See Hermínio Martins, "Portugal," pp. 60-89 in Margaret and Salvador Giner (eds.), *Contemporary Europe: Class, Status and Power,* London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971; Francisco Pereira de Moura, *Por onde vai a economia portuguesa?,* Lisbon: Seara Nova, 1974; *Classes, política: Política de classes,* Lisbon: Edições Afrontamento, March 1974; Manuel Sertório, "A arma da crítica," pp. 315-337 in *Teses: situaçcão e perspectiva política no plano nacional e internacional,* 3° Congresso da Oposição Democrática de Aveiro, Seccão, Lisbon: Seara Nova, 1974.

10. The most useful source on financial and corporative interests in Portugal is Maria Belmira Martins, *Sociedades e grupos em Portugal,* Lisbon: Editorial Estampa, 1976. She has also contributed an analysis of multinational penetration in Portugal, see *As multinacionais em Portugal,* Lisbon: Editorial Estampa, 1976. Also on foreign capital in Portugal, see Luía Salgado de Matos, *Investimentos estrangeiros em Portugal,* Lisbon: Seara Nova, 1973; J. Cândido de Azevedo, *A ofensiva do capital e a luta pelo socialismo,* Lisbon: Diabril Cooperativa Editorial, 1976; and João Martins Pereira, *Industria, Ideologia e quotidiano (ensaio sobre o capitalismo em Portugal),* Oporto: Edições Afrontamento, 1974? An example of an historical study of the mercantile bourgeoisie *colónias (1834–1900),* Oporto: Edições Afrontamento, 1975.

11. Two useful analyses of the banking situation are Anabela Fino, "A banca e a sabotagem económica," *Seara Nova,* 1553 (March 1975), 42-46; and Vasco Gomes da Silva, "O significado da banca," *Seara Nova,* 1554 (April 1975), 11-15.

12. Data and analysis drawn from Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, *Portugal,* Paris, 1974, pp. 10-11, 29-30.

13. "The MFA as a National Liberation Movement," *Monthly Review,* XXVII (September 1975), 28, from a document translated from *O Comércio de Porto,* (June 22, 1975).

14. Paul Sweezy, "Class Struggle in Portugal," *Monthly Review,* XXVII (September 1975), 16.

15. Alvaro Cunhal, *A revolução portuguesa,* Lisbon: Publicações Dom Quixote, 1975, pp. 151-164, originally published in *O radicalismo pequeno-burguês de fachada socialista,* Lisbon: Edições Avante!, 1971. After the 1974 revolution the PCP stated in some detail the conditions necessary for constructing socialist society—see Partido Comunista Português, *Programa e estatutos do PCP aprovados no VII Congresso (Extraordinário) realizado em 20/10/74,* Lisbon: Edições Avante, 1975, especially pp. 85-90.

16. Alvaro Cunhal, *A revolução portuguesa: o passado e o futuro,* Lisbon: Edições Avante!, 1976, pp. 125-133, 382-385.

17. Partido Comunista Português, *Conferência Nacional do PCP, 14 de Março de 1976,* Lisbon: Edições Avante!, 1976, p. 202.

18. Mário Soares, *Portugal's Struggle for Liberty,* London: George Allen & Unwin, 1975, p. 295. Soares dates the legacy of socialism to the First Republic, to various socialist underground activities during the Salazar Regime, and to the founding of the Acção Socialista Portuguesa about 1964 or 1965.

19. Interview with Manuel Dias, *Jornal de Noticias* (Oporto), (February 18, 1975), reprinted in Mário Soares, *Democratização e descolonização: dez meses no governo provisório,* Lisbon: Publicações Dom Quixote, 1975, p. 274.

20. Mário Soares, "Eurocommunism: Does it Exist?," *Atlantic Community Quarterly,* XVI (Fall 1978), 261.

21. Francisco Sá Carneiro, interview in *A Capital,* (January 21, 1975), reprinted in his *Por uma social-democracia portuguesa,* Lisbon: Publicações Dom Quixote, 1975, pp. 255-271.

22. By late 1978 some advocates of pluralism were suggesting the formation of a stable alliance of parties and groups to solidify political power around the President and ensure revision of the Constitution in favor of the President. See Marcelo Rebelo de Souza, "Da 'Federação Democrática Reformadora' à lei do recenseamento," *Expresso,* 310 (October 7, 1978), 2.

23. The letters are in Louis Althusser and Luiz Francisco Rebello, *Cartas sobre a revolução portuguesa,* Lisbon: Seara Nova, 1976.

24. Nicos Poulantzas, "The State and the Transition to Socialism," *Socialist Review,* VIII (March-April 1978), 9-36, an interview with Henri Weber.

25. See, for example, Daniel Bensaid, Carlos Rossi, and Charles-André Udry, *La Révolution en marche,* Paris: Christian Bourgois, 1975, who argue that a transition to socialism had occurred in Portugal. Nicos Poulantzas argues, contrary to the opinion of most observers, that there was no beginning of a transition to socialism in Portugal: "At no point in the period in question did the Portuguese situation really break through the limits of the democratization stage." Quoted in his *The Crisis of the Dictatorship,* London: New Left Books, 1976, p. 135.

26. Poulantzas, *Ibid.,* 152-153.

Review of Ian Gough, *The Political Economy of the Welfare State* Humanities Press, Atlantic Highlands, NJ, 1979. Cloth: $21.00; paper, $10.50.

James P. Hawley

Since World War II the growth of social rights in the advanced capitalist countries has been captured in the phrase the "welfare state." While most marxists and radicals have properly seen the developments of political and social rights as important in the recent history of capitalism, it has been remarkable that until now no one has written a book directly addressing from a Marxist perspective the problems and issues associated with the growth of the "welfare states." Ian Gough's new book remedies this situation. Drawing on concepts and materials of an earlier article ("State Expenditures in Advanced Capitalism," *New Left Review* °92), Gough's book is an important contribution to the growing literature on state theory. But more importantly its contribution lies in the concrete economic, and to a lesser extent, political analysis of the British welfare state (and secondarily of other welfare states). The book is published as part of a series on radical and Marxist approaches to social work and social welfare, and consequently it was written both as a text as well as an original analysis of the welfare state. The first four chapters are more textlike than the final three, which attempt to dissect the contradictory nature of the welfare state. This review will briefly outline and comment on the first four chapters, and will then spend most of the time discussing some of the issues raised in the final three, more analytical chapters.

For Gough the welfare state consists of two sets of activities: state provision of social services (combining elements of both social control and authentic service provision) and the state regulation of private activities. (3-4) In the first chapter Gough reviews various theories of the welfare state (functionalist, economic theories of government and pluralist theories), concluding that each of them capture a slice of reality, but not its totality. In place of these theories and explanations, Gough suggests that a Marxist explanation of the welfare state, ". . . simultaneously embodies tendencies to enhance social welfare, to develop the power of individuals, to exert social control over the blind play of market forces, *and* tendencies to repress and control people, to adopt them to the requirements of the capitalist economy." (12) In short, the welfare state embodies the contradictory qualities of capitalist society, and is itself contradictory.

The second chapter ("The Capitalist Economy") is a necessarily brief sketch of the central aspects of contemporary capital and capitalism:

class, exploitation, the capitalist mode of production, and the relation between capitalist development and social policy. In the last part of the chapter, Gough argues forcefully that there is no inherent functional relation between social policy, the structure of a particular capitalist state and the "requirements" of the capitalist mode of production. The functional requirements of capital are not necessarily carried out by the state, although it is important analytically to know what those functional requirements are. Two factors intervene between capital's imperatives and the intended or unintended end results of social policy. The first is the nature of the link between the state as a mediation of capital. The second is the role of class conflict (and perhaps Gough should have added other forms of social conflict as well) in the determination of social legislation and the actual workings of the social policy bureaucracies.

In the third chapter ("The State and Its 'Welfare Activities'"), Gough develops his main outline of the nature of the welfare state, relying heavily on James O'Connor's *The Fiscal Crisis of the State* (St. Martins Press, N.Y., 1973). Defining the welfare state as, ". . . the use of state power to modify the reproduction of labor power and to maintain the non-working population in capitalist societies . . ." (44-5), Gough presents O'Connor's characterization of the capitalist state's two basic and contradictory functions: legitimation and accumulation.

Chapter 4 ("The Origins of the Welfare State") briefly explores the origins (as contrasted with the functions) of the welfare state, focusing primarily on the British case, but with useful cross-national comparisons. The chapter tries to answer two central questions: What is the role of class conflict in explaining the emergence of welfare policies?; and, How are the "functional requirements" of the capitalist system mediated by the state? Gough points to the well-known examples of welfare policies insituted as a means of forestalling democratic reforms and hence greater working class power (Bismarck's Germany); and welfare policies instituted in part as a result of the use of democratic rights previously won (Chamberlain's Britain). The growth of both political and social rights is part and parcel of the contemporary welfare state and welfare state ideology, as well as of the current retreat away from it. Yet neither class conflict or the attempt to preempt it explain welfare policy. Along with class conflict, the growth of state intervention and the "relative autonomy" of the state from capital (representing capital's longer term "interests," according to Gough, although this is merely asserted rather than proved or illustrated) has been the increased centralization of state power and the growth of a class-conscious political directorate which has played a crucial role in defining the longer term, general interests of capital in social policy and other areas. An additional factor is cited by Gough which has produced social policy:

the congruence of interests between capital and labor around certain specific reforms (e.g., national health insurance in Britain in 1911). Yet this apparent coincidence of interests, as Gough points out, is most often a reflection of the politics of class conflict itself— the threat of powerful working class movements which often force concessions and compromises on the part of the ruling class and state managers. [This formulation draws on Frances Piven and Richard Cloward's work, *Regulating the Poor,* (Vintage, N.Y., 1971)]. The massive expansion of the welfare state since World War II has had two growth period: during and shortly after World War II in Great Britain, and between the mid-1960's to the mid-1970's in most of the advanced capitalist countries. The combination of the unprecedented long wave of relative prosperity in the core states and the general growth of the interventionist state along with the relative stability in the international system combined to make possible the greater economic and political bargaining power of labor. Thus, concludes Gough, the era of advanced capitalism *is* the era of the welfare state.

But what of the crisis of the 1970's and specifically of the crisis of the welfare state? Chapters 5 through 7 develop an analysis of the crisis, and of the role and place of the welfare state within it.

Chapter 5 ("The Expansion of Social Expenditures") traces the massive increase of social expenditures in Britain and in other advanced capitalist nations. Gough distinguishes between the *resource* impact of state spending (the use of real resources which would otherwise be available for other purposes) and the *transfer* function of state spending. Transfer spending is just that: spending that merely reallocates resources from one group to another. The distinction is crucial since theoretically state spending could approach 100% of GNP or GDP and capitalism could still flourish if transfer payment dominates. (This tends to be the model for many U.S. welfare programs, e.g., food stamps or medicare). In Britain since World War I each form of spending has comprised about half of the total of all government expenditures. Of total state spending in the U.K., welfare spending was composed of almost three/fifths resource spending and over one half of that (one-third of total welfare spending) was for wages and salaries. Since World War II, this has been a reflection of the high relative growth of the public sector labor force, the relatively labor-intensive nature of social services, and the ambiguous status of service sector "productivity" measurement with the resulting relatively low productivity gains possible in this sector. All this is standard knowledge which Gough presents in a compact and clear manner. Gough breaks down the growth of social expenditure into four categories: rising relative costs; population changes; new and improved services; and, the growth of "new" social needs. This is an important set of distinctions, for they go

beyond O'Connor's more general and abstract treatment of social consumption and social expense (leaving aside social investment). Gough suggests that the pool of formerly low paid, primarily women workers in the social service sector has dried up. This has placed on a more competitive footing state service sector workers (disproportionately women) with other sectors of the labor force. Thus, the costs of state wages paid to service sector workers has risen faster than either the rate of inflation or other sectors of the labor market until it has recently more or less reached parity. (85-6)

Demographic shifts have occured in all the advanced industrial countries such that the social security and medical service systems in particular bear a higher burden of support than previously. In addition to these shifts and the changing composition of labor in the social service sector, the extensive and intensive growth of welfare have contributed to rising relative costs. (The exact mix between extensive and intensive varies greatly from country to country.) Greater social service coverage (extensive growth) in the U.K. in the last three decades has accounted for little of the overall growth of the welfare state, while more coverage (intensive growth) has accounted for most of the welfare gains. In short, there has been a real improvement in certain sectors of the welfare state in most of the advanced capitalist nations in the post-World War II period. Yet, as a reflection of the contradictory nature of the welfare state, there has simultaneously been an increase in what Gough calls new social needs. New needs arise from both what Titmuss called "diswelfares" associated with capitalist development (the social costs of "progress"), as well as from the general recognition that the increased potentials of advanced industrial society have stimulated what some have called "equity claims" on the state from those with least income and wealth. (Gough, for instance, points to the "enormous" rise in mental illness as a social cost, but fails to critically consider whether this is in fact a real rise, or merely one resulting from the growth of the institutions and professions—social work, community mental health centers, etc.—which have as their task the labelling and "treatment" of mental illness.) The conclusion which Gough reaches is that while there has been real improvement in welfare delivery, this has been largely offset by the growth of new, unmet needs, creating a serious shortfall by the welfare states unable to meet these new needs. The growth of new needs has maintained or increased discontent with the function of the welfare state although there has been an absolute expansion of services, intersively and/or extensively.

This last point is particularly important since new constituencies are organized and created around new needs; constituencies which both support (and to some degree depend on) the welfare state, and perhaps as well as are hostile to it. The growth of numerous forms of state-

dependent populations seems to me a critical political fact about the growth of welfare states. Gough makes little of this, although others (too often conservatives) are well aware of the degredation and impotence of dependence. Since one of Gough's central points about the contradictory nature of the welfare state is that the specific points of contradiction are formed around conflict and class struggle, it would have been important to know more about the specifies of this political process. Specifically, have new need constituencies (e.g. women's movements demanding adequate child care, etc.) undermined (perhaps unintentionally) the bases of welfare state support, thereby making the political stability of the welfare state (and its supporting political parties) more vulnerable. [Morris Janowitz makes this point in his book, *The Social Control of the Welfare State* (University of Chicago Press, 1976)].

The lack of concrete political case studies in the book, and the general lack of an analysis of the seeming endemic political instability of all welfare states in the last decade and a half, is an unfortunate failing of Gough's book. This error of omission creates a large gap between Gough's explicit theory of the state (pp. 38-44 and 155-8) and the actual political workings of a specific state. Gough sees the state as relatively autonomous from capital while seriously constrained by the national and international structures and imperatives of the capitalist system. He concludes, "Within these constraints there is room for manoeuvre, for competing strategies and relative autonomy in no way acts as the passive tool of one class." (44) The state is a mediation of capital. Yet in the book there is little concrete discussion of the nature of the maneuvers, strategies and the alliances, coalitions and conflicts among, between and within social classes and groups. Thus, a certain backdoor, unintentional but implicit functionalism creeps in through this gap since the needs (requirements, imperatives, etc.) of the system tend to be stressed in the absence of a concrete, historical analysis of the terms and terrain of social conflict.

What have been the implications for capitalist development and the specific nature of that contradictory process of this massive growth of the welfare state? The final two chapters are addressed to this. Gough seeks to answer the question: Is the growth of the welfare state a fetter on or a support of capital accumulation? Ultimately his answer is: It depends. It depends (for Gough) on: 1-the structure of taxation; 2-the mix of "unreproductive" and "reproductive" activities (approximately corresponding to O'Connor's categories of social expense and social consumption); and, 3-on how labor power (variable capital) is itself valuated. While Gough's answer is ultimately ambiguous, his formulation of these problems is both intriguing and useful.

He begins by suggesting that the growth of welfare expenditures in terms of their impact on aggregate demand is neither necessarily

harmful nor beneficial over time *as long as taxation is increased and structured accordingly*. In Marxist terms an increase in welfare spending along with appropriate structured taxation will not affect the realization of surplus value. But what of the production of surplus value? Gough suggests that it may appear that the growth of the welfare related state sector workers produce no surplus value (that is they are "unproductive") since their work (producing only use values directly consumed rather than exchanged) decreases the total amount of surplus value produced in a particular country. Yet this appearance misses the essential *return flow* of what has become called the social wage—that is, state benefits and services as they return back to the capitalist sector. Gough's argument is directed against both conservative and some Marxist arguments which see state welfare spending as a net drain on surplus value or profits. (E.G. Bacon and Eltis, *Britain's Economic Problem: Too Few Producers;* and, Fine and Harris, "State Expenditure and Advanced Capitalism: A Critique," *New Left Review,* 98.)

Aside from subsidies, in the U.K. in 1975 social services in cash and in kind amounted to almost 30% of all personal income. (110) As has been indicated in many other studies, this is less a massive vertical redistribution between classes than a horizontal redistribution within classes to families, individuals, and groups of different types and in different life circumstances and stages of the life cycle. The implications of this for the issue of whether state spending is reproductive or unreproductive, and thus a new deduction from surplus value, lies in whether state-provided services are directly consumed as use values (e.g., there is no exchange value) or whether they are commodified through exchange, mediated by the state. The former Gough calls "collective consumption" (benefits in kind directly consumed); the latter, the social wage (benefits in cash exchanged in the market). Gough's argument is clear; state services (in kind and cash) increasingly contribute to the daily and intergenerational reproduction of the working-class, and therefore *increase* the value of labor power, and hence of surplus value (with the famous "all else being equal" necessarily appended). Thus, the redistribution of payments for labor via the state need not *necessarily* encroach on capital's share of profits (or surplus value) in the total output. While not necessarily a net deduction or a net addition, there are two additional factors Gough considers important to discuss: the nature of state-produced services (that is, the mix between the social wage and collective consumption); and, the dynamics of the growing welfare state.

In the all-too-short section on the "production of social services" in Chapter 6, Gough elaborates these points. In the case, for instance, of the National Health Service (NHS) labor pays for its total costs, while the very existence of the NHS has essentially eliminated the private

health care industry. Therefore, labor's gain is capital's loss, and this lowers health costs. (118) But if capital can reduce wages (that is, all else is *not* equal) or not increase them as rapidly as otherwise it might have, then labor's net gain is reduced or eliminated, and could theoretically increase capital's net profits.

This is complicated by the fact that the state and private sectors compete for labor (and Gough should have added often capital as well since especially in periods of deficit financing of state budgets the capital markets are drawn down by the state's debt issues). Gough argues that this last point to date has not been important for the U.K. since the growth of social services have depended on new entrants into the labor market (as discussed above). New entrants, however, enter only once, and furthermore this has been a general trend throughout the advanced capitalist nations and have not been restricted to the state sector.

Thus, while Gough sets up a useful conceptual model for analyzing the specific impacts of state spending in the division between reproductive and unreproductive activities, he does not come through on the promise for an analysis of these categories and their mix. Nor does he consider how the mix is determined, which is essentially a political process. He writes: "Much more work is required on the balance between these two components of the welfare state and their growth in recent years." (122) While this is undoubtedly correct, and keeping in mind that one cannot ask everything from one book, this type of issue is in fact placed by Gough as the nub of his main point about the role of welfare spending in the valuation of labor power. And this also holds in analyzing whether the state is a fetter on or support to accumulation, and if so, to what extent in and which activities. That is, if the welfare state is a contradictory entity, what are the interstices of that contradiction? (It might be noted in passing that Gough downplays the socio-cultural and historical content of the valuation of labor power. That is, the problem of the impact and process of the historical standards of the standard of living. The issue downplayed is that of the "fit" between the historical standards and the "functional" requirements of capital accumulation.)

In Appendix B (160) Gough points out that unreproductive services—social expenses—(e.g. police, armed forces, etc.) are essential for securing the general conditions for capitalist accumulation and reproduction, although they are not themselves productive. Yet he does not adequately dissect the mix of these in actual welfare state expenditures. For instance, are mental health or occupational related health programs and problems (and more generally all the social costs associated with capital accumulation) included in welfare state functions unreproductive or reproductive expenditures?

If the key question concerning the mix of state expenditures between the social wage and collective consumption expenditures and the mix between reproductive and unreproductive expenditures remain unanswered, so must questions concerning which sectors (that is, which class, class fractions, regions, etc.) ultimately bear the burden of welfare state taxation. This question of course is the question of the current retrenchment and restructuring of the welfare state in the face of stag- and slumpflation, and productivity slowdown. Gough argues that the growth of the welfare state during periods of either slow or no growth leads to inflation, reduced profits or both. That is, it becomes a fetter on accumulation. This is because any combination of raising taxes or of increasing state borrowing will be inflationary if passed on by capital to labor through higher prices. If not passed on by capital, it will then directly eat into profits. (Gough might have mentioned that costs passed along by monopoly or near-monopoly firms is not automatic, and in any case has limits, e.g., depending on the product, the impact of international competition which tends not to play by oligopolistic rules, etc.) Thus, one of the main contradictions of the welfare state is that while most state expenditures are directly or indirectly reproductive (and this is more asserted than proved) the ability to finance them without cutting into profits or increasing inflation or both remains a complete catch-22 for state managers. Thus the locus of conflict is often around taxes. Here the directly economic power of the working class generally involves the ability to win wage gains to meet increased taxation, in which case the tax increase in inflationary. Gough concludes: "The growth of the welfare state is neither cause nor consequence of capitalist development, but one aspect of it. Consequently, it is neither cause nor consequence of the present crisis, but again one aspect of it." (127) While I don't disagree with this, a greater specification of the "aspects" of the crisis and of developments would have been helpful. This can only be done through an analysis of the actual political and economic events of a particular historical period, rather than through a general formulation of the social forces and historical actors involved.

The final chapter ("The Welfare State and the Crisis") discusses the current crisis of international capital and the cutbacks of the welfare state as a direct result of that crisis. What is being cut is not total state expenditures, but rather the social component in order to restructure capital (read: subsidize it) as a means to better respond to the crisis. That occurs, of course, at the expense of the living standards of those most welfare-dependent. This has meant the abandonment of orthodox Keynesian strategies which would increase state expenditures available to stimulate aggregate demand, rather than decrease them in relation to the cost of living. The welfare state is pressured by the end of the long boom of the post-War era which gave labor some power over

wages, benefits and greater power in politics. This resulted in a squeeze on profits, Gough suggests, although he terms this a fall in the rate (rather than share) of profits. (135) Thus, future growth possibilities decline, while capital's most urgent task is the reestablishment of the conditions of profitable accumulation, itself restricted by the prior and exiting organization of the welfare state. This is the closest Gough comes to an actual analysis of the current state of class forces and social conflict regarding the future role of the welfare state and its relation to capital. (He points out that of course an economic crisis is also a social and political crisis, and thereby raises the demand for greater, rather than less, social expenditures.) Capital's demand to restructure the welfare state by shifting expenditures away from *realization* (or aggregate demand) functions to *production* functions implies a net less of effective aggregate demand. Consequently, this adds to stagflationary tendencies.

Gough suggests that four specific areas of welfare state restructuring are in progress: 1-Schooling to be made to "fit" better with labor market requirements and thus made more technocratic and hierarchical; 2-Greater attempts to force people off public assistance (called social security in the U.K.) and into the labor market which also implies an attack on minimum wages (a point not mentioned by Gough); 3-The making of social services more "efficient," to wit: computerization of the NHS in the U.K., with the consequent dehumanization and less one-to-one contact between patient and staff; and, 4-The reprivatization of parts of the welfare state, specifically in the form of cutting back on the direct state provision of services and increasing the subsidization and purchase of privately-produced services.

Gough argues that in the long run the impact of these "rationalizations" may well produce irrationalities. Concluding, Gough argues that, ". . . ultimately the growth of the welfare state in its present form is inimical to both the free market mechanism and the continued accumulation of capital." (145) But this conclusion is inadequate for it begs the central question Gough raised previously. That is, why has the present form of the welfare state, which in the prior chapter we are told is primarily reproductive of labor power, all of a sudden destructive of that end? Gough continues: ". . . we argued that a growing level of welfare expenditure need not interfere with the accumulation of capital, so long as the higher "social wage" could be financed out of a total labor costs (the value of labor power) rathe than from profits (surplus value)." (149) This is centrally important for resolving the ambiguity of the first quote, but unfortunately Gough fails to empirically indicate who has borne the tax costs of the social wage; how it may have changed over time (especially since the mid-1960's) and what has changed it. Calculating tax incidence is itself a complex task, one which I hesitate to

suggest should have been included in this book. But nevertheless much hangs on it, for it is a central mechanism for financing all state expenditures, and especially of calculating the components of the social wage. Gough's task here would have been not merely calculating tax incidence but as well to gauge the division between capital and labor of the costs not only of the social wage and collective consumption but the impact of these on the level of the real wages at the point of production. These two trends (and importantly as well the politics of them) would together indicate whether in fact the welfare state has squeezed profits, to what degree, and from what point in time.

In chapter 7 Gough argues (without proving the case empirically) that profits have been squeezed between a strong labor movement able to maintain its real point of production wages over time and the growing social expenditures of the welfare state (in addition to other state expenditures). Yet in Chapter 5 and 6 he argues that labor has borne the costs of the bulk of the social wage. Which is correct? The lack of concrete analysis of this crucial question is an unfortunate omission in an otherwise excellent presentation of the fundamental history, development and contradictions of the welfare state.

Gough's book is an important contribution to a relatively neglected area by previous Marxist political economists. It is also a provocative book conceptually, and should provide a standard point of departure for future work on the welfare state specifically, and for state theory in general. Gough's conclusions are undoubtedly correct: that the achievement of some social and political rights in the post-War period along with the growth of the material and human forces of production has come to an end. Advanced capitalism may no longer be able to advance on all three grounds simultaneously. That capitalism and aspects of social and political democracy have corresponded during the post-War period is important; that they are currently beginning to diverge foretells the depth of the currently emerging crisis. The golden era of the welfare state has indeed passed.

Review: Franco Cassano *Il teorema democristiano* (The Christian Democratic Theorem) Bari: De Donato 1979.

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This book, available only in Italian, is one of numerous studies analysing the political power structure in Italy. Usually these studies are too involved and enmeshed in the well-known "Byzantine" world of Italian politics which is so difficult for non-Italians to understand. Cassano's book is an attempt to enlarge the perspective of these studies by looking to a broader theoretical framework to interpret Italian politics. The theory of the state, in particular the relationship between state apparatus and economic power, is the key used by Cassano to interpret the political history of Italy after World War II. One of the final results of this effort is to make the Italian political event more understandable and less "provincial" and thus more interesting for non-Italians.

After each political election, occurring too frequently in Italy, politicians, sociologists and other politically involved people try to explain why the Christian Democratic Party of Italy (DC) still maintains a relative majority. This party has ruled, alone or in coalition, since 1946, from the beginning of the parliamentary republic in Italy. The DC can be considered the party most responsible for the majority of the economic and social problems in Italy today. Inside this party we can find people strongly compromised by fascist terrorism, people whose only worth is to be linked to the biggest economic and religious trusts (mafia included). One can also mention the numerous scandals that periodically come to light, like widespread political corruption that have involved people of the DC or the party itself, which are never penalized only because the DC has open control of the biggest positions in the courts.

In a country like Italy where we find a high level of politicization and where the presence of left wing organizations in institutions and in social life is very strong, before each general election the left forecasts or at least supposes a defeat for the DC. After the ritual eve of election spent awaiting the results and the equally ritual disappointments to see that the DC is still the biggest party with almost 40% of the votes, the time of reflection begins. Most explanations for the outcome of the election are unable to go beyond superficial and simplistic interpretations: the connection with the Catholic Church, more financial backing, international support, the low cultural level of the Italian population, the mammoth conditioning from the mass media. Although these reasons certainly have meaning, they are not enough to clarify why the DC is not only the biggest party, but is always, in any political, economic and social condition, at the center of every Italian government. Actually

there is no lack of books and articles which attempt to analyse the nature of the DC, from historical and sociological points of view. Nevertheless unresolved issues exceed the certainties.

Cassano's book is one of these attempts to give a global explanation of how and why the DC has held power in the last thirty years of Italian history. Former analyses into the nature of the DC power structure have been carried out through the study of its personal or ideological connections with the centers of social and economic power. As a ruling and mass party the DC is related to multiple and contradictory social strata: centers of industrial and agrarian power and organizations of small farmers, strong Catholic blue-collar unions and small but numerous right wing white-collar unions (mainly bureaucrats and teachers), organizations of top hierarchy judges and the mafia, the Catholic ecclesiastical hierarchy and professional and masonic organizations. It is obvious that with such a multitude of variables, without a clear methodology that is capable of objectively analyzing all these elements, political subjectivity easily dominates. Therefore frequently the political ideology of the author is the key most used to evaluate the nature of the DC.

Cassano utilizes, in my opinion with success, another approach: he places at the basis of his analysis the problem of the nature and function of the capitalist state. At the moment in Italy the discussion about the theory of the state is quite strong, but partly abstract and academic. In Cassano's book this discussion is utilized as a method of interpretation of the political events of the last thirty years in Italy.

Cassano starts by analyzing the two dominant political and theoretical positions on the nature of the DC that are present in the Italian left. The first widespread position considers the DC as a direct emanation of the interests of the pre-1960 industrial bourgeoisie and its allies: agrarians, small farmers, the middle class, etc. Even if strongly simplified this position is quite diffused inside the Marxist new left in the Italian Communist Party (PCI) at least until the 1950s and hypothesizes that this interpretation is still at the basis of the politics of the PCI in its relations with the DC (the historical compromise). In my opinion this intriguing hypothesis has a basis of truth, at least regarding the wing of the PCI more aligned with the USSR and Stalinism, as opposed to the more recent part of the PCI made up of younger militants from the new left experience of the 1960s. According to Cassano a consideration of the DC as an instrument of the bourgeoisie is based upon an accepted theory of the capitalist state whose activity is limited to defending the direct and immediate concerns of the bourgeoisie against the struggles and the interest of the proletariat; the DC's margins of autonomy are relative only to its choice of the best instruments to realize the goals of the bourgeoisie.

A second analytical position considers the DC as a party concerned solely with conserving its own block of political power. This block of power is not representative of any particular social class, but is a defender of the interests of a political class which was born and grew during the post-war years, the so-called "new bourgeoisie of the state." The growth of this "state-bourgeoisie" caused the growth of active intervention in society and in the economy. The goal was to maintain and reinforce the political power of this class. In particular the enormous growth of public enterprises that occurred in Italy is interpreted as the intervention of bureaucratic power in the economic structure. All the literature related to this position emphasizes the contradiction between "clean and progressive" industrial capitalism and state activity: the former means more accumulation and more occupation, the latter means waste and parasitism for the benefit of the state bourgeoisie and its allies (public clerks, bosses and workers in public enterprises, public services workers, etc.). The theory of the state behind this position is, for Cassano, apparently in opposition to the former: the accent is placed on the complete autonomy of the state from the traditional social classes, such that he who rules the state tends to form class "in se" and "per se."

For Cassano both these positions, besides being hardly able to analyse reality, are wrong and misleading. In fact both have as a base "an *instrumentalist* conception of the state, for which the state is reduced to an organ for the realization and protection of its internal interests" (p. 25). On the contrary for Cassano the state acts to promote "the reproduction of the *general conditions* of capitalist production." Therefore the state's main activity is to defend "the *political interests* of the ruling classes, that do not necessarily coincide with maximizing the rate of profit, but with the reproduction of capitalist society on the whole" (pp. 7–8). From this conception of the nature of the state, Cassano deduces that the DC has and continues to function as a political apparatus that manages the state. For Cassano the starting point is the consideration that for a long time in Italy liberal institutions have been less capable of controlling the process of accumulation than the survival of the capitalist mode of production itself. This leads to an understanding of the intense and growing politicization of the economy and to the enormous extension of political power in respect to "pure" economic power. All this occurs in an institutional context "where the degree of 'diffusion of politics in the social,' and the degree of power of the state apparatus are directly proportional to the degree of the difficulties in reproducing the capitalist mode of production" (p. 28). According to Cassano specific structural conditions in Italy did not allow for the possibility of involving the working class in the management of the state because of the impossibility of promoting high wages. Thus the

structure of the Italian economy leaves only the DC with the function of directing the state. This monopolistic power from one side increases the power of the DC over the bourgeoisie, from the other side it necessitates that the DC embody a large number of elements which usually characterize the opposition (pp. 29–30).

After clarifying his theoretical approach, Cassano uses it to provide a short review of the politics of the DC in the last thirty years. His main purpose is to analyse the way in which the DC has organized its politics and ideologies for ruling the Italian state. Cassano analyzes the four stages in which the postwar period in Italy is usually divided: 1948/58 (reconstruction after the war, and industrial transformation); 1959/62 (extensive economic development); 1963/69 (economic crisis and industrial restructuring); 1970/today (stagflation and recurring economic crisis).

The first phase (1948/58) was characterized by the need of the structural transformations of the Italian economy and society. This process happened by means of direct management of the economic processes by the DC, placing the "pure economic needs" of the industrial bourgeoisie secondary to political action, not connected with the defense of the existing ruling class order. This order was transformed when it became contradictory with the organization of a social block able to cope with left mass movements (p. 41). Christian Democratic theorists in that period argued that economic laws should not rule society because of conflicts that could develop between social classes. In theory and practice, this period witnessed a self-serving (voluntaristic) conception of politics very much reflecting fascist corporatism and authoritarianism.

The second period (1958/62) was characterized by a state intervention according to a "laissez-faire" model. According to Cassano this change was needed because "if it is true that the backwardness of the Italian bourgeoisie needs a strong autonomy of the political mediation, it is also true that backwardness itself does not allow that this autonomy can be able to express a 'productivist' line" (p. 77). In other words the industrial bourgeoisie, more linked to the international market and to expanding economic sectors, after the DC provided a favorable political basis (mainly: weak unions, political repression of the left, big unemployment reserve), took the situation in hand and affirmed the supremacy of "economic laws" and of capital accumulation. This stage of temporarily "putting aside" the active political intervention of the DC was very short. The extensive development of the economy, without the usual political mediation of the DC, bore new and acute contradictions, without being able to alleviate the old ones (e.g., the huge social problems caused by the masive migration from the agricultural south to the industrialized north, the persistent unemployment and under-

employment, the wild exploitation in the factories; from the political point of view the strengthening of the left and the development of strong contradictions inside different strata of the bourgeoisie).

The third period (1963/69) is characterized by mass struggles resulting in economic and political crisis. The DC attempted to enlarge and redirect the political basis of the state apparatus: this enlargment took the form of a coalition from the Italian Socialist Party (PSI). The so-called political phase of "center-left" (centro-sinistra) began, whose slogan was "the politics of structural reforms of Italian society." Beside being hindered by a part of the DC itself, this coalition was not able to mediate and mitigate the strong mass movements that materialized in these years. These struggles in fact involved exactly the social strata (students and primary working class) that would have to be the mass basis for the politics of the reforms and for the creation of a unified social democratic party as the political alternative to the DC.

The last pages of Cassano's book concern the present crisis in Italy which began in 1970. It is a complex and long-term political crisis surrounded by an alternation of economic crisis and recoveries. This last phase is characterized by the Christian Democratic attempt to involve the PCI in the management of the contradictions and, only in small part, in the management of power. According to Cassano this attempt failed and yet he concludes his book with a quick exposition of the present contradictions which the DC faces today. The choices that the DC must deal with are the usual ones: left wing politics through an alliance with the industrial bourgeoisie and part of the working class; or right wing politics of political repression of social movements and the alliance with the conservative strata. In spite of this impasse the DC until now was able to maintain itself at the center of the state apparatus and to maintain strong popular support through a huge enlargement of public expenditure. According to Cassano this answer will not be sufficient to mitigate the political problems of the DC. On the contrary it seems that these problems have placed these crises for the first time, in the center of this party.

A book, like Cassano's, that copes with the function and role of the DC in a period of thirty years is liable to omit some important and meaningful problems. For instance, problems like the authoritarian nature of the DC expressed through the use of right wing terrorism and through numerous attempts at authoritarian institutional reform are omitted. Also Cassano omitted the international links between the DC and U.S. imperialism and the recent development of links between a part of the DC and new German imperialism. Obviously Cassano's goal is not to give a complete history of post-war politics in Italy, but is an attempt to exemplify a reading of political life in Italy through a vision of the nature of the capitalist state that differs from an instrumentalist

theory. Cassano exalts the possibility of the politically autonomous direction of the state. In the specific historical Italian conditions the state represented active political intervention without which "the ruling classes could not have sufficient mechanisms for integrating the dependent classes, mechanisms able to mitigate class conflict. These mechanisms must be constructed through a wide intervention of the state and therefore through the transfer of a big share of decisions in the hands of the political forces who are directing the government" (p. 45).

Actually the need for these political mechanisms not only pertains to the Italian situation but is true for almost all capitalist countries with a parliamentary democracy. More interesting is the attempt to use the discussion about the theory of the capitalist state as a key to reading a political process. The adaptation of these theoretical ideas to Italy seems to me positive, because it is able to find in a short synthesis the main events in understanding Italian political life in the last thirty years. This is positive especially because it is able to give good theoretical help in contesting the economistic interpretation of Italian political history still prevalent inside the old and new left. Nevertheless, there is a danger in applying the interpretation of a "supremacy of politics" in the Italian situation. The duration of the Christian Democratic management of the state, its "unsuitability" in the management of power often bring about identification of the state with the DC. In my opinion there are grave dangers in doing this. Two examples of organizations which do this are: first, institutional, constituted by the PCI, the second anti-institutional: the Red Brigades (BR). Inside the PCI the position that identifies the DC with the capitalist state is a rather strong left wing interpretation of this conception. The final political result is that they identify state management by the PCI as *the* goal of socialism (this position is also present in the left wing of the PSI), where the defeat of the DC means the defeat of the capitalist state. On the anti-institutional side we have the Red Brigades whose slogan is "attack the heart of the state." This slogan has been made concrete in striking at outstanding Christian Democrat party members. The kidnapping and murdering of Moro is an example of this conception: Moro did not hold any institutional position in the state, he was only the chairman of the DC. During the long period of Moro's imprisonment the negotiations were made mainly with people of the DC, and it was quite clear that the goal of the BR was to be recognized by the DC as a political force in the war against the DC-state.

In conclusion, if the state has a large degree of autonomy from the bourgeoisie and from the ruling classes, it has even more autonomy from the political forces that from time to time control it. The only autonomy that the state cannot have is from the mode of production. Its institutions, its apparatus are in fact permeated in each level by the

laws of the capitalist mode of production. That does not mean obviously that, according to whom and the way in which the state is managed, it is not possible to find different contradictions. But each struggle for social change must have the capacity of having an impact on the institutions: namely its capacity of success is linked to the capacity of finding and facing the characteristic of the institution more affected by the capitalistic mode of production. For this reason it is very important to separate, at least at the theoretical level, the analysis of the political management of the state from the analysis of the nature of its institutions in their historical evolution.

Review: A Friendly Critique of Claudia Von Braunmühl's *"On the Analysis of the Bourgeois Nation State within the World Context: An Attempt to Develop a Methodological and Theoretical Approach"**

Margaret A. Fay and Barbara Stuckey

Introduction

In a year when newspaper journalists are scurrying around the globe to report on revolutionary situations and the overthrow of governments in the poverty-stricken capitalist nations of the Third World, Marxist academics in the First World are too often still busy searching for a theory of the state based on analysis of capital accumulation in the developed countries. Of the eight contributions in the recently published collection of essays from the German "theory of the state debate"—*State and Capital: A Marxist Debate*—only one, that from Claudia von Braunmühl, takes into account the world-wide dimension of capital accumulation, a dimension that since the beginnings of capitalism has had its empirical manifestation in the world market.

In his earliest writings on political economy, the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, Marx recognized that capital can only develop and attain its *"pure* expression" through "its *formation on a world scale."*[1] More concretely, in a passage from the *Poverty of Philosophy* (1848) cited by von Braunmühl, Marx stated:

> The colonies created world trade, and world trade is the condition of large-scale industrial enterprise. (p. 168)[2]

As von Braunmühl demonstrates in her analysis of Marx's basic concept, "capital in general", Marx did not abandon, but rather implicitly presupposed the essentially global dimension of capital in the categories that he developed in his late studies on the capitalist mode of production. In his three volumes of *Capital*, however, Marx tends to relate these categories "in moments of empirical concretization to the national framework" (p. 165), using the history of England to illustrate and elaborate the development of his argument. An explicit and systematic analysis of the global dimensions of capital always remained an item on Marx's agenda (to have been carried out in the sixth volume of *Capital),* but one that he himself never had the time to undertake.

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* Published in John Holloway & Sol Picciotto (eds), *State and Capital: A Marxist Debate,* Edward Arnold, London, 1978. A Review of this collection of essays by Margaret Fay appeared in *Kapitalistate* 7.

Thanks to the recent work of Andre Gunder Frank, Samir Amin, Immanuel Wallerstein, and others, in reconstructing the history of capitalism as a world system and as a process of world accumulation, this dimension of the capitalist mode of production is beginning to receive the attention it deserves. Nevertheless von Braunmühl is (to the best of our knowledge) the first among those engaged in the (German) Marxist theory of the state debate to insist that "the appropriate analytical level is that of the world market" and that "the derivation and determination of the form of the *bourgeois state* must be introduced on this dimension, or perhaps can only be accomplished at this level" (p. 164-5). Hitherto, most who have examined the role of the state in the capitalist mode of production have tended to ignore the international dimension of accumulation and have rested their examination on a taken-for-granted acceptance of categories such as "national economy", "national capital", "nation state", etc. If, however, (as has been demonstrated by Amin's, Frank's and Wallerstein's recent research into the historical evolution and manifestations of the capitalist mode of production), the accumulation, reproduction and expansion of capital has never been a process confined within the boundaries of any nation, then, as von Braunmühl correctly points out, it is "in fact theoretically impossible to consider national economic development and the activities of national state apparatuses as being to a large extent internally determined" (p. 161). This means that terms such as "national economy", "national capital", and "nation state", can no longer be accepted as unproblematic. Clearly they cannot refer to a self-contained unit with a self-propelling dynamic of its own, though this indeed is the way such terms have been used in the literature.

Thus, if we are interested in understanding the nation state in terms of the emergence and development of the capitalist mode of production—and similarly, if we are interested in understanding the emergence and development of struggles against that mode of production and its state—we cannot restrict ourselves to what has happened within the boundaries of a single capitalist country (such as the USA or England). Rather, as von Braunmühl argues, "attention should be turned to specifying the conditions under which capital—the movement of which is international in its very essence—is particularized into national capitals and their delimited political organization in the national state". (p. 164). "In other words, the accumulation of capital must be reconstructed conceptually"—and, we would add, historically—"in the world market context" (p. 163).

Von Braunmühl's approach for developing a Marxist theory of the state is novel, challenging, and valid in as far as she insists that the world market and the international capitalist system must be taken as the appropriate level of analysis for uncovering the hidden relation-

ships between the capitalist mode of production and the apparatus of the bourgeois state. But her own attempt to elaborate a methodological and theoretical approach for understanding the bourgeois nation state within the world market context is inadequate to cope with this challenge. Von Braunmühl raises the right question but gives the wrong answer. In the pages that follow we shall attempt to indicate in what ways von Braunmühl's answer goes wrong.

Accumulation in the Core and Non-Accumulation in the Periphery

Von Braunmühl opens her essay with the following sentence:

> The imperialist system, particularly in its metropolitan regions, is characterized to an increasing extent by the contradiction between internationalization and nationalization of the process of accumulation, a contradiction which manifests itself today in the appearance of internationally operating capitals, such as multinational corporations, and in the constant intervention of the state apparatus in the reproduction of the national capitals. (160)

This sentence— despite its promise to reveal the contradictory nature of the imperialist system— ignores the most striking contradiction of this system, namely the impoverishment of the peripheral regions (Third World countries) in order to enrich the metropolitan core (First World countries). Von Braunmühl has no right to say "particularly in its metropolitan regions" can we see "the contradiction between internationalization and nationalization of the process of accumulation". Not at all, this is not where the contradiction is "particularly" to be found. The contradiction is far more blatant if we look beyond the metropolitan regions of the imperialist system and take stock of the surplus generated in and extracted from the Third World countries.

The nation state, as von Braunmühl defines it, is a partial centre of accumulation; but this is a phenomenon to be found in only one part of the world capitalist system, namely the metropolitan core. Nothing that von Braunmühl tells us about the bourgeois nation state— its emergence, its form, its functions— allows us to use this concept for understanding the history of the peripheral areas. Thus she correctly characterises bourgeois nation state as politically bounded and *partial* centres of capital accumulation, competing with one another to share in the *globally* produced commodities circulating on the world market, but she forgets that the majority of countries that participated as suppliers to that market, namely the colonies of yesterday which have become the Third World countries of today, were drained of their natural resources and populations without being given an opportunity to accumulate anything.

She forgets those who were forced to produce for the world market but who were denied the opportunity to appropriate any of their surplus.

The surplus that has circulated on the world market has always been— and still is— a combination of the suplus produced in the First and Third Worlds (and with the opening of trade relations with socialist countries, the surplus of the Second World is also now circulating on the world market). But the appropriation of that surplus to create a national process of accumulation has historically been the exclusive prerogative of the countries of the First World, a prerogative however that was underpinned by the devastation and exploitation suffered by the other two thirds of the world.

Von Braunmühl's concept of the nation state as a partial centre of accumulation is therefore inapplicable to the majority of the countries participating in the world market, inapplicable to nations who have contributed to the process of capital accumulation, without themselves doing any of the accumulating. Thus her concept of the world market remains incomplete until she offers us a complementary concept to include these centres of non-accumulating producers. But far from offering us this complementary concept, she *generalizes* the "European nation-state" into the world market's "characteristic principle of organization" (172), into an aspect of the "universal character of the capitalist mode of production" (174).

In her historical sketch of the emergence and expansion of the world market, von Braunmühl does indeed recognize that the colonies were an essential component of the emergence of the world market and of the first stage of capital accumulation (primitive accumulation). But she errs in assuming that the colonies which the European countries populated with their own colonists, such as North America (and later South Africa, Austrialia, etc.), were typical of the colonized parts of the globe. The "white" colonies did indeed follow in the footsteps of their mother countries: they participated in the world market, not only as suppliers but also as accumulators; they too developed into "bourgeois nation states" and were able to appropriate enough of the globally-produced surplus to become part of to-day's First World. But to-day's Third World countries are distinguished by the fact that they shared the European experience not in its benefits, but as its victims.

By moving directly from the "analytical level of the world market" to "its differentiation as national capitals and its organization as nation states", von Braunmühl not only bypasses the crucial intervening level of analysis— the structure of the world market as accumulating and exploiting core and nonaccumulating and exploited periphery— but she in effect dismisses the periphery from further consideration. As a result, she is incapable of carrying out the task she has set herself, the task of examining the bourgeois nation state in the context of the world

market. Instead of critically examining concepts such as "national capital", "national economy", and "nation state", she ends up uncritically perpetuating their usage.

As soon as we include the other half of the world market—the exploited peripheral regions—in our examination of the history of the evolution of the capitalist mode of production, we can immediately see that the task is not only to explain the differentiation of the world market "as national capitals and its organization as nation states" (164); rather we must also illuminate the consolidation of a world-wide produced surplus into a *few* national capitals in the core countries of the system at the expense of the *many* non-accumulating nations in the periphery. If we are to develop a conceptual appartus for the purpose of such illumination, then it should become immediately clear that the term "national capital" obfuscates rather than illuminates. Capital is only national in the sense that within the political/geographical boundaries of a given nation, there are agents, both private and state-organized, accumulating and deploying capital. But what has been accumulated as "national capital" in First World countries was never the product of one nation alone. It has always been a combination of both international and national surplus. In other words, every "national" capital includes non-national capital—i.e., a transfer of surplus from other countries, particularly from the colonized regions of the Third World.

There is a certain irony in von Braunmühl's eurocentric appropriation of a perspective that was pioneered and developed by people whose primary concern was precisely the devastating consequences that Third World peoples have suffered by being incorporated into the world-wide process of capital accumulation. This perspective, as developed in A. G. Frank's study of Latin America, is characterized by von Braunmühl as a limited insight, an insight "confined to the extreme disparities exhibited in the relationships between the metropolitan areas and the peripheral regions" (161). Von Braunmühl promises to liberate this insight from these restrictions and to raise it "to the level of theory". But the promised liberation turns out to be an impoverishment of the insight itself.

For in characterising Andre Gunder Frank's concept "the development of underdevelopment" (cited by von Braunmühl on p. 162) as "the insight into the way in which the world market mediates national accumulation and development of the productive forces" (161), von Braunmühl forgets the other side of the coin which was Frank's major preoccupation: namely the way in which the world market has mediated the *non*-accumulation of subjugated nations and imposed upon them the *under*-development of their productive forces.

A Misreading of Marx and a Misunderstanding of the Scope of Primitive Accumulation

Von Braunmühl draws together a convincing selection of passages from Marx's own writings to illustrate that Marx himself was very much aware of the international dimensions of capital accumulation, even though in his major exposé of the capitalist mode of production he relates his analysis "in moments of empirical concretization to the national framework". But at the same time she misrepresents Marx as being unable to "conceive of the world market as anything other than an aggregation of the national units (165). As proof of Marx's inability, she cites his explanation of "National Differences of Wages" (chapter XXII of *Capital I),* and yet it is precisely in this chapter that Marx introduces "the universal market, whose integral parts are the individual countries".[3] Compare this formulation by Marx with von Braunmühl's earlier formulation of the "correct view":

> The world market is not constituted by many national economies concentrated together, rather the world market is organized in the form of many national economies as its integral components (162).

The only difference between Marx's characterization of the world or universal market and von Braunmühl's is that Marx, more correctly than von Braunmühl, avoids attributing to individual countries their own "national economies".

Von Braunmühl not only misrepresents Marx's concept of the world market, she also misunderstands it. Thus at the end of her essay, she blames Marx for an "extremely blurred concept of the world market", and justifies this criticism by citing "two separate states of affairs", which Marx designated by one and the same term, "the world market". Von Braunmühl asserts: "Clearly a theoretical distinction must be drawn here". It is not at all clear to us that what she cites is indeed "two separate states of affairs" nor that a theoretical distinction must be drawn between them. She opposes Marx's use of "the concept to describe the location of those international trading relationships which in a centuries-long process helped to accelerate the destruction of feudal relations" to his description of "the entanglement of all peoples in the net of the world market, and with this, the international character of the capitalist regime". She correctly characterizes the latter as "the world market—envisaged as the fully developed domain of capital movement", but she incorrectly implies (by her demand that it be clearly distinguished from the former) that somehow the former concept of the world market fails to recognize that the world, and not the nation, is the only domain where the movement of capital can develop fully. This distinction seems clear to her (though not to us) perhaps because of her

mistaken assumption that "the process of accumulation and crisis (is) an *increasingly* international process" (176). What could be more international than the process of primitive accumulation in which feudal relations in Western Europe were destroyed *and* in which the countries of the Third World were raped of both their natural resources and human labor in order to provide the surplus indispensible (or getting the whole process of accumulation off the ground). In her preoccupation to identify the conditions under which the capitalist mode of production replaced the feudal mode of production in the countries of Europe, she identifies "the violent process by which the structure of the international division of a labour was established" as a process *concomitant* with the industrial revolution. This ignore the equally violent process three centuries before which had in fact already established the international division of labour. Von Braunmühl alludes to this earlier process—the process of primitive accumulation—when she speaks of "the capturing of wealth and the absorption of commodities" (168) as a presupposition for "the establishment of the capitalist mode of production" (168). She describes the colonies "as providers of raw materials, precious metals, luxury goods, and slaves", which enabled the world market to act "as powerful driving force in the accumulation of treasure, the circulation of money and commodity production for an expanding market" (168). But she fails to recognize that what she is describing is already an international division of labour, a division of labour between the exploited periphery of the international capitalist system and the metropolitan core. She fails to see that during this process of primitive accumulation, the political actors in the world market were not the nation-states of England, Holland, France, etc., but the British *empire,* the French *empire,* the Dutch *empire.*

The "successful" accumulation of capital in the First World countries was a joint product of the accumulating First World and the non-accumulating Third World. Since there is no "Fourth World" for the Third World to exploit a successful 20th century accumulation of capital in the Third World can hardly take place on the same basis as that of the First World Countries, which had whole colonies and empires at their disposal.

Statehood and Capitalism

Two months ago, we attended a conference on the labour theory of value. The conference participants were very diverse not only in their political and academic concerns, but in their countries of origin: Third World, Second World, First World—Marxist and non-Marxist. During

the last hour of the meetings, an Hungarian delegate gave a clear and concise summary of Marx's basic concepts and of the 19th century socialist movement's common vision of a socialist struggle. She ended up with the statement: "And so it was the biggest joke in history that the first, second, third, fourth, etc. socialist revolutions took place in the underdeveloped countries". But then a representative from the Third World replied: "Yes, but no. That is merely the second big joke in history. The first is that capitalism arose in the backwater of barbaric Europe—in England—and went on to dominate and exploit the originally much more advanced nation states of Egypt, Persia, Inida, China, Meso-America, the Ottoman Empire, etc." Despite the truth of this statement, we still find theory of the state debaters implying that the nation state in an invention and/or prerogative of capitalism. Marx was quite correct when he spoke of capital as "the production of a stage of society in comparison to which all earlier ones appear as mere *local developments* of humanity and as *nature-idolatry*". Marx continues:

> For the first time, nature becomes purely an object for humankind, purely a matter of utility; ceases to be recognised as a power for itself, and the theoretical discovery of its autonomous laws appears merely as a ruse so as to subjugate it under human needs, whether as an object of consumption or as a means of production. In accord with this tendency, capital drives beyond national barriers and prejudices as much as beyond nature worship, as well as all traditional confined, complacent, encrusted satisfactions of present needs, and reproductions of old ways of life. It is destructive towards all of this . . .[4]

Von Bruanmühl cites the latter half of this passage in her own essay (p. 163). But she does not make it clear that the "national boundaries" beyond which capital drives are not necessarily national boundaries established by capital itself. Rather, many state boundaries are relics of a pre-capitalist epoch. They are boundaries of the self-contained units into which the pre-capitalist world was divided. For the precapitalist world was an organization of separate civilizations whose boundaries defined not merely the limits of an authority structure but also the limits of the reproduction context. The emergence and development of capital, i.e., the process of capital accumulation, was not located at *any* historical state within these pre-capitalist self-contained units. It took place (and therefore can only be adequately analysed, as von Braunmühl herself elsewhere insists upon), at the world level. It is at this level that capital gathered strength and impinged on the national boundaries of the precapitalist social formations *from outside* in the Third World, *from inside* in the First World. It was not the case that conditions within any of these local units ever led to an emergence of capital which in an early embryonic form was confined to the boundaries of a precapitalist nation state and which then burst out of its national fetters.

Thus when von Braunmühl states

> The World market must be seen as an international, state-organized and specifically structured, all-encompassing effective international context of competition, within which statehood arises and consolidates itself and states form their characteristic economic, social and political structure (p. 167).

she errs in using the abstraction "statehood' instead of identifying the historical and geographically specific phenomenon, namely the rise of the bourgeois states of Europe during the transition from feudalism to capitalism. Her formulation ignores the whole precapitalist history of "statehood". Long before the rise of the world market, "statehood" had arisen and consolidated itself. States had formed "their characteristic economic, social and political" structures on all continents during the precapitalist epoch. By equating the nation state with the bourgeois state one loses all sense of historical perspective, because this equation abolishes one of the most important aspects of the historical context in which capital came into being: the precapitalist existence of nation states.

Conclusion

In this critique of von Braunmühl's attempt to analyse the bourgeois state in the world market context, we have emphasized the validity of her insistence on the world market as the appropriate level for analysing the historical manifestations of the capitalist mode of production, including the appartus, form and functions of the bourgeois nation state. We have also shown how von Braunmühl's disregard for the basic structural characteristic of the world market, its division into an accumulating metropolitan core and a non-accumulating, exploited periphery, led to an impoverished and Eurocentric perspective that failed to build on the research already generated by the capital-as-a-world-system approach. We showed that this disregard for the core-periphery structure of the world market led von Braunmühl to adopt a highly uncritical attitude towards the usage of such terms as "national economy", "national capital", and "nation-state", even though, as von Branmühl's own opening remarks reveal, it is precisely these terms that are called into question and rendered problematic, if not unusable, by the historical analysis of the worldwide dimensions of capital accumulation. Thus, while we thoroughly endorse von Braunmühl's objective "to achieve . . . conceptual clarification . . . through historical analysis informed and accompanied by systematic reflection" (167), we cannot accept the conceptual apparatus that she herself has developed.

The bourgeois state associated with the development of "national capital" is not the mainstream consequence of the forces of the world market and of accumulation of a world scale, but an expression of the fundamental inequality of the international division of labour brought

fundamental inequality of the international division of labour brought into being and perpetuated (though in changing forms) by the capitalist mode of production. Von Braunmühl in her historical outline of the rise of capitalism does not ignore this *"new and international division of labour, a division suited to the requirements of the chief centres of modern industry . . .* (Capital vol. I)" (p. 170, emphasis hers), nor does she ignore the process of colonization as the historical precondition for the emergence of world trade, which in turn "is the condition of large-scale industrial enterprise (*Poverty of Philosophy*)" (p. 168). But her theoretical framework restricts both of these manifestations of world market forces to the category of "requirements of the chief centres of modern industry" and ignores their equally decisive effects for that part of the globe which was assigned the task of supplying these centres.

In order to develop an adequate methodological and theoretical approach for understanding the role of the nation state in the world capitalist system, we require a critique of these hitherto taken-for-granted categories, a critique far more radical than the one that von Braunmühl offers us, and a far more thorough rethinking of the versions of the past offered us by historians who have operated with these categories. We ourselves are not presenting a conceptual apparatus adequate to this take of rethinking the history of the state under capitalism.[5] We merely offer the following dictum to those undertaking that task: *No "national" capital has ever been national nor has capitalism ever been a national economy.*

FOOTNOTES

1. T. B. Bottomore (ed.), *Karl Marx: Early Writings,* Mc-Graw-Hill, New York, 1964: p. 144 (emphasis Marx's).

2. All unreferenced page numbers refer to Claudia von Braunmühl's essay: "On the Analysis of the Bourgeois Nation State within the World Market Context", pp. 160-177, in *State and Capital: A Marxist Debate.*

3. Karl Marx, *Capital* Vol. I, New York: International Publishers, 1972, p. 560.

4. Karl Marx, *Grundrisse,* Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1973, p. 410.

5. Our own recent work and thinking on the world market economy is contained in the following two essays, available in mimeo from Max Planck Institute, Starnberg Germany:

— J. Hengstenberg, M. Fay, B. Stuckey, F. Fröbel, S. Sardei-Biermann, "Ungleicher Tausch: Konstruktionsversuch einer Theorie",

—B. Stuckey and M. Fay: "Rural Subsistence, Migration, and Urbanization: The Production, Destruction, and Reproduction of Cheap Labour in the World Market Economy". (The latter is also available in German).

Starnberg, West Germany

Review: Ellen Kay Trimberger, *Revolution from Above: Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt and Peru.* New Brunswick: N.J.: Transaction Books, 1978. 196 Pp.

Sheryl Lutjens

The relatively recent demise of social science notions of an evolutionary and democratic path to industrialization in Third World states has unleashed an unwieldy array of issues, questions, and unresolved theoretical problems. Despite almost unanimous concern for the role of the international capitalist system in conditioning and limiting economic options in the periphery, there are a variety of often contending approaches to the nature of linkages between the national and international structures, to the scope and character of feasible policy choices, and to the prospects for autonomous and/or capitalist development. Analyses of the political processes which maintain, permit or challenge the internal conditions of late-developing states are just as contentious. Such analyses have responded to the spread of authoritarian military regimes in disparate societies with new theories for the non-democratic political systems which accompany increasingly state-directed efforts at development. Despite the abundance of "political-economic" studies of development, there is no consensus on how to explain both the politics and economics of the peripheral state. *Revolution from Above* is a book which pulls the reader into some of the on-going debates.

Trimberger seeks to overcome the many times artificial separation of international and national factors within a political economy approach because such a separation provides a weak basis for both intellectual and practical political assessment of the possibility for major social change. In presenting an "alternative methodological and substantive approach through the study of 'unusual' attempts at revolution in the non-Western world," she combines Weberian and Marxist theory in an alternative perspective on the political patterns usually subsumed under the heading of military rule. While the historical and theoretical dimensions of her model engage current scholarship in a number of areas, especially that of theories of the military in politics, this review will focus on the model itself and how it seeks to explain attempts by military bureaucrats to use the state apparatus to "foster capitalist industrialization independent of foreign control" (p. 9).

Trimberger's alternative model of revolution is the result of wide-ranging historical investigation emanating initially from dissatisfaction with standard sociological theories of revolution. Not content with the results of previous debates on how best to characterize transformations such as occurred in Japan after 1868 and in Turkey beginning in 1919, she has moved beyond exclusive categories of bourgeois or mass revolution to include the possibility of revolution initiated by military bureaucrats. While rejecting Barrington Moore's approach as overemphasizing internal class configurations, Trimberger includes consideration of the international capitalist system, but consciously seeks to avoid the opposite pitfall which she identifies as characteristic of dependency theory—the overemphasis on external relations. Her efforts are aimed at identifying revolutionary political change by explaining the relationship between the nation-state and the structural constraints of a complex international system, a relationship that cannot be explained by simple economistic reduction. What emerges in her case studies of Japan and Turkey, and her brief comparisons of Egypt and Peru, is a method for explaining domestic conditions which, located in an international capitalist context, may give rise to attempts at autonomous development. Assuming that a "liberal political system in a late-developing state is antithetical to sustained economic development" (p. 117), the model is intended to provide some "preliminary answers" to crucial questions concerning the nature of state and military activity in late developing countries and the possibility that state action based on military rule can be progressive.

A revolution from above is a military takeover which is distinguished from a coup because it involves a process by which the "economic and political power of the dominant social group of the old regime" are destroyed (p. 2), rather than being simply a reshuffling of top personnel. It is also distinct from the more usual conception of revolution in that it is not predicated upon a mass movement or mass upheaval, but instead on the "revolutionary potential" of state bureaucrats themselves. This revolutionary capacity is dependent upon specific conditions, however, and Trimberger isolates them according to a process definition of revolution—a definition which allows identification according to actors and processes, rather than "causes and long-range consequences," so that different types of revolution can be more precisely explained.

Five characteristics are used to identify a revolution from above and are tested carefully in the case studies of Turkey and Japan. The model is refined in the Egyptian and Peruvian cases (indicating historical change in the international and societal structures which accompanied the development of world capitalism in the twentieth century). The specifics of the process of revolution from above are outlined as: 1) The extralegal takeover of state power by military (and sometimes civilian) bureaucrats who initiate political, economic, and social change; 2) Little or no mass participation in the actual takeover or in the processes of change and, although mass uprisings may precede and/or accompany revolutions from above, the military is independent of (and often in opposition to) such movements; 3) Little violence or repression; 4) No

ideological justification is required for the changes which are initiated—they appear, and indeed are, pragmatic; 5) The existing political and economic bases of power of an aristocracy or upper-class are destroyed (p. 3). These conditions are sufficient in identifying a revolution from above; the case studies document historical processes which followed this pattern.

What appears is a picture of state power seizure by military bureaucrats who initiate a concerted drive toward industrialization; a picture which arouses a second-image of the "Bonapartist state" where power is seemingly wielded by agents who are above or outside class conflict. The Bonapartist appearance of a revolution from above is, however, mistaken. Trimberger's analysis differentiates clearly between Bonapartism (occurring in a predominantly capitalist country) and her own model as serving to explain changes in agricultural and/or dependent capitalist countries. As such, the strength of the landed class is an extremely important determinant.

The five characteristics which pinpoint a process of revolution from above to push to the fore Trimberger's key analytical tools: the dual concepts of "relatively autonomous" and "dynamically autonomous" bureaucrats. Relative bureaucratic autonomy is based on an independence from the classes which control the means of production, in that top bureaucrats are neither recruited from these classes nor form alliances with them once in high office. Relatively autonomous bureaucrats must be "free of connections and control by both internal and international class interests" (p. 4) and are most likely to emerge when there is no consolidated landed class of "when a landed oligarchy is in economic and political decline" (p. 5).

When crisis destabilizes conditions in a national society the relative autonomy of military officers as bureaucrats can become dynamic. Thus they can attempt to consolidate and strengthen the state against foreign forces and destroy existing social and economic power bases. Lacking control over the means of production, bureaucrats have recourse only to state coercive, monetary, and ideological resources in their attempts to restructure society politically and economically (p. 4). Revolutionary bureaucrats are generated under specific conditions where there is 1) an independent officer class 2) which becomes politicized and cohesive 3) through a concurrent nationalist response 4) to foreign activity which impinges on the sovereignty of the state. A fifth condition, an alternative regional base of power, was also necessary in the less-centralized states of the Ottoman Empire and the Tokugawa Shogunate. Essential to the strength of Trimberger's model is the ability to conceptualize and historically identify those situations where such a group gains control of the state and is seemingly above the nationalist class struggles which might have precipitated its assumption of power.

The book is organized in a text-like fashion with chapters which consider the central role of these autonomous bureaucrats in the genesis (ch. 3), process (ch. 3) and results (ch. 4) of revolution from above in Japan and Turkey. The core chapters spell out a theory of bureaucracy which buttresses her conception of military and civilian officials located in the particular historical periods of the Meiji Restoration and Ataturk's rule. The brief comparison with the more recent Nasser and Velasco regimes in Egypt and Peru (ch. 5) allows Trimberger to contrast the two sets of cases in terms of a changing international environment and constraints, different relationships between civil and military bureaucrats, and differences in the nature of the landed classes. This next-to-last chapter permits Trimberger to offer a concluding section on the future possibilities and outcomes of such revolutionary action in Third World states, given what she perceives as the proliferation of certain preconditions: continued weakening of landed classes and unsuccessful attempts at industrialization; a military which is increasingly bureaucratic, autonomous and nationalist; and possibilities for weakness in the international system (p. 173).

Although Trimberger's introductory remarks point to the ability of revolutionary bureaucrats to destroy existing power bases as a "fundamental precondition for the innovative and positive change associated with revolution" (p. 2), a different view of the actual changes arises from her case studies. She writes: "Analysis of revolution from above in these four cases leads to the conclusion that the use of the state bureaucracy to foster capitalist development through the sponsorship of either an independent or state capitalist class will be ineffective" (p. 174). Not only were such attempts judged ineffective, but the single option which revolutionary bureaucrats retain, as they attempt to maintain or foster capitalist relations of production, is to "constitute themselves as a new ruling class, which . . . means a capitalist class" (p. 174). This diagnosis is made on the basis of the exclusion of the masses from the revolutionary process and of the necessity for regime consolidation through compromises with classes which are anticapitalist or have more interest in maintaining "cooperation with international capitalism than from trying to promote autonomous development" (p. 174). Political compromise negated the "technical" needs of modernization—economic development and efficient government; exclusion of the masses precluded more "humane" development—one based on values of equality, democracy, and social welfare (pp. 7–8). This assessment is crucial for understanding and evaluating the model of revolution from above as it isolates the limitations which foreclose state-directed restructuring of society.

Bureaucratic autonomy. In all four cases it is "not the aristocratic or elitist nature of state functionaries that is a preconditon [for revolution

from above] . . . but their degree of bureaucratization" (p. 151). Expanding from Weber's theory of bureaucracy, Trimberger locates the seeds of bureaucratic autonomy in the structures of the patrimonial state. The initial separation of political and economic power which removed state officials from direct class ties meant that partially-specialized bureaucracies were filled with military officials whose "status and power depend(ed) solely on the state" (p. 42). Lasting until the 19th century in Turkey and Japan, the separation of bureaucrats from landholding as a source of income and power was accentuated in Japan by centralization of daimyo in the Tokyo court and in Turkey by Moslem religious traditions which prevented personal accumulation of wealth from extending beyond tenure in office.

Change in the patrimonial bureaucracy reinforced the possibility of dynamic bureaucratic autonomy. Trimberger sees two fundamental sources of the politicization necessary for bureaucratic seizure of the state. Radicalization accompanied initial reforms undertaken as a response to internal threats to state authority—"military and political rebellion of janissary and ayan armies in Turkey and the economic threat of wealthy merchants and peasant landlords in Japan" (p. 65). Bureaucratic reforms by mid-19th century included separation of military and civil administration, modern personnel recruitment criteria (merit and specialization), and remuneration in salary. "Class autonomy of the state apparatus" was furthered by the new reliance on technical knowledge which differentiated new bureaucrats from older patronage cliques. A second impetus for bureaucratic rationalization is identified in the Western imperialist expansion which sought new markets in both Turkey and Japan. In each case the perception of Western encroachment stimulated periods which Trimberger labels "defensive Westernization" in which integration of Western technology and science into training and recruitment standards for bureaucrats reinforced the non-traditional orientation among parts of the bureaucracy and helped disseminate a progressive nationalist ideology.

Western intervention in the affairs of the national state also precipitated the events which led directly to the Meiji Restoration and the Ataturk regime. Rebellions in two of Japan's western provinces were quelled in 1863 with Western forces; bureaucrats in Chosu and Satsuma provinces were attacked by the embarrassed Emperor leadng to their rejection of Shogunate authority. In Turkey, the movement begun by Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) was spawned by Turkey's surrender to the allies in 1919.

Where other nationalist movements had failed, revolutionary bureaucrats succeeded because of their cohesion, rejection of and distance from traditional power, and importantly, because of the contradictions in the internalized situation which meant, simply, that the Western

nations did not mobilize against their takeover (p. 43). The interplay of domestic class forces represented in the patrimonial bureaucracy and the process of "defensive Westernization" engendered by foreign pressure locate the characteristics of bureaucrats as revolutionary actors. The revolutionary process is summarized as the necessity of regime consolidation and pragmatic elimination of opposition in anticipation of state-directed industrialization. Somewhat successful political consolidation accomplished a destruction of the traditional polity through preemption of traditional symbols and structures, neutralization of aristocracy and masses, and manipulation of moderate supporters to exclude conservative opposition. Personal and organizational skills facilitated control of the civil service and army and the formation of an authoritarian regime under the *Genro* in Japan and Ataturk's Republican People's Party in Turkey. Yet, the political settlements ultimately made diminished bureaucratic autonomy as the need for regime stability intersected with broad economic goals. "Rule by autonomous bureaucrats who actively promoted industrialization was inherently unstable. . . . (T)hose bureaucrats who initiated revolution from above needed a solid social base" (p. 108). Compromise for stability demanded at least the tacit cooperation of the most influential local interests to institutionalize the power of the new regime.

Economic Failure. Economic reforms were aimed at bolstering the strength of the state (and bureaucratic self-interest) through industrial transformation, premised on destruction of existing social and economic power bases. The reforms in Turkey failed to remove the economic power of the landed class, while in Japan reforms led to "increased class stratification in the countryside." It was compromise with these anti-capitalist landed and commercial classes which undermined both economic development and political stability (p. 105). Both groups of bureaucrats advocated private capitalist industrialization, but took the lead in investment due to lack of private capital or its unwillingness to invest. Turkish "etatism" and Japanese "zaibatsu capitalism" also failed to transform agriculture, contributing to the contradiction between the need for "internal accumulation of capital and for internal markets for capitalist products" (p. 119).

International pressures also conditioned what Trimberger identifies as economic failure. Turkey had been a penetrated economy for a century prior to the revolutionary expropriation of foreign holdings. State efforts to restrain consumption and tax urban industrial/commercial enterprises produced some early success, but sustained economic growth was precluded by the opposition of rentier landlords to industrialization. Conflict within the single party structure allowed the alliance of commercial and landed interest which gained control of the state and repaid U.S. support by terminating the restriction over

foreign capital. Further economic development was halted by this alliance as the agricultural surplus was not channeled into industrialization: "Turkey in the 1960s remained an underdeveloped country . . ." (p. 123).

Trimberger's assessment of Japan's economic failure directly challenges both the scholarship which recognizes the Japanese pattern as atypical but successful, and the apparent strength of the Japanese economy in the current international system. Although never colonized nor directly penetrated, five of Trimberger's criteria for dependent capitalist development are applicable to Japan: industrialization for an external market; technological dependence; industrialization in a narrow sector; superexploitation of workers and peasants; industrialization geared to military activity and expansion (pp. 124–126). The effects of subordination due to capital dependency are substituted by Japan's increasing raw material dependency, "hence Japan's industry was probably as dependent on foreign control as that of Third World countries today" (p. 126). Trimberger maintains that success was apparent in an early period, but that the internal structures which prevented peasants from becoming industrial producers or consumers forced Japan into the search for external markets. Such expansionism is perceived as engendering conflict with, and demonstrating dependency on, the advanced capitalist nations. The real advances in Japanese industry are related to periods of international crisis (World War I and the Depression) which allowed Japan to "break out of its subordination to the advanced nations" (p. 124). Despite Japan's rise since WWII to a position as "second largest capitalist economy in the world," Trimberger holds that it is still dominated by Western—U.S.—interests, and characterized by dependent and distorted development.

The combination of domestic and international factors are again displayed in the changed environment confronting the Peruvian and Egyptian military regimes. A more "highly structured international arena" had disadvantaged them by "years of direct economic penetration and more indirect political and military dominance by Western powers" (p. 153). Large landowners had become capitalist exporters and were allied with a small group of commercial and industrial capitalists who had links to foreign capital. The state played an even more significant role than in Japan and Turkey; initial attempts at stimulating private capital investments led to nationalization and expropriation. Peru and Egypt never broke their reliance on foreign capital, attempted to develop internal markets, or modernized agriculture. Nasser and Velasco "used land reform to increase the economic and social power of small independent farmers . . . who produced for the market" (p. 166), but this arrangement blocked further radicalization, resulting in a mere "renegotiation" of the terms of each country's dependency.

Preliminary Answers. Trimberger's work demonstrates that an explanation of political and economic impedimentts to autonomous industrialization demands simulataneous attention to domestic and external forces. Provocative and challenging, her model integrates these factors by placing the state personnel in a pivotal conceptual position. Yet the broad historical sweep of her comparisons, as well as the definition of the model itself, unveil some problematic dimensions which are either untouched or obscured in her approach.

Comparative history has the advantage of providing a wealth of supportive information which may document similarities while downplaying real differences. Because *Revolution from Above* invites the reader to join in evaluation and judgment of the results of such military takeovers, as well as to speculate about the applicability of the model, the conditions for the interaction of international and domestic structures as a context of radical change must be carefully and clearly spelled out. It is important to focus on two aspects of Trimberger's comparative study of attempts at restructuring and redirecting the major relationships in society: the international capitalist system and her concept of autonomy.

The existence of and pressures emanating from the international capitalist system are integral to the analysis in *Revolution from Above,* yet its history and development are treated as a residual backdrop to the actual revolutionary periods studied. The mechanisms and characteristics of accumulation processes in the center and periphery of the system underpin both international and domestic social structures, yet there is no analysis of the major historical shifts occurring in these underlying processes. The specific means of imperialist penetration and/or structurally-imperative dependence must be explained in terms of capitalist relations. This is made mandatory by Trimberger's identification of all four cases as failures in transforming the relations of wage labor, private profit, and the market on the one hand, and at proceeding with autonomous industrialization on the other. Had Trimberger clarified the process of change in international structures, the direct penetration of Turkey, market dependency for Japan, and multinational corporate activity in the current Third World states would have demonstrated distinct phases.

Questions arise from Trimberger's presentation: What are the differences in international linkages which sustain capitalist relations? What are the "proverbial political and economic strings" of foreign investment? How has the international arena become more "structured"? The answers to these questions are found in an understanding of the development of capitalism and its international system, such that the meaning of dependency and distorted development can be clarified more fully.

The characterization of Japan's dependency points to this gap in her work. Taking what can be considered a controversial position that Japan demonstrates dependency in the conflict over external markets, Trimberger needs to more carefully differentiate Japan's development from the origins of Western capitalism. The relations of capitalist trade development with—not to mention plunder of—peripheral areas in the earliest instances must be carefully explained in order to substantiate the argument that conflict over markets in the Japanese case differs fundamentally from the European experience. In other words, with no criteria for identifying a process of autonomous capitalist industrialization, it becomes difficult to accept Japan's potential industrial success as hindered by anything other than a late entry into the international competition over markets. Moreover, any future efforts to implement "new strategies for industrialization, adapted not only to idiosyncracies in national social structure, but more importantly to changes in the international balance of power" (p. 9), can only be explained and examined in light of the opportunities and constraints which each historical change in the international system brings.

The autonomy of certain elements of the state personnel is properly located in the nexus between domestic class structures and its international linkages. It is within the context of historical structural relationships that the concept of bureaucratic autonomy and the issue of state power need to be tested and not simply assumed. While attempting to use a class analysis to ground her argument, Trimberger employs a concept of *sui generis* autonomy which focuses almost entirely on the relatonship of actors within the state personnel to the dominant classes. This same formulation slides easily into "an autonomous state apparatus" and an "autonomous political system." Somewhere in between the brief critique of Marxist (Poulantzas) and structural-functionalist (Huntington) theories of state autonomy, and the initial discussion of autonomous bureaucrats, an explanation of the state and its institutions is missing. State coercive, monetary, and ideological resources are presented as being controlled by bureaucrats who can use them, and the "governing apparatus" is viewed as a source of power independent of economic power. The state is thus conceptually reduced to a series of potentially neutral institutions.

Despite its posited autonomy Trimberger finds that the state still cannot be stabilized within society without a secure social base. This weak conception of inherent instability further undermines Trimberger's account of state autonomy in two ways. First, revolutions from above may fail precisely because the state cannot or does not have the autonomy which it is granted by Trimberger's model, despite the fact that changes in personnel may produce "dynamically autonomous" bureaucrats. The ability to use state power to govern requires political

compromise and demonstrates the inability of the state to remain free of class ties and support. Class-based rule always demonstrates historical relations of domination, and the state in turn is grounded within those relations as a primary structural force for ensuring their and its own survival. Second, revolutions from above may alternatively be construed as periods of transition in which partial social restructuring is engineered. In a situation of imminent political compromise, a social base can be secured from *either* the masses *or* the dominant class. Trimberger's revolutionary bureaucrats in each case chose the latter alliance, thereby consolidating a new status quo and ensuring that their own bureaucratic "power and status was no longer in danger" (p. 10). Such self-interest is said to originate in the very identification and politicization of bureaucratic concerns which sparks the nationalist response, an interpretation which leads to Trimberger's necessary inclusion of the upper bureaucrats as part of the newly-formed capitalist class. In neither case can attention to state autonomy be dismissed without inspection of the relations of domination which the state expresses.

Autonomy of the state is not an impossibility, even when it is considered as a structural social relationship of domination. Yet, the difficulties in Trimberger's attempt to identify and explain autonomy are heightened by the combination of a static analysis of class structure with her analytical separation of the state from the relations of domination in society. In attempting to isolate a new type of revolutionary process with reference to distinguishable actors, Trimberger seriously weakens her presentation of the causes and consequences of revolution from above, and the significance of class analysis for locating destabilizing conflict in society. In fact, the revolutionary process can be understood and identified only by explaining the genesis and subsequent activity of revolutionary bureaucrats within a class society where conflict ensues not only between the state and the dominant classes, but among all classes. Trimberger overlooks conflicting class relationships as they actually locate the state within an historical context and as they provide the basis for conceptualizing a "relative" state autonomy. The conceptualization of relative autonomy would have provided a better representation of those contending forces within the institutional structures of the state which allow partial, or potential, restructuring of society and thus alter the relations of domination.

The model of revolution from above requires identification of impediments to industrial development which nations must confront in seeking to overcome subservient and distorted development. The fundamental issues raised by Trimberger have a politically strategic importance: Development through any form of progressive regime which challenges the obstacles to "humane" economic reform will

succeed only through the mobilization and support of the "masses." Though the world economy is inescapable, Trimberger does suspect that even exclusionary authoritarian regimes (revolutions from above) might move, through forced cooperation with a strong independent leftist movement (p. 175), toward progressive social reform. Such inclusion of the masses, however, excludes the regime from the scope of the model, and prompts a summary comment on Trimberger's perspective.

As scholarship, Trimberger's work does not promise to present definitive answers, but to provide the groundwork for fresh analysis. In as much as revolutions from above are inherently limited by exclusion of the masses, the model should lead to a rethinking of other regime types (military or not) as to the availability of nationalist options and the necessary requirements of mass participation. Such analysis can only proceed with a scholarly reinspection of the concepts which are used, as the question of participation will become crucial in actual state-led reforms as well as for our understanding of that possibililty. Debates concerning the economic linkages between national and international structures will continue to provide the context for partial understanding of the options reformers might have. But the debates must continue to extend the examination of the nature of struggle within society over access to, and control of, a state which can neither be autonomous from all classes, nor demonstrate anything less than the relationships between them.

Research Notes

"Women's Work and the Capitalist State"*

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During the Fall of 1979, we, a group of seven women working at the University of California at Santa Cruz, established a work group within which to share our ongoing research into the relationships of women to capitalism, the Western welfare states, and social change. We have established the foundation for continuing research on the subject of "Women's Work and the Capitalist State." In addition, we have begun to define some of the relevant issues involved, as well as to develop both theoretical and methodological frameworks to orient future reading and research in this field. Furthermore, we have drafted a proposal for expanding and instituting our endeavors here at Santa Cruz.

Our understanding of the problem is centered around the interrelationships between three substantive areas: (1) women's work, (2) the capitalist state, and (3) resistance. Each of these subjects will be discussed in greater detail.

Women's Work

In our conceptualization, "women's work" refers to all contributions, both paid and unpaid, that women make to the processes of the production and reproduction of capitalist society. The underlying theme of our analysis is that in capitalism, all lower and middle class women are working women. Further, and less immediately evident, all forms of women's work, both within and outside of the home, are interdependent and part and parcel of the same system. Without

*We seek exchange with people working on these and related issues from similar and different perspectives. Please write to us, "Women's Work and the Capitalist State," c/o Sociology Board of Studies, Merrill College, University of California, Santa Cruz, California 95064.

the particular work that women do, capitalism could not survive in its present forms.

Both the so-called "public" and "private" spheres of women's work, which appear to be separate entities, are essential for the maintenance of capitalism. We seek to analyze "women's work" in this light, focussing on the ways in which the welfare state blurs the boundaries between public and private life, and the ways in which women's "family" work is simultaneously for their families and for the completion or processing of incomplete and insufficient state services. The powerful impact of the economy and the state on family life renders "the family as haven" a rare experience for women.

By stressing women's work, we are committed to demystifying the crucially interdependent connections between the supposedly "productive," "unproductive," and "reproductive" spheres of capitalism. We wish to reveal the relationships between the state and two other predominant institutions: the family, usually considered a reproductive unit, and the labor force, usually seen as the center of production. The structural dynamics and the internal characteristics of these two arenas, and their relationship to each other vis-à-vis the state, are the subjects of this component of the project.

An important aspect of women's work also includes the production and reproduction of interpersonal social relationships. We shall compare the "capital logic" theories that view women's work as primarily a reflection of economic realities with "need-oriented logic" theories that stress women's responsibility for the social, relational work of defining and meeting family members' needs.

This comparison gives rise to yet another aspect of women's work: work for change. The reproduction and production work that women engage in is not always strategic to capitalism. Women, through their work, also develop strategies for survival, resistance and innovation. It is because of this that we describe the various activities which women perform as "work.' We therefore reject passive descriptions of women's activities as implied by terms such as "role," "position," "status," or "condition." Women act both to shape and resist capitalism through their daily activities within the home and in the paid labor force. Thus, women are not merely "situated." Rather, women create their situation through their actions and reactions.

The Capitalist State

One way in which women confront the contradictions of capitalism is through their relationship to the institutions of the welfare state. Our concern in this component of the project is to analyze the development and current crisis of the welfare state in American and Western European societies. It is our contention that much is to be gained in our understanding of capitalism and the functioning of the state if traditionally neglected issues about women's work and the family are incorporated into the analysis. We will therefore work to expand upon the current lines of research on the role of the state to include the following issues.

Family work and its relation to the state brings women into direct confrontation with both the contradictions within the state and with the contradictory demands of their work in several spheres of activity (state, family, paid employment). Institutions of the welfare state are arenas in which women, in

particular, are located, both historically and conceptually. Women form a link between family units and the welfare state in two ways: in the family work they do to process and complete insufficient state services, and in their work as state employees, that is, in service work which has grown as the state has assumed certain "nurturing" or "servicing" functions which have traditionally been female.

The welfare state is also an arena in which women develop strategies of resistance. It is here that they come face to face with the state's contradictions, and with contradictory demands from the spheres of their activities. This formulation may be the basis for an extension of theories of community organizing, with women and their experiences with the welfare state as the central theme. Though unions have traditionally posed the biggest direct challenge to capitalism, they have never developed a direct attack on the welfare state. The direct confrontation that men have with the welfare state usually comes when they are unemployed, and is therefore short-lived, whereas one finds women in many social movements and forms of struggle in the state arena.

We will also address the reliance of the welfare state on the family units which it molds, supports and regulates ideologically and materially as the most "functional" arrangement within the predominant conditions of production, reproduction and consensus management. Other issues which we intent to focus on include the conditions under which family policies developed by the state are generated, the pressures which come to bear on the state in the struggles over these policies, the ways in which the state fuses capital and the household, and the ways in which women adapt to resist and change these conditions.

We also consider it necessary to integrate more closely into state theory subareas which have been analyzed as part of the structure and action of the state system: legal provisions (such as property laws, inheritance laws, divorce, etc.) which affect the family as an institution; the tax system; the social security and welfare systems and their administrative practices; employment and training practices; and the voluntary sector wherein charities often provide unpaid work for women and fill gaps for which the state fails to provide.

As the state's presence and the development of social services have expanded, the concerns of some feminists and state theorists have been converging. The development of social services has meant, on the one hand, a commodification of the services provided by the family, and on the other, the incorporation of women into the labor market. The state increasingly influences women's lives, not only in the work force, but also through implicit or explicit family policies which regulate the movement between the spheres of paid and unpaid production. Consequently, it is both the neglect of women's unique position and experience, and our critique of previous work in the field, which informs our analysis of women and the state.

Resistance

A theory of resistance is central to our analysis of women's work and the welfare state. While an analysis of a social system seeks to understand the component parts of that system and what makes them work, it should also seek to understand how the system fails to work, either through internal contra-

dictions or through human intervention. Systems themselves are shaped by resistance to them, and a true understanding of social systems therefore requires an analysis of resistance.

We propose to look at women's resistance in the different spheres of their activities—the family, the welfare state, capitalism—in order to understand the critical importance of their compliance/resistance for the stability/instability of those systems. Each of those systems is a product and reflection of women's resistance as well as class struggle. And in their efforts to evade and coopt, each system is changed by its resistance to resistance. This is the structural level at which resistance is important.

Resistance is also essential to an understanding of how people lead their daily lives within the structures that threaten to dominate them. We know that in all kinds of ways people have exhibited what we call "fightback" under the harshest circumstances in order to make a livable world for themselves and their children. We intend to investigate further this refusal to accept completely the terms of oppressive structures, conditions and relationships. This active, defiant response has been expressed throughout the history of class and patriarchal societies; and today we see increasing evidence of resistance as the quantity of contradictory demands in our lives multiplies.

We want to understand the sources of this resistance, of the energy and determination for what Eugene Genovese calls "creative survival," and even for wrestling from society's oppressors some contribution to this creative survival.

A theory of resistance relevant to women as revolutionary subjects must also explain the *conditions* under which resistance occurs, and the specific *activities of women* within the social formation which makes their resistance as women critical both to the larger systems and to people's survival on a daily basis. For the larger systems—capitalism, the welfare state, male dominance—women's resistance is potentially either threatening or cooptable, e.g., feminism reduced to liberal feminist demands for participation in the labor force at a time when this coincided with capitalism's need for more cheap labor. Survival on a daily basis is sometimes served by women's resistance, and sometimes by women's compliance. The actual outcomes of women's resistance can only be known by looking at history.

By looking at concrete examples of what people have done and are actually doing, we recognize the importance of human intervention in both creating or shaping systems and in transforming them. A theory of resistance posits people as subjects actively creating their own lives and the social structures which organize their lives, and it does so not merely as an act of faith but on the basis of empirical, historical investigation.

Sources and Origins of Resistance

We have identified two general sources for the occurrence of resistance. First, we argue that family members act out of a relatively autonomous logic of human needs which can provide the basis for resistance to capitalism, the welfare state, or male dominance. A second source of resistance, not mutually exclusive with the first, lies in the contradictory demands on women created both at the intersections of these systems and within the systems themselves.

While our analysis of women's work reveals the family as structurally integral to capitalism and the welfare state, we must look beyond the ways in which they impinge upon the family. Although families do adjust to economic changes, and although state policies do affect families, family members also move according to an autonomous logic, a logic of human needs which is socially defined (and not only by capitalism or the state), and includes such things as quality-of-life demands and social-relations-of-work demands. Families, and people within families, do not change only because capitalism somehow "needs" them to change in some functionalist or automatic way. Another "system" or "logic" of human needs, compels people to act as they do. These actions may be consonant with the needs of capitalism or the welfare state. The point is that these needs are created out of a different logic and, though changing over time, they change according to different "laws" than those of the economic system. This logic of human needs mediates between what capitalism or the welfare state "need," and what people do.

This aspect of autonomous creation should be emphasized. *It is not voluntaristic*. People do operate within constraints, but their decisions are motivated by a set of needs and understandings which are relatively autonomous from the needs of capitalism. And we speak of autonomy not in an individualistic sense, but in a social sense. How, for example, do people know that there is something wrong with capitalism? It is not from their biological nature, but from some *socially created* and *socially transmitted* sense of what it is to be human. Capitalism violates some things which people need, or value, or believe in. This sense of violation has its source in a logic which is somehow autonomous from the needs and determinations of capital, or it could never be critical. Resistance is itself the evidence of this autonomous logic.

The preceding discussion of the logic of human needs indicates the second source of resistance: resistance which arises from contradictory demands which women experience in the spheres of capitalism, the welfare state and the family. Women's activities within these spheres bring them into confrontation with contradictory pressures forcing them to make choices. These choices can become *occasions* for women to resist some demands, if only because of the impossibility of fulfilling them all, as well as occasions for women to produce social change. Given this situation, *the way in which people construe their needs* conditions the resolution of contradictory demands. In short, resistance has as much to do with choice and human agency as it has to do with structural contradictions.

Why Women?

Women's work is essential to capitalism and to the welfare state, and women's resistance to that work has tremendously disruptive effects on these systems. Women's unique potential for resistance to the state, and to their work as it is defined in a male-dominated society, is the result of their almost perpetual confrontation with welfare state institutions. Women's labor is required to process and deliver services to their families, for example, taking children to school, helping dependents fill out forms, taking aged parents to the doctor. Resistance is also occasioned by the contradictions between women's domestic responsibilities for reproduction and consumption needs, and other demands

from capitalism and welfare state. Women feel these contraditions acutely because their very identity is wrapped up in their activities as providers of services for familiy members, that is, in their responsibility for being aware of family members' needs and for trying to organize resources to meet those needs.

In our research we are organizing historical examples of resistance along a continuum in order to begin to explain the conditions or circumstances under which people resist or are likely to resist domination. This schema would classify examples of individual and collective resistance in terms of efforts which are acts of: (1) survival—coping, making do, etc., (2) resistance—active defiance, "creative survival," (3) innovation—initiating reforms, or (4) revolution.

Program Proposal

That we are now considering the relationship between women's work and the capitalist state is not just a product of intellectual discourse within an academic context. Our raising of the issues is a reflection of the broader transformations now occurring in late capitalist societies and in the social movements of our times.

In order to continue to address these issues in an ongoing and institutionally supported manner, we have proposed the development of a program of studies and activities concerning "women's work and the capitalist state" as a component of the Sociology Graduate Program at the University of California at Santa Cruz. Our proposal consists of a year-long sequence of graduate courses in topics relating to women and survival, resistance and innovation; a conference with the theme "Women's Work and the State in Capitalism" to be held in the Fall of 1980; the development of a critical review of the literature in order to reinterpret and integrate existing knowledge and resources; a series of bi-monthly guest lectures and colloquia; and the development and teaching of undergraduate courses by people doing related research. We intend to develop a program which builds a structure of support and contributes to knowledge while simultaneously remaining responsive to the groups and movements out of which these concerns grow.

"U.S. National Urban Policy and a State Theory of Policy Formation"

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I am currently working on a Ph.D. thesis on the formation of U.S. national urban policy since around 1974, with special emphasis on the Carter Administration's formation of explicit and implicit national urban policies. The aim is to develop a theory of how policies are formed within and around the capitalist state. All too often, Marxist theories of the state have treated the capitalist state

as something of a black box, failing to account for the fragmentation and complex separations of powers in the U.S. federal system. One's view of the process of making state policy is too often deduced from theoretical views of the class nature of the state, without dealing with how policy is actually formed.

The Carter administration's efforts to form an urban policy offer an interesting case for working out such a theory of state policy formation. In substance, urban policy is subservient to the larger task of dealing with a general economic crisis, one which has brought about a regional and industrial restructuring of capital accumulation but a severe problem of promoting sufficient private investment. In visible form, urban policy statements are highly ideological attempts to hold urban political constituents at bay, while in the cities living conditions worsen. Overall, urban policy has not been very important to the Carter administration, but the experience, with its small successes and many failures, is typical of how policy is formed under the crisis circumstances of advanced capitalism.

Neither bourgeois theories of policy formation, nor recent theories of the state, equip us for understanding policy formation of this kind. We need to take into account structural factors such as the nature of this economic and social crisis, fiscal circumstances, the intergovernmental structure of the state and the persistence of prior urban policies. We also need to include the more immediate political factors such as the relative positions of classes and fractions in the social formation, federal agency constituencies, the exercise of interest group and party political power, the politics of the various branches of governments, and even, in some cases, personal idiosyncracies. But for a full understanding of policy making under present conditions, we need to go further to include struggles around designing the policy formation process itself, the ideolgical climate (professional, political, etc.) that determines what can be considered and what is out of the question, the barriers that block certain possibilities and not others, the transmission of class interests through the professional methods of state workers, and other less direct influences of policy formation and blocking.

Essentially, I would argue that the extraordinary structural constraints placed on urban policy possibilities determined that, however well thought out the explicit proposals were, they were bound to be extremely weak in terms of direct changes to be brought about, and thus became only ideological. By contrast, the *implicit* urban policies pursued by the Carter administration directly contradicted the stated urban policies. Thus, what at first appears a policy formation process becomes, in fact, the production of "non-policy," a form of ideology that obscures, or at best appears to ameliorate, concrete but implicit policies.

In specific terms, but as yet rather tentatively, I would argue as follows: The task facing capitalists in the U.S.A. was to successfully complete the (regionally selective) process of destruction of old capital promoted by the 1974–5 recession, and to encourage general economic recovery principally through incentives to private investment, then the weakest point in the business recovery. The implicit policy was therefore to encourage new capital investment wherever in the U.S.A. that might be, while the explicit policy was to seem to modify its effects by targeting minor incentives to private capital in "distressed" areas. Although ideas for policies representing the interests of different fractions of

capital were strongly contested, they all came up against severe political and economic constraints. In the first place, the capital mobility arising from the destruction of old capital and the growth of new industries had to be encouraged, albeit with ameliorative gestures. Part of the task before capitalists was to reclaim much of the surplus value earlier claimed by the public sector for redistributive programs, so a second compelling constraint on urban policy, legitimated by the rhetoric of fiscal crisis and the economics of cutting growth in the money supply, was that there could be little expenditure to solve the massive urban problems being documented by the policy planning group. Careful nurturing of capital mobility and avoidance of government spending led to a third constraint: to not regulate private investment, instead, to regulate the state itself. Coordination of the urban impact of federal government activities themselves, for many years on the agenda of federal urban planners wanting to expand their power, suddenly became a politically respectable urban policy instrument. Documentation of urban problems inadvertently worsened by the federal government fitted in neatly with the antistatist ideology which the administration, paradoxically, sought to politically harness. Selective regional targeting was proposed on a similar basis, that of saving money by concentrating limited programs and government activities on the most "distressed" areas.

The trouble with both the spatial coordination of federal activities and the targeting of programs is that they politicize the bureaucracy even further, at a time when the legitimacy of the federal government was sinking very low anyway. This situation constitutes a third overriding constraint on urban policy formation. Dealing with the detritus of past policy responses to urban crises (HUD's formation, legislation requiring urban policy reports, and so on), the policy planners had to run a race between the growing politicization of past modes of expressing urban policy (categorical programs of the "Great Society," block grants of the "New Federalism") and the need to invent new, apparently impartial, professional justifications for urban policies. Regional conflicts and conflicts among class fractions (working class politics being barely represented at all) stripped the professional mystique off federal policies so fast that even the new "targeting" idea was considerably debased by the time it was proposed to Congress. Even as the scope for concrete action was narrowed by economic, political and fiscal constraints and the exercise consequently became primarily ideological, so the veils of legitimacy were being stripped off by conflicts within the ruling classes. Indeed, it is fair to speak of a crisis of urban policy formation itself, one faced by the very administration that proclaimed itself the first producer of an explicit urban policy statement.

The current research encompasses different scales:

1. The history of national urban policy formation since the New Deal is traced within the context of the changing political economy of the U.S.: capital accumulation, productions relations, social struggles and the structure of the state apparatus. Urban policy at each stage will be related to inherited structures and responses to new crises. This work is necessarily only in outline.
2. The scope now narrows to an examination of national urban policy changes in relation to the economic crisis which sharpened in 1974, and to the internalization of contradictions within the state itself, so that the capacity to form effective

policy is to a large extent paralyzed. The Carter administration's explicit formation of an urban policy will be reviewed in this part.
3. The scope narrows further onto case studies of new program proposals. They are used to trace the origin, development and in some cases, demise, of urban policy proposals. The national development bank (now merely development finance assistance through an existing agency), urban development action grants, urban impact analysis, and state incentive grants may all be covered, though I shall probably focus on the first two.

By working at different scales like this, I hope to piece together a coherent picture of how national urban policy is really formed, and thereby to offer a test case of the extension of Marxist theories of the state into the realm of state policy formations.

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